Dynamics of policy change: three Italian cases by Mele, Valentina
The London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dynamics of policy change: Three Italian cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Valentina Mele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the Department of Management of the 
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy, London, April 2014 
 
1 
 
Declaration 
 
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD 
degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my 
own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others 
(in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other 
person is clearly identified in it). 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, 
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced 
without my prior written consent. 
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the 
rights of any third party. 
I declare that my thesis consists of 62,650 words.  
 
Statement of conjoint work  
I confirm that Chapter 3 was jointly co-authored with Professor Compagni and I 
contributed 60% of this work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
The common research interest of this thesis’s chapters is the dynamics of policy change 
in the context of the Italian governmental system. The collection of three published 
papers each included as a chapter in the core of the thesis is preceded by an introduction 
explaining the theoretical approach and research strategy.  The chapters are consistent in 
following a middle-range processual theory of the politics of public policy decisions in 
a country case, an event-centric approach to explaining policy choice and an elite-
interviewing approach to data collection. 
The first two chapters, respectively entitled “Government Innovation Policy in 
Italy (1993-2002): Understanding the Invention and Persistence of a Public 
Management Reform” and “Dynamics of Electronic Government Policies: The case of 
Italy (1992-2003)”, examine the dynamics of public management policy change in Italy 
over the period of a decade, employing the case of the Policy for Government 
Innovation and the case of the Electronic-Government Policy. The analysis of these two 
newly reported cases of enduring public management reform is suited to question the 
argument set by previous literature; that the country’s legalistic administrative culture 
inevitably suppresses meaningful reform. In particular, the chapters set forth two 
significant reservations about this argument, namely that the outcomes of public 
management reform initiatives are more varied than the current literature shows and the 
theoretical approach in the established literature attributes exagerate causal influence to 
the governmental system’s legalistic traditions. 
The third chapter, entitled “Explaining the Unexpected Success of the Smoking 
Ban in Italy: Political Strategy and Transition to Practice”, analyzes the episode that 
unfolds in a domain that addresses a general interest reform, very visible to public 
opinion, unlike public management reform. The chapter follows the issue beyond the 
pre-decisional stage, uncovering the dynamics of transition to practice: a phase between 
the formal passage and the full application of a law.  
A concluding section compares the three chapters, explores the interactions 
between analytically significant features of the Italian context and the policy cycle, and 
distils analytical refinements to the notion of policy entrepreneurship.    
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INTRODUCTION   
The research interest of this dissertation lies in the dynamics of policy change in the 
context of the Italian governmental system. The chapters I have selected adopt the same 
theoretical framework, institutional processualism, and are consistent in following a 
middle-range processual theory of the politics of public policy decisions in a country 
case, an event-centric approach to explaining policy choice and an elite-interviewing 
approach to data collection. The dissertation, in line with its chosen format, includes 
three self-contained chapters, in the sense that they can be read and understood 
independently. Each includes its own review of the relevant literature and a brief 
account of the research strategy.  Each analyses a different episode of policy change in 
the country setting of Italy.  
The first two chapters, respectively focused on the policy-making process of 
Innovation  in government (1993-2002) and of the policy for Electronic Government 
(1992-2003), examine the dynamics of these two instances of public management 
policy change in Italy over the period of a decade. The third chapter, focused on the 
policy process of the Smoking ban in Italy (2000-2005) analyzes an episode that unfolds 
in the healthcare domain and that addresses a general interest reform - very visible to 
public opinion.  
I have organized the thesis in three main parts. The three empirical chapters 
represent the core of the thesis. They are preceeded by an introduction, which sets the 
analytical premises of this work. It defines the unit of analysis - public policy and public 
change, it reviews theories of policy change and explains the theoretical tenets of the 
selected framework - institutional processualism (IP) - assessing its strengths and 
limitations. Next, it accounts for the methodological strategies employed to analyse the 
empirical cases. In particular, it explains the challenges faced when turning sheer 
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volumes of empirical data in a policy narrative and when constructing the corpus of data 
through documentary analysis and elite interviewing. It then sets the scene for the 
policy episodes by introducing the main elements of the Italian political and 
administrative system. Last, it previews the empirical cases and provides the rationale 
for their inclusion in the thesis.   
The empirical chapters are followed by a concluding section, which compares 
the dynamics of policy change across the cases. The conclusion starts by spelling out 
the main differences between healthcare and public management and then moves to the 
case comparison. Last, it explores the interactions between features of the Italian 
context and the policy cycle and it distils analytical refinements to the notion of policy 
entrepreneurship.    
 
Policy, Policy Change and Institutional Processualism 
Defining policy and policy change 
I am going to start with some definitional clearance. In the context of the notoriously 
pluralistic research on policy (for a review see Dye 1972; Feldman 1978; Hogwood and 
Gunn 1984; Pal 2010, Parsons 1995), I take as a starting point a well-known definition 
according to which “policy at its simplest can be conceived as a choice made by 
governments to undertake some course of action or inaction” (Howlett and Ramesh 
2003, 3). None of the substantive terms in this formulation, however, speaks for itself 
and therefore I offer some commentary to elucidate the meaning it holds. First, choice 
here is not conceptualized as a determinant moment so much as a process through 
which issues and problems come to be defined and constructed (Colebatch 2002). In 
other words, it is a way for actors, both participants and observers, to make sense of 
(Majone 1989; Fischer and Forester 1993) and contribute to the governing process. 
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Second, understanding policy also requires a focus on inaction (Heclo 1972) or, more 
precisely, on non-decisions (Hill 2005). In turn, the policy process can be analyzed from 
a variety of epistemological and disciplinary perspectives (for a review see Fischer 
2007; Peters and Pierre 2006), which can be broadly categorized in:  
- analysis in and for the policy process, i.e. employing analytical techniques, often 
grounded in microeconomics, and research to support problem definition, 
decision-making, evaluation and implementation; 
- analysis of the policy process, which turns its attention to “how problems are 
defined, agenda set, policy formulated, decisions made and policy evaluated and 
implemented” (Parsons, 1995 xvi).  
The research interest of this dissertation clearly falls within the second broad category. 
The need to chart the otherwise intractable complexity of the policy process has led 
scholars to narrow the scope of their analyses to specific components that, in turn, 
reflect different ontologies of policy-making. A (non-exhaustive) list of such 
components include power and its distribution among groups, as in the pluralist-elitist 
approaches; the network of relevant policy actors; the language employed in policy-
making, such as in the works drawing from the theories of Foucault and Habermas; and 
the phases of the policy process, as in the ‘stagist approach’.  
This latter approach to policy analysis, so widely adopted that it is referred to as 
‘the textbook approach’ (Nakamura, 1987), considers the policy process as evolving 
through discrete stages. Initially put forward by Lasswell (1956) the model is comprised 
of seven stages: intelligence, promotion, prescription, invocation, application, 
termination, and appraisal. Subsequently several scholars revised and developed the 
model (Brewer and DeLeon 1983; Wildavsky 1978), mostly adding or specifying sub-
stages. Over time these variations have coalesced in a conventional conception of the 
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policy process organized in the chronological stages of agenda-setting, policy 
formulation, decision-making, implementation, and evaluation, eventually leading to 
termination (Colebatch 2002; DeLeon and Martell 2006; Parsons 1995). Lastly, the 
input-output model has given a cyclical twist to the stages model; the outputs of policy 
processes perpetually feedback on inputs resulting in the so-called policy cycle (Jann 
and Wegrich, 2007). By simplifying the complex policy process, the stagist approach 
has had the uncontested merit to enable and stimulate research on the specific stages, 
especially agenda setting and implementation.  
At the same time, the stagist approach raises analytical problems that have not 
remained unnoticed. Specifically, critiques have developed along two main lines. One 
critique contends that the stagist approach cannot be considered a theory as it falls short 
of providing any causal explanation of how policy moves from one stage to another 
(Sabatier 1988, 2005). Second, with its artificial sequencing, it fails to provide a 
realistic account of how policy-making unfolds. Scholars seem to agree unanimously on 
this second reservation. However, the conclusions they draw differ markedly. Some 
conclude that the approach should in fact be disregarded as its deceptive focus on top-
down decisions and its narrow scope on one policy cycle at a time exacerbates the 
dichotomy between theory and practice (Nakamura 1987; Sabatier 1991, 2005). Others 
acknowledge that policy does not evolve in a clear-cut pattern and that sequences are 
enmeshed in an ongoing process (Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Jann and Wegrich 2007). 
Nevertheless, they resort to the stages as a heuristic device “persuasive because of its 
neatness” (Colebatch 2002, 85) that enables the construction of a model with which we 
can explore public policy1. In the words of Parsons, “to imagine that public policy can 
1 Only a few scholars maintain that the stagist approach is not (only) a heuristic device and defend its 
analytical bearing, claiming that a framework’s contribution to the understanding of the policy process 
does not stem only from its ability to highlight causality. They suggest that the framework should be 
evaluated against its ability to generate insight about the nature of policymaking and stimulate discourse 
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be reduced to such oversimplified stages has more methodological holes than a sack-
load of Swiss cheese. However it is not without its advantages and should not be 
abandoned lightly” (1995: 80). Since contemporary policy analysis is multi-framed, the 
stagist approach affords a structure within which we may adjust the multiplicity of 
perspectives “with the provision that, when we deploy it as a heuristic device, we 
remember that it has all the limitations of any map or metaphor” (Parsons 1995, 80).  
Each stage provides a context within which we can deploy different frames. In 
particular, the stage of agenda setting has become almost a metonymy for policy 
change. This characterization is likely the result of the fact that change in agenda setting 
is “permanent and structural, because no problem can remain on an agenda forever” 
(Rayner 2009, 87). More often than not, the pre-decisional and decisional stages are 
clustered together as they complement one another (Schlager 2005). Therefore, works 
on agenda setting – that is to say the move of an issue from its recognition to the formal 
political agenda (Jann and Wegrich 2007) – also include policy adoption.  
Starting in the mid-1980s, the discontinuities at the level of agenda setting 
started to attract scholarly attention (Dudley et Al. 2000). Three strands, namely the 
multiple streams theory (Kingdon 1984), the punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1988), 
have become so mainstream they are conventionally referred to as ‘theories of policy 
change’.  
The stated research interest of my thesis, ‘dynamics of policy change’ conforms 
to this convention and acknowledges that the distinction between ‘normal theories’ and 
‘theories of policy change’ is a fictitious one (Capano 2009). In order to understand the 
about public problems (DeLeon, 1999; DeLeon and Martell 2006) and in this respect the stagist approach 
has proven to be a valuable framework. In the same vein, others highlight that Laswell’s approach has 
been unduly reduced to the identification of the stages, while his conception of policy was much more 
sophisticated and involved the wider context of problems, social process, values and institutional 
structures within which policy-making and policy analysis unfolded (Parsons 1995).  
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nature of change, in fact, it is also necessary to understand and explain the persistence 
of the object of analysis. Therefore, any theory of change ought to attend to both 
constancy and change (Hernes 1976). 
 
Theories of policy change 
Expectations of typical patterns of policy change in the three approaches vary and I will 
proceed to outline them schematically (for a review of the three approaches see Parsons 
1995, 192-207; for their comparative analysis see John 2003; Nowlin 2011; and Real-
Dato 2009). Policy change in the multiple streams approach (Kingdon 1984) is 
associated with the coupling of three independent streams flowing in parallel – 
problems, policy and the political context. Change depends on the opening of an 
opportunity window for policy entrepreneurs to adopt solutions that have typically been 
developed in the community of policy experts (Barzelay and Gallego 2010; Howlett 
1998; Travis and Zahariadis 2002; Zahariadis 2005). In punctuated equilibrium theory 
(Baumgartner and Jones 1993), change results from the breakdown of institutionalized 
policy monopolies. Dominant participants safeguard policy monopolies by constructing 
positive policy images about one issue until change entrepreneurs or exogenous events 
subvert the issue image and the conflict expands beyond the boundaries of the policy 
subsystem (Baumgartner et Al. 2006; Baumgartner et Al. 2009; Givel 2006; John 2006; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2012; McBeth et Al. 2007; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2010; 
Walgrave and Varone 2008). Last, the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 1988) 
offers an account of policy change resulting from an alteration of policy beliefs shared 
within a constellation of actors that form a policy coalition. The alteration is normally 
triggered either by exogenous shocks that challenge the dominant core beliefs or by 
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policy learning within the coalition (Albright 2011; Matti et Al. 2011; Shanahan et Al. 
2011; Weible 2007; Weible et Al. 2009).  
These strands have mostly proceeded along tracks remarkably separated from 
one another (John 2003; Real-Dato 2009). However, their common focus is on how 
public policy develops over time in regards to the dynamics of policy change and policy 
continuity. In particular, these strands are committed to grasping the multidimensional 
character of public policy and “genuinely consider public policy as a complex 
phenomenon and not simply as an output of macro-factors” (Capano 2009, 8). In doing 
so they have become so mainstream (Capano 2009; Real-Dato 2009; Nowlin 2011) they 
have prompted some scholars to pose the provoking question: “is there life after policy 
streams, advocacy coalitions and punctuation?” (John 2003). The question seems to 
suggest that studies on policy change may have reached their climax with the three 
theories but, at the same time, it is also symptomatic of the discontent that has begun to 
emerge in the scholarship (John 2003; Howlett and Cashore 2009; Cashore and Howlett 
2007; Real-Dato 2009). In particular, it raises awareness of the limitations of current 
theories of policy change taken separately and to the letter, such as their weak 
explanatory power and the substantial lack of communication (John 2003; Real-Dato 
2009). 
Promising signs that scholars are engaging with these frameworks, as opposed to 
adopting them uncritically, have started to appear. In spite of the differences among 
research questions and empirical settings under investigation, a strand of research has 
offered an alternative viewpoint in response to these theoretical challenges, i.e. “a 
greater degree of conceptual reconciliation among approaches” (Roness 2009, 50) 
previously considered, if not incompatible, at least alternative. Some scholars have 
attempted to overcome the relative insulation in which the three theories have incubated 
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for several years by including elements from each one to form a new synthesis of policy 
change (Nowlin 2011; Real-Dato 2009). Others have displayed a remarkable level of 
analytical craftsmanship in complementing one theory with components taken from 
parallel disciplinary traditions, e.g. historical institutionalism (Ackrill and Kay 2011; 
Borràs and Radaelli 2011; Eberlein and Radaelli 2010; Barzelay and Gallego 2006, 
2010).  
Blending theories in the social sciences is not peculiar to research on policy 
change (Giddens 1979; Lamont and Molnar 2002)2. This debate is particularly well 
established in the field of organizational analysis, where Pettigrew and Reed have 
recommended integrationism (Reed 1985, 185) and contextualism (Pettigrew 1985, 42) 
as strategies to provide a more systematic account of organizational structures as the 
outcomes of a continuous process in which members are faced and deal with constraints 
that limit their design options. The same focus on process is what may have also 
encouraged in policy studies the development of hybrid theories that combine two or 
more explanations of change (Poole et Al. 2000). The palette of options3 include, 
among others, nesting or complementing theories (Hall and Taylor 1996) as well as 
synthesizing them (Campbell and Pedersen 2001, 264) in a way that blurs their 
boundaries. Notwithstanding some methodological differences, the underlying premises 
of these approaches are shared and rest on the shift of the function of theory, from truth 
providing to that of insights-seeking or “how much insight and understanding can be 
extracted from the constellation of theories generated from the several paradigms in 
use” (Roness 2009, 50). The European Union is undoubtedly a level of governance 
whose study has generated a fruitful dialogue among theories (Juppile et Al. 2003; 
2 The very notion of ‘disciplined imagination’ of Weick rests on the possibility to import metaphors from 
other domains for theory building (for a more recent discussion see Cornelissen 2006). 
3 See Roness for a taxonomy of ‘hybridization’ research strategies devised to handle theoretical diversity 
in political sciences (2009, pp. 45-62). See also the paragraph on Models of theoretical dialogue in 
Juppile et Al. (2003, pp. 19-24 and the synoptic table, pp.29-30).  
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Risse 2002; Schneider and Aspinwall 2001). Illustrative of this scholarly inclination, 
Juppile et al. offer a magisterial account of how to complement the “real but 
surmountable divide” (2003, 15) between rationalism and constructivism to explain 
policymaking in the EU:  
“Our goal is to help develop middle-range social scientific approaches and 
not to engage in arguments at the level of abstract meta-theory. We well 
appreciate that there are big and (possibly) unresolvable issues dividing 
some proponents of the two institutionalisms. Yet we are also well aware 
that [...] from a problem-driven, empirically oriented perspective, such 
divides rapidly begin to melt away. The starting point of the analysis moves 
from ‘either/or’ to ‘both/and’, with the latter pushing questions of scope and 
domains of application to the fore” (2003, 16). 
 
In summary, complementing theories opens promising research avenues, often paved 
with more realistic assumptions than the original theories, to understand how policy 
processes unfold. My dissertation shares this broad orientation, for it largely draws its 
conceptual foundations from a framework: institutional processualism (Barzelay 2003; 
Barzelay and Gallego 2006, 2010a, 2010b), that has combined different explanatory 
components from various theories. 
 
Analyzing policy change with institutional processualism 
The analytical understanding of public policy change proposed by institutional 
processualism (IP) adopts the spirit of comparative historical analysis in the social 
sciences (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003) and combines “Kingdon’s institutional 
processual theory of discrete policy-making episodes, an institutional model of ongoing 
policy-making in partial equilibrium situations and a processual model of organizational 
learning” (Barzelay and Gallego 2006, 543). In this section, I first account for my own 
exploration of the broader analytical debates in social sciences to clarify the theoretical 
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premises of the framework, then present the understandings of the scholarship 
committed to this particular logic of doing research on policy change. Last, I discuss 
some of its specific limitations.  
 
Analytical coordinates of institutional processualism 
The conceptual foundations of the selected framework chapters can be spelled out as 
middle-range processual approach to explain the dynamics of policy change. Above, I 
discussed the object of analysis - public policy change. Let me unpack the rest of the 
formulation by specifying the connotation of the component terms. 
First, by embracing a processual approach, this work recognizes that processes 
are embedded in contexts, that context and action are strictly interrelated and that 
process analysis must be linked to the explanation of outcomes (these requirements are 
discussed at length in the manifesto for a processual analysis by Pettigrew, 1997). 
Correspondingly, the conceptualization of policy change is not limited to a modification 
in the content of a policy program as much as the overall process of policy 
development4. 
A focus on the process of policy change entails a full appreciation of its 
temporal dimension (Abbott 2001; Howlett and Rayner 2006; Mahoney and Thelen 
2010; Pierson 2004; Pollitt 2008). Temporality, in turn, is a term that requires 
qualification. Here it is not associated to the basic notion of calendar time (i.e. 
4 A processual understanding of policy change has not always been the dominant one. Rayner 
characterizes the notion of policy change before the advent of new institutionalism of various types, and 
historical in particular: “[policy change] was understood to be anything more than the observable 
differences between a series of snapshots taken at different points in time – comparative statics – and was 
usually accommodated within the ‘general linear reality’ characteristic of positivist approaches to policy 
analysis” (2009, 83). In the often quoted words of Abbott, the general linear reality view of the social 
world “as made up of fixed, given entities with variable properties’’ – cases and variables – in which 
outcomes consist of the succession of the values of a dependent property or properties over time’’ (Abbott 
1990: 141). Hence, policy decisions are regarded as the outcomes of stochastic processes resulting from 
the combination of specific sets of variables. Processes pass through time which is conceived of as a 
‘frictionless medium’ (Rayner 2009, 84) and not as an explanatory factor in its own right. 
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chronology) as much as to periodization that “must accommodate complex emplotment 
involving a variety of linkages between events” (Rayner 2009, 87). Further, 
understanding temporality requires an appreciation of the relative magnitudes of the 
different temporal processes (i.e. temporal scales). The framework acknowledges that 
there is a “looming presence of the heavy hand of the past” (Pettigrew 1997, 341) in 
current policy making since antecedent conditions shape the present and the emerging 
future. Often actors respond to recurring enduring problems that persist over time by 
selecting among the options they have inherited from the past (Rayner 2009): “policy 
trajectories change while being embedded in previous policy legacies” (Howlett and 
Rayner 2006, 14). Sometimes policy memory (Kay 2006) comes as familiarity or 
habitus of the policymakers with a certain issue (Bordieu 1984).   
Institutional processualism can be defined as a middle-range approach (Merton 
1949) which entails, by definition, coming to terms with the impossibility of identifying 
a grand theory that is key to explaining all social phenomena. In the words of Boudon, 
“middle-range means it is hopeless and quixotic to try to determine the overarching 
independent variable that would operate in all social processes” (1991, 519). At the 
same time, it signals (Geels 2007; Mills 1959) a general malaise against “mere 
empiricism of little worth” (Boudon 1991, 520), that is to say drafting inventories of 
low-level empirical propositions focused on data-collection and statistical runs to find 
correlations between variables. In synthesis, the academic pitching of a middle-range 
theory witnesses the attempt of distancing from undesirable extremes, to offer a way out 
from the same old idiographic-nomothetic divide and by providing a conception of 
theory that “explains, consolidates and federates empirical regularities which on their 
side would otherwise appear segregated” (Boudon 1991, 520).  
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The framework is set to explain policy dynamics. Yet, what counts as a valid 
explanation needs to be specified. Notwithstanding the marked differences between 
disciplines - above all between social-scientific and historical approaches over what is 
an appropriate explanation - a structure of any explanation lies on two pillars (Kay 
2006; Van Parijs 1981), namely causality and intelligibility.  
Causality entails identifying a causal link between facts. If we assume that the 
social world is made up of situated actions or social relations, phenomena are not linked 
to one another but are entangled in social time and social space or “interactional fields” 
(Abbott 2001, 123). Therefore, explanations should give us an account of how 
interactional fields work. This account will be combinative, searching not for an 
independent variable but for possible combinations of causal conditions capable of 
generating a specific outcome or ‘multiple conjunctural causations’ (Ragin 1987). As 
such, it will require that we understand the context that enables or disables specific 
individual causes (Ragin 2006). This account, however, cannot be ‘purely causal’ 
(Abbott 2001, 123) because it should include two interrelated aspects that irremediably 
challenge the strong determinism intrinsic to most theoretical analysis in the social 
sciences (Capano 2009). On the one hand, there are free action and choice (Abbott 
2001) bound to some degree of unexpectedness but nevertheless prone to be analyzed 
and unpacked since, as submitted by Czarniawska, “unpredictability does not imply 
inexplicability” (2004, 13). On the other hand, we have possibility or chance that in the 
social sciences is generally considered “a very unwelcome guest, ubiquitous but 
studiously concealed, ignored and even denied the right to exist” (Boudon 1986, 179). 
Boudon warns us that free action and possibility are not to enter in our accounts as a set 
of variables but should inform our understanding of events as structural characteristics 
of certain causal chains.  
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The second pillar of any explanation is intelligibility, which enables answering 
the ‘why’ question by identifying the mechanism(s) through which the causal link is 
produced. As Kay eloquently put it, “we cannot explain without understanding, where 
this consists of imagining a plausible mechanism through which the fact to be explained 
is brought about, created or produced” (2006, 59). The plausibility or types of 
mechanisms vary depending on the conventions of each disciplinary field. An accepted 
pattern of intelligibility is an explanation resting on types of causal mechanisms 
conforming to the standards recognized by the academic community. In turn, causal 
mechanisms (Gerring 2007; Hëdstrom & Swedberg 1996; Mayntz 2004) “Ontologically 
speaking [...] refer to recurrent processes linking specified initial conditions and a 
specific outcome” (Mayntz 2004, 241) or an explanandum. The appeal of mechanisms 
as “micro-foundational causal analysis” (Gerring 2007, 175) rests on their middle 
ground positioning between pure description and social laws (Coleman 1964; Hëdstrom 
& Swedberg 1996). Put differently, mechanisms are more general than the phenomena 
they subsume. It is exactly this reference to a more general category that delivers 
intelligibility.  
I now turn to the second task of this section, which discusses the purpose and the 
understandings of the selected framework. 
 
The understandings of institutional processualism 
Institutional processualism has co-evolved over the last decade with a research program 
on the comparative historical analysis of public management policy cycles (Barzelay 
2003; Barzelay and Gallego 2006, 2010a, 2010b), focused on recent episodes of public 
management policymaking. These episodes are located in different administrative 
settings at the national level, including the US, Mexico, Brazil, Thailand, Germany, 
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France, Spain, and Italy and supra-national level as in the case of the EU Commission.  
The episodes also differ in the areas of public management object of the reform efforts, 
including administrative modernization, over-bureaucratization, strategic planning, 
streamlining, innovation and ICT in public sector, planning and control of public 
expenditure, and development policy. Variety is also displayed in the features of the 
stable context - i.e. whether the form of state is a presidential or parliamentary 
democracy or a constitutional monarchy - and of the context ‘in motion’ – whether, for 
example, the public sector is contracting or expanding or whether the country is 
undergoing devolution or a unification process.  
Two journal symposia have been the milestones in terms of theoretical 
development and publication of empirical studies patterned on the framework5 and a 
number of articles have employed it outside those two explicitly comparative 
endeavors6. These studies represent a homogeneous corpus of literature from an 
analytical and methodological perspective7. Utilizing a common framework, all the 
contributions seek to explain the trajectories and outcomes of the selected episodes of 
policymaking, mostly through not exclusively in the domain of public management. The 
processual nature of the framework, discussed above, makes it geared to provide 
generalized causal accounts about how policy outcomes, the explananda, result from the 
concatenation of cause and effect relationships, where the explanans include joint 
combinations of the results of past actions, process design features, and context factors. 
5The first milestone was a journal symposium in IPMJ  (Barzelay 2003; Barzelay and Fuechtner 2003 
Cejudo 2003; Gaetani 2003; Gallego 2003; Malee 2003; Moynihan 2003) and the second, a comparative 
historical analysis of public management policy change in the setting of Southern-European Countries, 
was published as a journal symposium in Governance (Barzelay and Gallego 2010a, 2010b; Corbett 
2010; Mele 2010) 
6 Asquer 2012; Barzelay and Gallego 2006; Barzelay and Schvets 2006; Barzelay and Jacobsen 2009; 
Butler et Al. 2010; Corbett 2005; Mele 2010; Mele and Ongaro 2014; Natalini and Stolfi 2012.  
7 This hardly needs explanation for the studies published in the journal symposia. As for those adopting 
the framework without partaking in the research programs, their alignment may have been facilitated by 
the frequent and articulated stocktaking exercises (Barzelay 2003; Barzelay and Gallego 2006, 2010a, 
2010b). 
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Strong analogies with the epistemological occupations of new-institutionalism in 
political sciences, principally with the historical strand (Mahoney and Thelen 2010; 
Pierson 2004; Streeck and Thelen, 2005; Thelen 2003) and moderately with the 
organizational-sociological strand (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; March and Olsen 1989; 
March 1994; Powell 1991; Sahlin-Andersson 2002) have warranted to this processualist 
framework the label of ‘institutional’ (for a review of the three main strands of neo-
institutionalisms in political sciences see Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 1999; Schmidt 
2006)8. 
With historical institutionalism9, the framework shares the research interest for 
the inception and development of public institutions, i.e. public policies, explained by 
the intended and often unintended outcomes of purposeful choices and historically 
unique initial conditions. The two approaches, nevertheless, differ significantly in at 
least two interrelated respects. First, the macro-historical level of analysis prevalent in 
most accounts of this strand of institutionalism can appear historically deterministic or 
even mechanistic where it focuses exclusively on continuities and path-dependencies 
(Schmidt 2006)10. Second, this level of analysis highlights structures and underplays 
both the micro-level events that constitute them and the individual actions that spurred 
8 I refer to Barzelay and Gallego 2006, pp.534-536, for a discussion of the main differences between 
institutional processualism and rational choice institutionalism. The latter is typified by the works of 
Hood (2000, 2002 and 2006 with Lodge) on public service bargains. 
9 The so called ‘historical turn’ in political science and sociology (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; 
Saldana 2003; Pierson 2004) reflects exactly the determination of a larger group of social scientists to 
‘bring history back in’ the analysis of policy processes (Abbott 1988, 1990, 1992, 2001; Hall and Taylor, 
1996; Haydu, 1998; Steinmo et al., 1992) by challenging the ahistorical temporality of social processes 
(Howlett and Rayner 2006). According to this view, the direction of policy outcomes is not deterministic, 
in a stochastic sense, but much more contingent than previously considered. The sources of contingency 
are structural factors such as historical timing or the “ordering” of policy-relevant events (Howlett and 
Rayner 2006, Pierson 2004) as well as individual actions in a given environment. 
10 The emphasis on structured sequencing in historical institutionalist studies on public policy 
development has identified path dependency as the main alternative to stochastic models, often 
overlooking alternative possibilities and models which do exist (Thelen, 2003; Lieberman, 2001). 
Frequently, these studies even disregard whether or not the specific attributes of the path dependent 
model do in fact fit the reality of specific policy-making situations (Kay, 2005; Greener, 2005) as they 
“uncritically accept analogies from the economic literatures where it developed” (Howlett and Rayner 
2006, 13).  
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those events. Turning to sociological institutionalism, it shares with IP the recognition 
of the crucial role played by the cognitive and normative components of the institutional 
context, as exemplified by well-known accounts of the logic-of-appropriateness (March 
and Olsen 1989; March 1994). Mirroring the discussion on historical institutionalism, 
there are some marked differences between IP and this strand that, as argued by 
Schmidt (2006, 2010), may appear culturally deterministic where it emphasizes the 
cultural routines and rituals to the exclusion of individual action which breaks out of the 
cultural norm. Interestingly, IP has incorporated the logic of appropriateness (Barzelay 
2003; Corbett 2003, 2005; Moynihan 2003) in its repertoire of explanatory mechanisms. 
It has done so, however, by adding an agentic twist: “An appropriate action is one that 
fits the situation, given the agent’s evoked identity. As a social mechanism, the logic of 
appropriateness works to link a configuration of context factors—the situation—to 
actions or efforts, through a motivated reasoning and judgment process. […] In seeking 
a partial explanation of agenda inclusion by analyzing the logic of appropriateness as a 
social mechanism, we therefore need to consider both actor identity and construed 
situation” (Barzelay 2003, 276).  
In sum, the ‘institutional’ character of the selected framework, consistently with 
the historical and sociological strands of new institutionalism, can be located in its 
attention to institutional context, both cognitive and normative, to sociologically 
patterned identities, and to relations among actors as sources of causal factors. 
Specifically with historical institutionalism, IP shares the intellectual enterprise to 
provide historically grounded generalizations (Abbott 2001; McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly 2001; Ragin 1987; Weick 2001; Yin 1994) about institutional and policy change. 
To perform such ‘causal reconstruction’ of social phenomena (Mayntz 2004), it 
employs the concept of ‘social mechanisms’ (Hedström 2005), which can be defined as 
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recurring causal processes that enables scholars to find a right pitch between 
contingency and search for causal regularities.  
A principal reference of IP is Kingdon’s Agendas, Alternatives, and Public 
Policies (1984). Kingdon’s analytical trademark, typically portrayed as a public policy 
variation of the garbage can approach, is the recognition that three streams - problems, 
policy and politics flow in parallel and is their coupling, enacted by policy 
entrepreneurs, to determine public policy decisions. The coexistence, as opposed to the 
sequence of the streams, challenges the supposedly chronological ordering of the stagist 
approach. This does not prevent Kingdon from recognizing that the three sub-processes 
of agenda-setting, alternative specification, and coupling and deciding, require their 
own distinctive analysis and can be employed as heuristics for ‘wrapping things up’ 
(1984, 196-208). In the same vein, institutional processualism utilizes these sub-
processes to dissect policy-making in agenda-setting, alternative specification and 
decision-making. Therefore, a policy cycle patterned on Kingdon’s approach contains 
the analytically defined events of the three sub-processes. Nevertheless, the systemic 
perspective on the overall process of policymaking is guaranteed by acknowledging that 
the sub-processes may temporally cross and that there are clear sources of influence 
between them (Barzelay 2003). Illustrative of such concatenation, agenda-setting 
influences alternative specification through the framing of the issue and its assignment 
to distinct venues, as well as though the codification that participants make of agenda 
setting trajectories when deciding whether and how to contribute to alternative 
specifications.  
Causal processes are identified within agenda setting, such as in the form of 
“focusing events”, or between agenda setting and alternative specification, for example 
with “policy spillovers” between policy domains. The framework allows researchers to 
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account for the role of political actors and policy entrepreneurship (Ackrill and Kay 
2011; Balla 2001; Mintrom 1997, 2000; Mintrom and Norman 2009; Mintrom and 
Vergari 1996) in determining the path and outcome of policymaking. Mechanisms such 
as “attribution of opportunity” explain how political actors make sense of specific 
occurrences based on their experience and reasoning, “actor certification” (McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly 2001) clarifies how situational conditions influence actors’ attributes – 
or how their identities are perceived.  
Another essential determinant of the trajectory of public policy is the 
configuration of the policy subsystem. Borrowing from Baumgartner and Jones’ theory 
of punctuated equilibrium (1993), IP does not consider the policy subsystem as an 
immutable feature of governmental systems but rather as a reasonably stable 
institutional context. In particular, IP resorts to Baumgartner and Jones' theory to 
explain the bursts of rapid, unpredictable policy change that ‘punctuate’ patterns of 
stability in government activity as the result of interlocking changes within the policy 
subsystem in the pre-decisional process. These are the framing of an issue, the 
composition of the policy subsystems in which policy is formulated, and the 
conceptualization of functional interdependencies of domains. Policy subsystems are 
also the conventional venue where IP locates policy learning, enacted through 
information gathering and through appraisal of previous initiatives (Bennett and 
Howlett 1992; Levitt and March 1988, May 1992). IP owes the conceptualization of 
policy learning especially to the work of Levitt and March. Building on classical studies 
on organizational routines, they define organizational learning as the process of 
“encoding inferences into routines that guide behavior” (1988, 320). In other words, the 
experiential insights are captured by routines in a way that enables vicarious learning, 
i.e. it does not require that organizations and organizational members have to go 
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through that experience. For example, IP has been attentive to the interplay between the 
configuration of the policy-subsystem (Baumgarter and Jones 1993) as well as to the 
availability and retrieval of experience enabled by organizational routines.    
In summary, the framework complements explanatory components borrowed 
selectively from the theories of Kingdon (1984), Baumgartner and Jones (1993), and 
Levitt and March (1988). The operation of complementing offered by IP resonates with 
Juppile’s ‘domain of application’ approach that “works by identifying the respective 
turfs and “home domains” of each theory, by specifying how each explanation works, 
and finally by bringing together each home turf in some larger picture” (2003, 21)11. In 
so doing, institutional processualism has facilitated causal interpretations of recent 
episodes of public policy making in different countries. As discussed before, the 
episodes exhibit significant variety, particularly in terms of the national and supra-
national administrative settings where they unfold, the themes of policy change, and the 
stable and transitional features of the context.  
Notwithstanding such diversity, the framework lends itself to address research 
questions of analytical and historical significance. From an analytical point of view, the 
framework has equipped scholars to investigate the interplay between belief and action 
as experience unfolds, how the operation of processes and mechanisms can be explained 
by contingent context factors and how situational conditions - stationary and transitory - 
influence actors’ properties. Using this framework, scholars have been able to address 
questions of historical significance and puzzles such as how a particular policy issue 
was conceived; how it was then introduced in an agenda, including those instances 
where the agenda was congested or the issue did not score high in the pre-electoral 
11 The view of synthesis offered by domain application is modest, i.e. there is no ambition to a Hegelian 
synthesis nor to transcendence defined as a marked analytical independence of the final theory from the 
component theories. 
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program; how specific ideas survived the legislative process and then became law; how 
an issue was maintained on the agenda despite a partisan change in the government, or 
how an issue was revamped after a period of dismissal from the agenda; why a new 
minister decided to follow different reform tactics than the predecessor; how an issue 
was approved amid contentious political debate or why, two periods within the same 
episode, had opposite policy outcomes. 
 
Strengths and limitations of institutional processualism   
In this section I have highlighted the reasons why researchers have selected institutional 
processualism as the framework to analyze and explain episodes of public 
policymaking. In stylized terms, IP enables event-centric explanations while also 
granting a prominent role to agency (and agents). By acknowledging the ‘human hand’ 
in the processes of change (Poole et Al. 2000, 25), it overcomes the ‘cultural or 
historical determinism’ (Schmidt 2006; Ackrill et Al. 2013). Also, by resorting to social 
mechanisms, it strikes a reasonable balance between the quest for causal regularities and 
the explanatory power of contingency, thus meeting sensibly “the challenge faced by 
temporally oriented policy studies of how to abstract particular historical contexts and 
identify the extent to which regularities across historical time and space endure” 
(Ackrill et Al. 2013, 878).  
It is worth considering that, by ‘following the process’, the framework offers a 
flexible mode of inquiry, both at the theoretical and at the methodological level. As for 
the first implication, a focus on the process is likely to result in an intellectual openness 
to complementing theories, thus affording an increased explanatory power. As for the 
methodological implications, ‘following the process’ often entails in-depth analyses 
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which generate extremely rich data. The level of detail afforded by processual analyses 
casts the possibility of unexpected or unanticipated findings. (Poole et Al. 2000). 
I am now going to chart the limitations of institutional processualism 
differentiating between those inherent in the analytical framework and those inherent in 
the research design. The first set of theoretical limitations stems from the ostensible 
focus of the framework on the process of policy-making at the expense of the attention 
to its content and to the selection of cases “representative of the population of policy 
cycles in the countries considered” (Barzelay and Gallego 2010a, 212). I am not 
contending that the substance of a policy has been completely disregarded by 
researchers adopting IP, and more in general by those interested in studying policy 
dynamics. For example, appreciating key attributes of the policy process such as 
directionality (for a critical discussion see Howlett and Cashore 2009) has prompted 
researchers to also analyze the modification of policy content over time. Turning to 
content, however, has remained a requisite to recognize whether, in the example above, 
change was cumulative or was an oscillation around an existing policy equilibrium. 
Substance, in synthesis, has mostly been conceived as a means to study process (Jones 
1984; Pal 2010). Prima facie, this may appear a choice of research design but I am more 
inclined to consider it a theoretical limitation. The repertoire of causal mechanisms 
available, in fact, does not seem conceivably fit to offer substantive understanding of 
the policy content. A further implication of the marked focus on process is that the 
comparison of the cases of policy process in the setting of different countries “lacks 
interest in generalizing to the population of reform cycles within these countries” 
(Barzelay and Gallego 2010a, 212). This analytical choice may insulate the scholarship 
using IP in a subfield that finds it hard to dialogue with the broader academic 
community of comparative public policy (for a review see Lodge 2007, 273-288). 
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Further, it may confine its findings to play a marginal role in current policy debates 
covering the very domains and issues they are studying. Last, since the attention of 
scholars adopting this framework is focused on following the process of change without 
a comparable engagement with its substance, they are likely to ‘overstate change’ 
(Barzelay and Gallego 2010a) compared to the general perception of practitioners and 
academics, expert of that specific field and/or country setting.  
As for the next theoretical limitation, it has been argued that complementing 
theories matches the flexible and creative mode of inquiry of IP. Nevertheless, this 
analytical operation also carries a number of risks. Logical coherence may be harder to 
achieve, as the resulting theories could be too vague and so wide-ranging that “we can 
see everything but also nothing” (Pettigrew 1987, 659). In addition, there have been 
concerns that the resulting theories do not lend themselves easily to generalizability and 
their eclectic nature often comes at the expense of parsimony (Roness 2009). The quest 
of IP for generalizability, in the guise of historically-based limited generalization, has 
already been accounted for in this section. To attend to the issue of parsimony I refer to 
a convincing counter-argument already developed by Barzelay and Gallego (2010b). 
Building on the epistemological premises set by Abott (2001), Hedström (2005) and 
Ragin (1987) they point to parsimony as only one among several ways to achieve a 
body of research arguments that are illuminating, and one which should not prevent 
scholarship to follow alternative research trajectories. The argument could be further 
corroborated by taking stock of discussions that have been ongoing in other disciplinary 
domains, from statistics to economics, as exemplified by Hirschman’s position paper on 
“Against parsimony. Three easy ways of complicating some categories of economic 
discourse” (1984). These discussions cast doubt on the opportunity to deliberately limit 
the complexity of a model when the problem is evidently complex.  
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Turning to the limitations, or better limits, of the research design, these include 
the narrow focus on agenda setting, onerous data-collection and the limited time frame 
of the policy episodes. First, studies conducted with IP as reference framework are 
typically based on episodes bound to the pre-decisional and decisional stages of the 
policy cycle – that is to say – they end with an authoritative choice being taken. This is 
an element IP has in common with the three streams approach and to a considerable 
degree, with punctuated equilibrium (Zahariadis 2005). Accounting for policy as 
authoritative choice is an established perspective (see for example Colebatch 2002, 39). 
In the words of Colebatch: “It is a very straightforward formulation which accords with 
‘common sense’ understandings of government, and it is very useful in helping people 
to make sense of the process.” (2006, 5). By stopping at the level of an authoritative 
decision, however, one misses how great expectations in agenda setting are dashed in 
the implementation - paraphrasing Pressman and Wildavsky (1979). It should be said 
that the choice to focus on agenda setting is not led by the lack of empirical interest or 
analytical consideration for the stage of implementation12. Rather, the scholarly division 
of labor, as well as feasibility are constraints (in terms of both research capacity and 
publication format) that have dictated a focus on agenda-setting. I attribute this 
limitation to the research design. IP as well as the multiple streams framework (MSF), 
are seen almost exclusively as explanations of the agenda setting, but they can 
“conceivably be extended to cover the entire process of policymaking at various levels 
of government” (Zahariadis 2005, 65).  (Few) subsequent works, in fact, have shown 
that IP can be employed also beyond the decision-making phase. In particular, two 
studies have applied IP to the implementation phase (Asquer 2012; Barzelay and Shvets 
12 For a comprehensive review of the studies on implementation see O’Toole 2000; Hill and Hupe 2002. 
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2006).13 One of the chapters included in my thesis (Mele and Compagni 2010) is to date 
the only study where IP has been employed to analyse both the pre-implementation and 
early-implementation phase (transition to practice). In doing so, it has provided new 
empirical evidence and an ‘institutional processual’ backing to the notion that political 
dynamics and entrepreneurial activities continue after the decision has been taken 
(Patashnik 2003; Pressman and Wildavsky 1979). It has also witnessed that the focus on 
the predecisional phase of IP studies does not results from analytical shortcomings but 
more from considerations about the feasibility of academic projects. 
The second limit of the research design is that, with its focus on both context and 
agency, IP requires heavy methodological ammunition. For example, capturing the 
agentic component of the explanation entails understanding the consequences of actions 
on future events as well as motives and intentions. This hermeneutic activity 
(Collingwood 1946) is hardly achievable without interviewing the ‘agents’. I will 
subsequently discuss the specific challenges of accessing, collecting and analyzing 
sheer volumes of data from diverse sources, but two considerations are worth 
mentioning here. The high toll taken by this type of research in terms of collection and 
analysis of information has raised concerns because “it demands access to significant 
amounts of information to explain without the promise of corresponding ability to 
predict” (Ackrill et al 2013, 883). Furthermore, such a hermeneutic approach has 
repercussions both in the way in which the case studies are selected and their boundaries 
are set. In fact, the choice of the cases is limited to recent episodes of policymaking and 
does not afford us the ability “to shed light on policy dynamics that might operate on a 
time scale of several decades or longer” (Barzelay 2003, 259).  
13 Also the multiple streams framework has been employed by subsequent studies to analyze the 
implementation phase (Exworthy and Powell 2004; Ridde 2009). 
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These considerations are relevant for the next section, and in what follows I will 
account for some of the methodological choices that have guided my empirical analysis, 
in the spirit of clarifying details that have not been included in the three chapters. 
 
Methodological Notes On My Research Journey 
Each of the three chapters is an instrumental case study (Flyvbjerg 2006; Gerring 2004; 
Stake 1995). The inherent aspiration of instrumental cases is to contribute to the 
understanding of a phenomenon of which the object of analysis is an instance (Abbott 
1992). To recapitulate the analytical premises discussed above, objects of analysis in 
this work are processes rather than entities, conceptualized as temporal phenomena and 
this dynamic perspective is meant to capture the unfolding of event trajectories 
(Barzelay and Gallego 2007). Narrative is the synthetic label that sociological 
scholarship in the traditions of the Chicago school has given to such “processual, 
action-driven approaches to social reality, approaches that are based on stories” (Abbott 
2001, 184). The explanations rendered by narratives come often in the form of limited 
generalizations, or arguments travelling across contingencies (i.e. times and places): 
“categories and theories logically cannot take the form of unrestricted universals or of 
deductive axioms unqualified by considerations of time and place” (Kay 2006, 23-24).  
 
Narratives: epistemological premises and methodological challenges 
In order to make events intellegible - i.e. conveying not only information but also the 
understandings at the basis of any explanation - narratives recount events. Unlike 
chronicles or annals, however, they try to make sense of what happens as a “single 
coherent story, albeit with subplots” (Stone 2001, 74). They do so through enchainment, 
or the ‘narrative analogue’ of causality where it is stated that there are links between 
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consequent points in the narrative and order, meaning the narrative must proceed along 
a sequence that is ultimately aimed at explaining a given outcome (Abbott 1992; 
Howlett and Rayner 2006; Ospina and Dodge 2005). 
The leap from recounting events to conveying understandings is a challenging 
task for researchers, and critics from different academic quarters charge narrative 
inquiry with excessive discretionality in this delicate passage. Despite this common 
concern, the remedies being proposed vary significantly. Some recommend researchers 
to impose more structure on their narratives, formalizing as much as possible “the 
mechanisms through which characteristics or events at time 1 lead to or are transformed 
into characteristics or events at time 2 […] in order to avoid teleological arguments14 in 
which some overarching logic of development, divined by the observer, is all that ties 
historical events together or supports causal links (Haydu 1998, 351). Others, instead, 
recommend undoing the structures imposed by the narrative on the stories.15 In the 
words of Boje, for example, to carry out organizational research: “we should recover the 
polyphonic quality of storytelling […] I long for a different storytelling that is an ante-
narrational and undoes the timeframe imposed by narratives. I bet on the incoherent and 
the unplotted telling (2001, 6).  
My work acknowledges that discretionality is an inevitable consequence of the 
‘mediated coherence’ (Polkinghorne 1988) provided by the narrator and in what 
follows, I try to elucidate the critical assumptions on which the methodological 
approach of my thesis rests.  
1414 For a discussion of teleological temporality see “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful 
Sociology” (Sewell 1996). 
15 The ‘stories’ here are conceptualized as separated from narrative, consistently with Culler (1981) who, 
after reviewing the Russian formalists, the American structuralists and the Frech structuralists, identifies a 
duality of narrative over story.  
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The first assumption16 relies on the notion that narratives subsume interpretive 
schemes (see in particular Polkinghorne 1988, pp.17-18) or meta-narratives. As much 
as narrative inquiry is often portrayed as whole-heartedly inductive, it “in fact 
presupposes many generalizations” (Martin 1986). Put differently, in order to 
understand what is happening in a story, researchers need to connect the events in a way 
that assumes the existence of logic that interrelate them (Cebik 1984). Interpretive 
schemes should “offer analytical structure at a broad level but not an over-restrictive 
theoretical web” (Pettigrew 1990, 293), for they make reality intellegible. Schemes act 
as the basic template or structure for the narrative. Consistently with Kay, in my work 
policy can be conceived as an interpretive scheme, a “heuristic concept that allows a 
path to be drawn through policy time and space, rather than being exclusively conceived 
as a natural category of investigation” (Kay 2006, 73). Specifically, I have used the 
policy cycle as the interpretive scheme across my three instrumental cases, and 
Kingdon’s meta-categories of setting the agenda, alternative specification and decision-
making as the subplots of the scheme. However, in the spirit of complementing theories 
‘by domain’ I have added a meta-category derived from Baumgartner and Jones on 
managing organizational transition within the specific policy sub-system and learning 
within the policy sub-system (Levitt and March 1988) for the case where the evidence 
collected has prompted me to do so. Furthermore, depending on the specific nature of 
the explanandum, i.e. piece of legislation vs program, I have adapted the meta-
categories to include setting the agenda, developing the program, and deciding and 
launching it (Annex 1 includes the Research Schematics related to the chapter on 
16  This assumption resonates with traditional debate between ontology and epistemology (see Wendt and 
Shapiro 1997; and Hay and Rosamond 2002) questioning whether ontology tells us what to look for (i.e. 
ontology precedes epistemology) or whether an epistemological refutation of ontological propositions is 
possible (i.e. epistemology precedes ontology).   
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Government Innovation, as an example of the event structure and the research questions 
connecting the events).  
A second underlying assumption regarding my thesis is that the narrator has a 
license to simplify reality in order to avoid what Pettigrew vividly defines as “death by 
data asphyxiation” (1990, 281). In my thesis, the simplification of reality rested on three 
interrelated pillars or ‘conventions of narration’. These did not turn out to be 
constraints, but rather enablers of narratives: without them, and confronted with sheer 
volumes of data, the social scientist would have nowhere to begin. (Danto 1985; Martin 
1986; White 1980, 1984, 2009).  
The first pillar is the connection of events that, by drawing a path that consists of 
a series of steps between different states of the policy process, provides a structure to 
the narrative. In each of the chapters I have organized the time-line of the story – the 
‘narrative temporality’ (Genette 1980) as a single episode of policymaking, though 
divided in different policy cycles (three cycles in the chapters on Innovation and E-
Government respectively, two cycles in the chapter on the Smoking ban). In turn, each 
cycle has been organized by using the sub-plots provided by three phases of agenda-
setting, alternative specification and decision making. Several of the actions organized 
by phase actually took place in parallel, though I narrated them through the convention 
of narrative temporality where “the narrator spins the thread of a story so that it appears 
to be a continuous strand not a series of overlapping motifs” (Martin 1986, 129). 
The second pillar of simplification is the so-called selective silencing (Bal 2009; 
Buchanan and Dawson 2007) that can be considered an ‘unavoidable feature of a 
narrative’ (Pentland 1999, 715). Kay (2006) argues that in policy narratives, it is crucial 
to designate some issues and characters as salient and omit many as non significant. 
This is exactly what I have been doing, in the endeavor to ensure coherence to my unit 
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of analysis – i.e. the unfolding of policy episodes – without (excessively) dispersing the 
narrative with factual or biographical digressions.  
The main device employed to select the evidence to be included in- and more 
importantly omitted from my narrative- has been the research schematics17 (see Annex 
1). Consistently with accounts of processual research methodology, and particularly of 
pattern reduction (Pettigrew 1990; Strauss 1987), I have been engaging in an iterative 
dialogue between theory and data and, more specifically between the “deductive 
element of specifying theories of method and meta-level analytical frameworks and the 
inductive elements of data reduction, display and theoretical elaboration” (Pettigrew 
1990, 284). In Annex 1, I include as an example the actual research schematics I have 
been using for the instrumental case on which the first chapter of the thesis is based. 
The research schematics, as well as any “sorting and classifying tools of a processual 
researcher” (Pettigrew 1990, 284), can be considered the material enabler of the 
iterative inductive and deductive processes as it specifies the analytically significant 
events – in the form of actions – providing the skeleton for the narration.  
The research schematics I have employed included both an event structure and 
research questions connecting the events. The event structure has been organized 
around the events at the heart of the case. Previous, contemporaneous and related 
events18 are also included, as long as they were meaningful for a specific development 
within the main cycle. For example, a parallel policy change in another domain would 
be included in the related events if it influenced the main policy as a policy spillover. 
17 The research schematics has been a fundamental tool to conduct my own research as well as to link my 
work to the broader research program on the The Comparative Historical Analysis of Public Management 
Policy Cycles in France, Italy, and Spain. In order to make the three ‘instances of a process’ of public 
management reform comparable, the researcher had to agree upon common research schematics which 
included: a) Event Structure, b) Research Questions and c) Narrative Outline for each case. 
18 Contemporaneous and related events both unfold in parallel to the main episode. The distinction lies on 
the impact on the case. Contemporaneous events are more in the background of the case, influencing 
transitory structural factors (e.g. devaluation of the lira). Parallel events would be listed as related events 
when they had a direct bearing on the policy episode.   
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Current events have been ordered based on the meta-categories of agenda setting, 
alternative specification and decision-making. In particular, the agenda-setting phase 
included processes such as the emergence of a policy issue and the activities of policy 
entrepreneurs aimed at increasing the issue visibility and status. Alternative 
specification included the activities aimed at developing the proposals, e.g. assessing 
the status quo, drafting reports, gathering ideas, negotiating within and outside 
government agencies. The final phase included the decision and approval of a proposal, 
as well as its official launch. A remarkable aid to connect events has been provided by 
the historically-based research questions, i.e. those closely related to the case (See 
Annex 1). Research questions for each chapter have been ordered from the analytically 
significant questions to the historically based ones. The latter, in turn, were linked to 
specific events in the event structure as well as to the analytical questions they were 
contributing to address by providing historically-based insights. 
Another narrative decision, which has led to the omission of some of the 
evidence collected through documentary analysis and interviews, has been the 
identification of eventful and uneventful periods as far as the policy episode was 
concerned.  I should also mention that, along the timeline of my episodes, the three 
main meta-categories have been applied to explain the pre-decisional and decisional 
phase of each single cycle. In the example of the first chapter, the narrative of the 
episode of Innovation in government covers three policy cycles during the period 1993-
2002. However, years between the end of a cycle and the beginning of the subsequent 
one have been only touched on19. In omitting periods that are uneventful, I have 
19 For example between the launch of the first initiative (Projects for change in 1993) and the revamping 
of the issue for Innovation in government in 1996 that led to the approval of the second initiative 
(Program for change in 1998), events that happened in two years (1994 and 1995) are only mentioned en 
passant. Similarly, the years between 1998 and 2001, when the issue was revamped and led to the 
approval of the third initiative (Construction Sites for change in 2002) are only hinted at but not analyzed 
in depth. 
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followed an established convention of writing narratives. Chronological gaps are 
functional in the narrative that, unlike chronicles, must include ellipses, i.e. temporal 
periods left out from narration (Martin 1986). Ellipses are in line with the instrumental 
character of my case studies, aimed at illuminating the basic facts that support the 
analysis without cluttering the narrative with details that remain unexplained in the 
analytical section.  
The last pillar requires devising and mixing different types of narrative 
discourse. This is particularly challenging when the framework, such as in my work, 
emphasizes the volitional conduct of actors. By granting a role to ‘choice’ in the policy 
process (Kay 2006), in fact, the narrative must ensure ‘access to consciousness’ (Martin 
1986, 131) of the actors without turning an event-centric narrative into the motives and 
intentions of ‘great men’, i.e. the policy entrepreneurs. In my policy narrative, I strove 
to find the right balance between the advantages of third person narration, typically 
smooth and easier to follow, and the authenticity secured by first person quotations. I 
was faced with the task of compacting years of events and many details about personal 
interactions afforded by the transcripts of my in-depth interviews. Therefore, I decided 
to rely predominantly on the third person – i.e. the authorial voice – and to allow my 
main characters to speak in first person only in special circumstances, such as 
expressing a personal view on the events or when they were referring to their inner 
motives.20 
Overall, I set the methodological assumptions and their relative implications on 
the narrative strategy (i.e. connecting the events, selective silencing and ellipses, and 
20 A quote expressing a personal view on the events is exemplified by this comment of an interviewee 
reported in the first chapter: “The role of the Minister moved from expenditure advocate to treasury 
guardian.”  A quote indicating the inner motives of a policy entrepreneur is exemplified by the reference 
to a ‘moral duty, both as an oncologist and as a Minister’ (third chapter). 
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type of narrative discourse) trying to strike a balance between the feasibility of the 
research endeavor and my, unavoidable, intrusiveness in the sources’ evidence. 
 
Data gathering 
Turning now to some common elements of data gathering, the main methodological 
device that I have used to elicit narratives is interviews, and in particular those that 
allow the collection of first-hand testimony from direct participants and witnesses of the 
policy-making process: elite interviewing (Berry 2002; Tansey 2007). In order to 
identify the interviewees I adopted a snowball or chain referral sampling using both 
positional criteria and reputational criteria (e.g. influential actors that might otherwise 
have been ignored) to identify respondents (Tansey 2007). In particular, for the research 
project on public management reform, both snowballing and access has been facilitated 
by my previous work as consultant to the Department of Public Administration (1999-
2000). At the time of writing I was not under contract and did not face any restricting 
conditions or a non-disclosure clause.  As the main criterion for selection, for each 
episode I chose informants with a different perspective on the explanandum, i.e. policy 
entrepreneurs, civil servants and consultants, and academics with a profound knowledge 
of the policy domain and ministerial activities (e.g. academics whch had also served as 
consultants for the Ministry during the period under analysis). Annex 2 lists the 
interviewees for each case divided by background (i.e. policy-makers, top bureaucrats, 
experts or consultants, and relevant external stakeholders). 
The specific requirements for elite interviewing do not include only attending to 
extraordinary challenges in rapport building and interview scheduling (Bauer and 
Gaskell 2000). More importantly, interviewing political elites entails recognizing and 
dealing with the logic of ‘representation’ (Czarniawska 1999) or of ‘officialization’ 
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(Bourdieu 1990). In my experience this often prompted respondents to account for what 
should have happened instead of what did happen. Similarly to what was described by 
Czarniawska: “the logic of representation is used by everybody in positions that require 
official accounting for organizational practices [...] it is rhetorically skillful and self-
conscious” (2004, 53). I often received accounts grounded in theory complementing or 
even substituting answers grounded in practice. In other words, the interviewees would 
provide ex post rationalization and legitimating reconstructions of their choices and of 
the resulting events. 
It took me a few initial interviews during the first research project21 to realize 
that a peculiar type of logic of appropriateness was at work and to devise corrective 
measures to what was a potential source of ambiguity when reconstructing ‘facts’. 
Triangulation with other sources was obviously a key strategy to limit informant bias 
and improve construct validity. Therefore, interviews were conducted for each episode 
with informants who viewed the project from diverse perspectives: policy 
entrepreneurs, civil servants, former consultants, and academics with a profound 
knowledge of the policy domain under analysis for each of the chapters. Interviews 
were also prepared with, and corroborated by documentary analysis of official policy 
statements (e.g. white papers or policy briefs), parliamentary hearings, media coverage 
(available within the Ministry archives) and meeting minutes. Special mention perhaps 
should go to an early and rudimentary methodological attempt to attenuate the biases of 
that officialization I intuitively detected, namely a focus group. I used the focus group to 
bring together top bureaucrats and consultants who worked in different phases of a 
policy episode, with different political loyalties and known for their contribution to the 
debate on public management reform. What I was seeking was some degree of 
21 The comparative research project on Public Management Reforms in Napoleonic Countries was 
coordinated by Barzelay and Gallego. 
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confidence that both the case boundaries (Abbott 2001) and the milestones of the policy 
episodes that I had identified (the explananda) were somewhat shared by the relevant 
policy community.    
Over time, I developed more fine-grained skills. When parts of interviews and 
even written policy statements were in an obvious ‘officialized’ mode, I would spot and 
employ them as inputs to figure out the dominant or the alternative political discourse in 
the traditions of interpretive public policy and the view on policy change as a discursive 
problem (Foucault 1971; Zittoun 2009). I became aware, in other words, that policy 
statements are not ‘‘a representation of the problem, its consequences and possible 
solutions to solve it’’ (Muller 2004: 371), but pragmatic and discursive constructions 
(Fischer 2003) which transform and stabilize problems, and associate them to solutions, 
devices, arguments, publics and participants (Deleuze 1986, Latour 2006). Still, at times 
I needed to get the facts straight. Especially, I needed to uncover the political processes 
behind the scene, the “hidden elements of the political action […] that lack an 
accompanying body of documentation” (Tansey 2007, 767) either because they are 
exquisitely informal or because they are too sensitive to document in written forms. For 
this purpose, I devised subtle correctives to my interviewing style. I would prepare 
myself with a preliminary draft of the policy plot and how media had reported it. 
Consistently with Czarniawska’s recommendation to ‘aid memory’ (2004), I noticed 
that displaying precise knowledge of dates and participants as well as recollecting 
specific media coverage was very helpful in bringing the interviewee on track and to 
focus on filling the gaps of my narratives.  
 
Data analysis 
I analyzed the interview transcripts and the documents collected (see the 
methodological section in each chapter for the list of interviews and a description of the 
39 
 
main types of documents used) using the event structure in the research schematics –
that is to say, for each chapter I used as categories to organize my data: 
-previous events, contemporaneous and related events; 
-the main events in my episode divided by the policy cycles under analysis 
 (three in the first two chapters, two in the third chapter).  
In turn, for each episode, I used, first, the Kingdon meta-categories of agenda-setting, 
alternative specification and decision-making to organize the evidence (interviews and 
documents).  
The first iterations between the meta-categories related to three stages and data 
enabled me to adapt the meta-categories to my data22. Further iterations enabled me to 
add, as categories for the analysis, the causal mechanisms that were emerging from the 
evidence and I could relate to the repertoire offered by the framework (e.g. actor 
certification, attribution of opportunity, policy-spillover, etc.). Then for each meta-
category, associated with a code (e.g. agenda setting or actor certification), I tabulated 
quotes.  
In two out of three chapters, in order to organize materials – collecting, 
retrieving and coding – I used a software program (Atlas.ti). I uploaded all the 
documents on the software and directly coded them on file, except for the meeting 
minutes, for which I was given only a paper copy. For this set of documents, I selected 
and transcribed the quotes relevant for my analysis and then uploaded them. Compared 
to the chapter (Innovation in government) where this work has been done manually (see 
Annex 1), I admit that it was a very helpful tool to physically organize, store and 
recover diverse sources when drafting the deep narratives that provide the empirical 
22 As discussed above, in the first chapter I adapted the meta-categories to reflect the programmatic, as 
opposed to legislative, nature of the policy output (the explanandum). In the third chapter on the Smoking 
ban, I also added a meta-category labelled ‘transition to practice’ which included activities undergoing 
between the passage of the legislation and its actual enforcement. 
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basis for the chapters. After discussing the theoretical and methodological tenets of the 
thesis, I am now going to introduce the main elements of the Italian political and 
administrative context.   
 
The Italian Political And Administrative Context 
In the three chapters of this collection, episodes of policy-making unfold in the context 
of the Italian governmental sector, during three periods that, at least partially, overlap23. 
Each chapter introduces in the narrative those changes in the political and administrative 
setting that had a direct influence on the policy episodes. In what follows, instead, I set 
the scene of the country context by presenting some general features of the Italian 
political and administrative system that I deem relevant for my episodes, namely the 
political context, the administrative context, the law-making process and legalism, a 
prominent feature of the Italian state traditions.  
 
Political context 
In the early 1990s, the Italian party system, which had been stable for almost half a 
century with the coalition governments always formed around the dominant Christian 
Democracy (DC) party, underwent a profound transformation24. Afterwards, except for 
the technocratic interludes25, alternative coalitions of the right or the left have prevailed. 
Yet, despite the bipolar alternation, it is a widely held opinion (Bull and Rhodes 1997; 
2007; Diamanti 2007; Vassallo 2007) that the Italian political system is still ‘blocked’ 
23  The policy cycle in the first chapter unfolds during the period 1993-2002, in the second chapter 1992-
2003, and in the third 2000-2005. Therefore, I have tried to identify significant elements of the 
administrative and political context in the period 1992-2005.  
24 Morlino and Tarchi explain: “in 1991, the old Communist Party (PCI) changed its name and its logo, 
becoming the Party of the Democratic Left (PDS) and later, in 1994, even changed its leadership. A new 
protest party, the Northern League, emerged from the unification of various local, autonomist lists. In the 
1992 elections, the crisis of the Christian Democracy became evident and the protest in Northern Italy 
found a strong manifestation in the success of the League” (1996, 41). 
25 On p.43 I explain more in details what are ‘technical governments’. 
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and one where intra-coalition competition has impeded the political system from 
moving from a centrifugal to a centripetal tension (Bardi 2007). As Bull and Rhodes put 
it26: “Fragmented and unstable bipolarism works for winning elections, but becomes a 
setback when governing” (Bull and Rhodes 2007, 665).  
Notwithstanding the changes of the early ‘90s,27 the litmus test that Italy has 
remained in many respects an “incomplete and poorly performing democracy” (Bull and 
Rhodes 2007, 658) is provided by the length of governments: no government28 in Italy 
has ever lasted for an entire parliamentary term of five years (Cotta and Verzichelli 
2007). The fall of governments is typically due to internal problems within the coalition, 
instead of a parliamentary vote against the ruling majority moved by the opposition, as 
may be the case in other parliamentary democracies. Prime ministers resign when they 
realize their majority is not holding together – e.g. one or more negative votes in the 
legislative proceedings. The premature fall of Cabinets results in negotiations to form a 
government not only in the aftermath of the elections, but at virtually any point in time 
of a legislature. I refer to this frequent Cabinet turnover as political instability, i.e. “a 
basic source of variation in institutions and policies [… whose] frequency and character 
depend on voter preferences, political institutions, or salient events and issues” 
(Horovitz, Hoff, and Milanovic 2009, 1). In turn, this definition is based on the 
conception of political stability as government longevity, that is to say the duration of 
government expressed as a percentage of its maximum institutional life (Dowding and 
Kimber 1983)29.  
26 In their introduction on a special issue of Western European Politics on Italy as a contested polity, 
issued ten years after the last special issue of this journal in the Italian politics. In this section, I also quote 
Bardi (2007), Diamanti (2007) and Vassallo (2007), who have authored articles in the same special issue.     
27 During the decades of the Christian Democracy (DC) leadership the instability of Cabinets was 
tempered by the constant presence of the same party - DC – in every Cabinet and the fact that many 
ministers would often remain constant from one Cabinet to another. 
28 I use Cabinet, government and Executive synonymously. 
29 The literature has analyzed political stability from perspectives different from the one adopted in my 
work of Government longevity. Hurwitz (1973) for example identified five distinct approaches to 
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In this work, the political background of the policy episodes (1992-2005) is one 
characterized by political instability. There is an alternation of nine governments 
determined only once by the natural deadline of the legislature (2001) and more often 
by political crises resulting in two anticipated general elections (1994, 1996), in six 
government reshufflings with (1992, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000) or without (1999) the 
appointment of a new Prime Minister (in the Annex 3 I have included a table with the 
list of the governments and the ministers in the three domains where the episodes 
unfold). Four of these reshufflings (1992, 1993, 1995, 2000) have resulted in the 
appointment of ‘technical governments30’. This term refers to an Executive that is 
appointed, as opposed to elected, in times of political crises or extraordinarily difficult 
economic conjunctures. In these supposedly exceptional circumstances, the parliament 
appoints a government, normally composed by a non-elected group of experts. By 
virtue of its feeble political identity, a technical government normally eschew vetoes 
and receives reasonable levels of support from parties.  
Overall, this political setting is a challenging scenario for governing, and even 
more so for reforming efforts. The general view, in fact, considers instability as 
conducive to waning government performance. Cotta and Verzichelli argue that the 
short term perspective of every Cabinet and of most of the prime ministers has been 
“undoubtedly a serious limiting factor in their ability to effectively conduct the 
governmental mission and this was particularly so when it was time to introduce 
significant reforms” (2007, 129-130). In addition, the two principal contributions (Milio 
2008; Piattoni and Smyrl 2002) that have analyzed the effects of the Italian political 
political stability: absence of violence, existence of a legitimate constitutional order, absence of structural 
change, multifaceted societal attributes, and government longevity. 
30 A technical government in Italy is also referred to as a ‘transitional’ or ‘current affairs’ or ‘bridge’ 
government. 
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turbulence on its administrative capacity reaffirm the importance of political stability as 
a precondition for adequate government performance31. 
 
The Italian public administration 
In their book Political institutions in Italy, Cotta and Verzichelli begin their chapter on 
the analysis of bureaucracy (2007, chapter VII) with this effective opening:  
“Slowness, heaviness, disorganization and patronage have no doubt been 
long-established problems for the Italian public administration, and they still 
represent some of the most common stereotypes of Italy abroad. It is easy to 
find evidence to justify these stereotypes” (2007, 202).  
The subtitle of this chapter on bureaucracy - “From immobility to permanent reforms” – 
captures the perpetual effort to transform and improve the performance of public offices 
in which, since World War II, Italian governments have engaged.  
The reform cycle in itself has become a subject of study, almost a sub-discipline 
of administrative sciences, from historical (Melis 1996; Rugge 1995), legal (Cassese, 
1994), policy (Capano, 1992, 2003; Dente, 1995; Cerase, 1990; Lippi, 2003) and 
managerial (Borgonovi et al. 2008, Rebora 1999) perspectives. The incessant attempts 
at reform provide evidence of the misalignment between the administrative machine and 
the country’s needs. This misalignment is often referred to as maladministration 
(Cassese 1993, see also Mele and Ongaro 2014).  
A phenomenon in Italy that ended up being associated with maladministration is 
the steady increase in the number of public administrations32, and of civil servants33. 
31 For example, by analyzing the management of EU Structural Funds (an EU program aimed at 
sustaining regional development) in different Italian regions, Piattoni and Smyrl identify the main 
determinant of policy efficiency in the “different capacity of the political class to allocate the costs and 
benefits of economic development, in turn explained by its stability and commitment” (2002, 136). 
Similarly, Milio (2008) argues that continuity in key positions favored the coherence and regularity of the 
EU “Structural Funds” program management and generalizes that stable party coalitions shield political 
leaders from the constant undermining of their mandate and project paralysis due to the partisan use of 
veto power. 
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Such expansion in the number and size of public organizations is commonly considered 
by scholars and experts of the Italian administrative system, as a practice of the ruling 
majority to gain the political consensus of the beneficiary constituencies, and obviously 
detrimental to efficiency or effectiveness. Other associated phenomena include the 
weakness (Melis 2005), or according to some scholars, the absence (Cassese 1993, 
1999) of an administrative elite, and the ambiguous linkages, at times, between 
politicians and administrators, developed from the outset of the unitarian state (Sepe and 
Crobe 2008). This conspiracy of sorts, stigmatized by Cassese as pactum sceleris 
resulted in a systematic exchange between stability ensured to civil servants and power 
maintained in the hands of political parties (Cassese 1993). Since the beginning of the 
nineties, while the entire Italian political context was undergoing a dramatic crisis, the 
administrative reform attempts of the previous years were replaced by a “permanent 
cycle of reform” (Capano 2003, 787). The administrative context between the early 
nineties and the early 2000s is especially salient for the first two chapters of the thesis, 
focused respectively on the policy for innovation in government and on the policy for 
Electronic Government. 
Two features of the administrative context recurrently enter the policy scene in 
all three chapters, i.e. the process of decentralization and the process of EU integration 
and I am going to account briefly for them. In the period under analysis, Italy has 
32 Especially in the so-called parastato, the vast array of public entities, state-owned companies, etc. that 
quite often became an instrument of political consensus through the large recourse to public employment. 
Also, the number of local governments, especially the Provincial level (the second tier of local 
government in Italy), has steadily increased since their establishment, and it is commonly held opinion 
among commentators that one of the drivers for this has been the search for consensus. This process of 
multiplication of public entities has to be distinguished from the establishment of an entirely new level of 
government, the regions. Granted political autonomy by the Italian constitution in 1948 and implemented 
in 1970, regional governments have brought some degree of decentralization to the national governmental 
machinery especially since the mid ‘90s, as I discuss in this section. 
33 This is due to the new tasks taken up by the government over the 20th century, but also due to 
malpractices like ‘titularization’ (Cassese 1993; Sotiropoulos 2004), a process that involves hiring 
personnel to meet temporary labor shortages in the public sector and then granting to these personnel the 
status of civil servant or the functional equivalent. 
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undergone a process of progressive decentralization. According to Cotta and Verzichelli 
(2007, 174-177) Italy has a system of ‘territorial cleavages’, a concept that captures 
both the salience of the different polity levels (over 8100 municipalities – more than 
half of which have less than 3000 inhabitants, 10 large metropolitan cities, over 100 
provincial units, 20 regions) and the different degree of relevance attributed to these 
sub-national communities, in comparison with the idea of nation-state. In the 
background of my policy episodes, we see efforts aimed at devolving decisional 
autonomy and institutional capacity, especially to the intermediate tier of the 
administrative system: the regions. Two crucial reforms aimed at decentralizing powers 
to the regions were pushed through respectively by the centre-left and the centre-right 
(Ongaro 2006). The first attempt was performed in 1997 by Bassanini. His corpus of 
reforms transferred new competencies to the regions, strengthened mechanisms for 
intergovernmental dialogue and sought to clarify the distribution of powers and the 
legislative role of regions. A further step in this direction was a constitutional reform 
approved during the Berlusconi government in 2001. Potentially radical, this reform 
introduced the principle of ‘inverse subsidiarity’, i.e. specifying only the areas in which 
central administration had to retain the mandate and assigned anything else to the 
regions by default. In terms of results Keating submits that: 
“a decade of regional reform in Italy has produced rather little of substance. 
There has been some real devolution in the management of health and social 
services, but no proper fiscal reform. Bold declarations in constitutional 
reforms or laws have not been followed up with the necessary implementing 
laws and decrees, while the central parliament has continued often to 
legislate as though nothing had happened” (2009, 8). 
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Turning to the process of European integration, it is safe to state that it has 
played a prominent role in political change (Radaelli and Franchino 2004), especially 
but not exclusively due to pressure exerted by the treaty provisions on economic and 
monetary union (EMU). Some scholars, owing it to their focus on domestic political 
change, assign the European-level variable the status of an exogenous variable.  Others 
explain the changes in the Italian state as a direct effect of the process of integration, 
specifically through the alteration of power relations between technocrats and 
politicians, as well as between government as a whole and the parliament (See chapters 
10-12 in Dyson and Feathersone 1999). Overall, however, there seems to be agreement 
that the process of Europeanization has represented more of a resource than a threat for 
the political system. On the one hand, it has strengthened institutional capacities and 
policy-making technical capabilities (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000). On the other hand, 
domestic policy entrepreneurs have used it to widen their window of opportunity for 
reforms (Natali 2004; see also Quaglia, 2004 on the EMU conceptualized as an 
‘ideational construct’).      
 
Law-making in Italy 
In the policy episodes included in my thesis the role of policy entrepreneurs is typically 
played by ministers. They push for an item to be included not only in the governmental 
agenda but also in the parliamentary one, thus leading to a formal approval in the cases 
where the policy outcome had to take the guise of a piece of legislation. Therefore, it 
might be useful to provide a brief background of the law-making process in the country.  
First, Italy is a parliamentary republic with co-equal bicameralism. The fact that 
both chambers are on equal footing makes ordinary legislation quite a complex 
procedure (for a clear and detailed schema of ordinary law-making see Cotta and 
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Verzichelli 2007, p.145). Both chambers analyze each proposal through an ad-hoc 
committee, they also vote on each single article and then both chambers have to issue a 
final vote on all bills. The back and forth between chambers – the navette – must be 
repeated as many times as necessary to ensure that the same text is passed by a formal 
vote by both chambers. Second, government legislation does not enjoy any 
constitutionally based special treatment in its passage through Parliament (see the 
section on ‘Legislature and the executive’, Hine 1993, 149-150). 34 Over time, the 
procedural length of ordinary legislation together with the relatively weak institutional 
role of the government compared to the parliament, even more so when considering the 
average short-term perspective of each cabinet, have induced the government to try to 
reduce the influence or to bypass the power of the parliament. This attempt has been 
enacted in two ways. One is the increasing reliance on the government’s entitlement to 
issue decrees with the same status as acts of parliament. This ‘privilege’ has become an 
issue of contention since by constitutional provision they should have the character of 
genuine urgency, while they have been increasingly employed as ordinary legislative 
shortcuts. Their number has grown exponentially over the years and - since the early 
nineties - they are considered ordinary governmental devices to force a wide range of 
issues ranging from taxation to energy policy to public sector reforms on the 
parliamentary agenda. Another way has been to request an growing number of 
delegating laws, through which the parliament defines the general principles and then 
empowers government to regulate a certain area (Vassallo 2007). 
A striking feature of the Italian ‘legislative behavior’ in comparative terms (Hine 
1993) is the quantity of individual items of legislation that are approved every year. 
Such ‘legislative hypertrophy’ (Vesperini 1998) can been attributed to three, partially 
34 Special provisions may include restrictions on the amendments that Parliament can issue to government 
legislation or restrictions on the possibility for individual members of the parliament to issue legislation. 
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interrelated, factors. First, a large share of such legislation is a so-called micro-sectional 
legislation, limited in scope to local communities or to selected categories of welfare 
services’ recipients or public employees (Hine 1993). This, in turn, may be ascribed to 
the often-cited phenomena of political patronage (Golden 2003) and clientelism 
(Piattoni 2001). Second, it may also reflect the frequent political turnover discussed 
above. Specifically, the impossibility to agree upon clear-cut government programs 
results in an excessive legislative incrementalism that frequently crowds out major 
reforms to focuse on a plethora of minor issues (Borghetto and Giuliani 2012).   
Third, there is wide consensus that overlegislation is encouraged by the 
‘legalism’ of Italian policy-making. Hine argues that the very constitution in Italy is 
infused with checks and balances, which are intended as guarantees against the abuse of 
power by any branch but that results in a system that operates through institutional 
bargaining, mutual vetoes and legalism (on the origins of the stato di diritto see Hine 
1993, 233-236).  
 
Legalism 
Legalism is often indicated as the most striking feature of the Italian administrative 
traditions, which, in turn, can be defined as “an historically based set of values, 
structures and relationships with other institutions that deﬁnes the nature of appropriate 
public administration within society” (Peters 2008, 118). Scholarship focusing on 
administrative traditions has tried to identify the long durée effects of historical legacies 
on policy processes and outcomes of administrative reforms (for a review see Meyer-
Sahling and Yesilkagit 2011) and has grouped countries accordingly (Castles 1993; 
Kickert 2005; Knill 2001; Painter and Peters 2010, Peters 2008; Rugge 2007).35 
35 The dominant trait of this perspective is path dependence: traditions are typically argued to block, delay 
or filter the reform proposals of political and administrative reformers (Christensen and Laegreid 2001). 
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In this wider comparative perspective, Italy fits squarely with the Napoleonic 
administrative traditions – characterized, among the others, by a conception of law as an 
instrument for intervening in society rather than as a means of conflict resolution 
between different societal actors (Knill 2001; Ongaro 2011; Ongaro and Valotti 2008; 
Painter and Peters 2010 chapter 2; Sotiropoulos 2004). Scholars have pointed to a 
dominance of legalism in the Italian administrative community (Capano 2003) or to a 
monopoly of administrative lawyers and legalistic thinking in the public sector (Kickert 
2005). Legalism is broadly considered to have adverse consequences on the reforming 
efforts, in particular when these efforts are aimed at modernizing the public sector. A set 
of studies points to mechanisms that ‘hollow out’ the substance of reforms (Ongaro 
2011). For example, Panozzo (2000) argues that a movement to introduce managerial 
accounting systems as a means to promote performance-oriented organizational practice 
became disabled for both the institutional and cultural components of legalism. On one 
hand, fragmentation of law-making determines a piecemeal type of reforms where the 
main purpose and vision becomes diluted in a series of sectoral laws. On the other hand, 
once agents of the legalistic administrative culture codify the innovative practice in 
legal norms, it becomes a compliance requirement, instead of a mechanism to enable 
change. 
Likewise, Capano (2003) contends that the progressive institutionalization of a 
hegemonic administrative law paradigm describes the course of Italy’s modern history 
of public administration. Accordingly, the conditions for a secure movement supporting 
a rival paradigm have never been established. In the same vein, Gualmini submits that 
“in Italy…the legal and juridical culture prevented the implementation of extensive 
reforms” and that the delay in adopting managerial reforms, compared to other 
The divergence between groups of countries is explained by reference to the existence of some sort of a 
common logic of appropriateness among countries with historical, geographical and cultural ties. 
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countries, can be attributed to the “dominance of a red-tape philosophy, to the 
traditional compliance with formal rules and to the extensive presence of ex-ante 
controls” (2008, 92). Similar pernicious effects of legalism have been devised by Lippi, 
according to which “a superfluity of laws on the same subject enacted at different times 
has generated greater ambiguity rather than reducing it” (Lippi 2003, 160). He argues 
further that reforms based as a legal obligation instead of as a voluntary choice, are 
likely to be conducive to a formal implementation of reforms, without changing the 
standard operating procedures (Kuhlmann 2010).  
 
Preview of the empirical chapters and case selection. 
The chapters in this ‘Italian collection’ are intended to contribute both to their 
respective specialized literatures and to the broader scholarship on the dynamics of 
public policy change.  
The chapter on “Government Innovation Policy in Italy (1993-2002): 
Understanding the Invention and Persistence of a Public Management Reform”36 has 
advanced the studies on public management reform in Italy. By showing that the 
initiatives aimed at promoting government innovation in Italy between 1993 and 2002 
enjoyed relative continuity and a consistent direction, the chapter has questioned the 
established view that efforts aimed at administrative modernization are bound to fail due 
to the insurmountable barriers posed by the country’s state traditions. The chapter 
concludes that not only the outcomes of public management reform initiatives are more 
varied than the current literature demonstrates, but also that the theoretical approach in 
36 The chapter has been published as a paper included in a journal symposium resulting from a research 
project on “Comparative historical analysis of public management policy cycles in France, Italy and 
Spain.” (Barzelay and Gallego 2010a; Barzelay and Gallego 2010b; Corbett 2010; Mele 2010).  
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the established literature attributes excessive causal influence to the governmental 
system’s legalistic traditions. 
The chapter “Dynamics of Electronic Government Policies: The case of Italy 
(1992-2003)”37 has expanded the empirical scope of the comparative research on public 
management policy change with a study set in a domain that had not been previously 
investigated with this analytical lens. More importantly, the chapter has contributed to 
advance the literature on E-government by focusing on the dynamics of policy change. 
Providing explanatory claims that combine actor-centric and event-centric explanations 
of an E-government policy cycle trajectory, the chapter has responded to recent calls for 
the theoretical anchorage of E-government research in established public policy 
frameworks.  
The third chapter of this collection, entitled “Explaining the Unexpected Success 
of the Smoking Ban in Italy: Political Strategy and Transition to Practice”, unfolds in a 
markedly different policy domain, healthcare, and deals with an issue highly visible to 
public opinion (Hilgartner and Bosk 1998). The chapter reveals the subtle strategies 
policy entrepreneurs can employ in managing political feasibility, thus increasing their 
chance of success in highly legalistic administrative settings. The chapter has followed 
the policy cycle beyond the final decision stage to include an early phase of 
implementation. This phase, labeled ‘transition to practice’, requires actions such as 
maintenance of political consensus and intergovernmental coordinating mechanisms, 
especially in countries where formal approval ought to be translated into regulatory 
documents. The vast majority of studies patterned on institutional processualism stop at 
the decisional stage, with scant examples of the adoption of IP to understand 
implementation (Asquer 2012; Barzelay and Shvets 2006). To my knowledge, this is the 
37 The chapter has been published as a paper included in a journal symposium on “Public service 
innovation” (Farneti and Young 2008; Korteland and Bekkers 2008; Mele 2008; Moore and Hartley 
2008; Osborne et al. 2008; Samaratunge et al. 2008). 
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only study that combines, at least partially, the pre-implementation and the early 
implementation phase. The policy episode includes two cycles: one that stops before the 
decision is taken and one resulting in the approval of the ban. This allows to compare 
through an IP framework a case of decision and one of non-decision and, in doing so, it 
also responds to the call for a focus of policy studies on both decision and non-decisions 
(Hill 2005, Kay 2006). These two features of the case help us better understand the 
analytical potential of IP, while differentiating between the choices of the research 
design and its intrinsic limitations.  
In the conclusion I will account for the potential differences between policy domains. 
However, I anticipate that in all three cases the image of the policy issue is bipartisan, 
that is to say it does not split the public opinion nor the political spectrum between left 
and right wing. This common feature attenuates what may otherwise be an intractable 
difference. It also provides some interesting analytical insights through the case 
comparison.    
Last, the three cases share the same country setting. Italy, as I have discussed in the 
previous section, has been mostly on the radar of public policy scholars with an 
‘administrative traditions’ perspective, which has explored the adverse consequences of 
an highly legalistic, Napoleonic culture on reform efforts. The case comparison takes 
issue with the notion of state tradition. However, the selected framework allows me to 
explore the interplay between entrepreneurship and legalism to offer more fine-grained 
views of the policy dynamics activated in this setting. The Italian administrative setting 
offers another particularity, i.e. the short duration of governments, whose mandate is 
interrupted by frequent turnovers. This specificity can be exploited to refine our 
understanding of key concepts such as the policy window and the interdependencies 
between streams, and the concluding section aims to do so.   
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1. GOVERNMENT INNOVATION POLICY IN ITALY (1993-2002): 
UNDERSTANDING THE INVENTION AND PERSISTENCE OF A PUBLIC 
MANAGEMENT REFORM∗ 
Introduction 
Understanding how political conditions and processes influence public management 
institutions, policies, and routines is a significant field-level research enterprise in 
executive politics and public administration. A strong tendency within this enterprise is 
to report and analyze public management reform at the level of countries, whether 
considered significant cases in themselves (Benz and Goetz 1996; Campbell and 
Halligan 1992; Pusey 1991) or as a basis for comparative analysis (Barzelay 2001, 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000; Zifcak 1994). Reflecting this tendency, research literature 
on public management reform in Italy has developed over the past decade (Panozzo 
2000, Capano 2003; Gualmini 2008; Ongaro 2006; Ongaro and Valotti 2008). Most of 
this scholarship has looked at Italy as an instance of a Napoleonic country (Ongaro and 
Valotti 2008). In stylized terms38, the highly legalistic state traditions are broadly held 
accountable for disabling reform efforts (Capano 2003; Gualmini 2008; Lippi 2000; 
Panozzo 2000). The argument that Italy’s legalistic public administration tradition is 
such a powerful and pervasive force that public management policy and practice remain 
stable would thus appear to have become established knowledge. However, this chapter 
sets forth two significant reservations about it. The first reservation is that outcomes of 
public management reform initiatives are empirically more varied in Italy than the 
current literature allows – as documented by this chapter’s in-depth case study of Italy’s 
episode involving the issue of government innovation. The second reservation is that the 
∗Mele, V. 2010. ‘Government Innovation Policy in Italy (1993-2002). Understanding the Invention and 
Persistence of a Public Management Reform’. Governance 23(2).  
38 See the introductory chapter for a more extensive discussion 
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theoretical approach in the established literature attributes questionable causal influence 
to the governmental system’s legalistic tradition of public administration.  
This chapter presents a variation-finding case study (Ragin 1987, McAdam, 
Tilly, and Tarrow 2001). The case is the career of the public management issue of 
government innovation policy from its inception in 1993 through 2002, when the 
analysis concludes. During the first one-year interval of this policy cycle, top-level 
policy-makers formulated and championed the issue of “government innovation” and 
developed, as well as instituted, a policy initiative called the Projects for Change 
program. The second interval of policy-making occurred in 1997-8, leading to the 
launch of the Programme for Change, and pursued similar change objectives by 
somewhat different means. The third interval occurred in 2002, leading to the 
inauguration of Construction Sites for Change. The policy issue of government 
innovation thus enjoyed an extended career between 1993 and 2002 – with three 
intervals of policy-making, each altering the design of programs to promote government 
innovation. Overall, the series of three policy-making intervals constituted an issue 
career characterized by the same direction of public management policy choices on a 
decadal time-scale. Because of this series of policy choices, novel public management 
policy and practice effectively became normalized. In this respect, among others, the 
case of government innovation policy is analytically different from those on which the 
established literature appears to be based.      
This chapter considers the career of the government innovation policy from 
1993-2002 as a single cycle of public management policy-making. The overall arc of 
this policy cycle is that of a progressive development of policy and practice, rather than 
that of an initiative that decayed in the face of deeply-rooted structural tendencies.  
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The policy cycle is divided into three intervals. The first concluded with the 
choice to institute the Projects for Change program, mentioned above. The second 
included the choice to institute the Programme for Change, and the third interval 
included the choice to institute the Construction Sites for Change program. The chapter 
reports the three-interval policy cycle narratively before presenting a research argument 
that explains its various trajectories and outcomes. More specifically, with respect to the 
first interval, the chapter explains why the issue of innovation was introduced into the 
policy agenda and why the design of the Projects for Change program came about. 
With respect to the second and third intervals, the chapter explains why the direction of 
policy choices remained stable and how follow-up programs for government innovation 
were instituted.    
On the basis of this analysis, the chapter qualifies the established literature on 
the politics of public management policy making in Italy, and it does so by challenging 
the theoretical case that the country’s state tradition and legalistic culture operates as an  
indomitable structural constraint on public management reform. In the chapter, actor-
centric forms of explanation include the conduct of executive and legislative politicians 
that actively discredited these traditions, influencing the path and outcome of agenda-
setting in the innovation policy. Event-centric forms of causal explanation include the 
stability of Ministry jurisdiction, the bi-partisan issue image of government innovation, 
the ability of the policy community to manage the frequent political transitions and to 
routinize the initiative upgrades. Consequently, the research argument shows how the 
characteristics of meso-structures (e.g. policy subsystems) are deeply implicated in 
public management reform. 
This chapter’s research design includes Kingdon’s (1984) framework for 
describing conditions and occurrences as belonging within three parts of a policy cycle 
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– agenda-setting, alternative-specification, and decision-making. The description of the 
political-governmental system includes what Kingdon calls the political stream and 
what Baugmartner and Jones (1994) call policy subsystems. The time-path of certain 
agenda issue properties, as well as those of policy alternatives, are among the 
explananda of the historical research argument. This explanatory argument is structured 
as a narrative (Abell 2004); combining event-centric forms of causal explanation along 
with actor-centric forms of intentionalist explanation (Hedström 2005). Some of the 
specific explanatory claims draw on theoretically defined social mechanisms, including 
organizational learning and commitment dynamics (Kelman 2005; Levitt and March 
1988). 
Data collection for this research project followed a triangulation strategy to draw 
on the particular strengths of various data sources in order to validate the findings and 
conclusions (Creswell 1994; Marshall and Rossman 1995). Three sources of data were 
used: in-depth interviews (See Appendix A), written documents and archival reports. 
During the field research (2003-2005) access to both internal documents and to the 
interviewees was facilitated by the author’s work as a consultant for the Public 
Administration Department within the Prime Minister Council (1999 and 2000). All 
interviews were transcribed and subsequently coded using ATLAS software for 
qualitative data analysis according to the theory-driven meta-categories of the research 
framework. Based on the interviews and corroborated by analysis of the documents, the 
thick narrative was drafted and, in a subsequent phase, analysed using the theoretical 
framework developed for the research project. An iterative process, which required 
strong coordination efforts with the authors conducting the parallel cases, cycled back 
and forth between the data and the emerging analysis and theory, leading to a constant 
refinement of the findings.  
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Narrating Innovation Policy in Italy 
The Long Wave of Government Innovation Programs in Italy 
Administrative reform has been an issue in Italy ever since the establishment of the 
modern nation-state following reunification in 1861. This reformist vocation was 
evident as early as 1865, when a senator spoke of Italy’s “uncontainable aspiration to 
reform” (Sepe 1996, 81); it reappeared in the post-WWII period. A first interval of 
reform in the post-war reconstruction period was carried out in the name of adjusting 
the public sector to the Constitution’s democratic principles.  This interval generated a 
stable institutional base in the Office for Bureaucratic Reform in 1948. A second reform 
interval, extending from 1961 to 1972, instead was guided by an agenda of planning and 
efficiency.   
 
Projects for Change 
The beginning of the Italian government’s novel policy to promote innovation in public 
administration was marked by the launch of an initiative called Projects for Change39. 
The initiative was developed and proposed by the Ministry of Public Administration 
during 1993, and was approved by the Council of Ministers in the same year. In 
advocating for this initiative, the Public Administration Minister, Sabino Cassese, 
claimed that it would not only help modernize the central administration, but would also 
reduce public expenditure. To understand the genesis of Projects for Change and the 
government innovation policy, the early stages of this interval of the policy episode 
need to be set in the historical context of the early 1990s, including a massive shake-up 
in Italian politics and macroeconomic instability.   
39 The original title of the initiative Projects for Change was Progetti Finalizzati a sperimentare soluzioni 
innovative per migliorare la funzionalità e l’efficienza delle prestazioni delle Pubbliche Amministrazioni, 
con particolare riguardo a quelle aventi immediata rilevanza per gli utenti (Projects finalised at 
experimenting innovative solutions to improve the functionality and the effectiveness of the Public 
Administrations’ services, with specific reguard to the ones with immediate impact on the final users). 
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Setting the Agenda 
The political shake-up began partly by design: a referendum in 1991 introduced an 
electoral reform, which came to undermine the hegemonic position of the Christian 
Democratic Party. The electoral reform was followed by the so-called ‘clean-hands 
scandal’, which intensified as the media revealed prodigious evidence of political 
corruption, including bribery, which judicial authorities had been taking advantage of 
for years. The ‘clean-hands’ scandal led to the collapse of the government in 1992, 
removing the Christian Democrats from power and allowing other parties to regroup 
and reposition themselves. For example, the Communist Party reinvented itself as the 
Italian Democratic Party of the Left.  
 A government headed by Giuliano Amato (1992-1993) was followed by one 
headed by Carlo Ciampi (1993-94). These governments incorporated experts, including 
academics, many of whom had no formal political affiliation. “There was the 
opportunity to create a new political class, one that knew what it was talking about” 
(Interview with Bruno Dente, June 2005). Ciampi’s own career had been based in the 
central bank, where he rose to the most senior office. In assembling his council of 
ministers, Ciampi appointed Sabino Cassese as Minister of Public Administration. A 
well-known professor of administrative law, Cassese had established his credentials as 
an expert on the public administration’s functioning through his participation in writing 
the so-called Giannini Report, back in the 1970s. 
Prime Minister Ciampi faced widespread public discontent with state institutions 
when he became Prime Minister in April 1993, along with a need to stabilize the 
economy. In his investiture speech40 before Parliament on May 6, 1993, the new Prime 
Minister sought to reassure the public that “economic recovery does not mean the end 
40 This speech is a formal requirement for the candidate President, shortly before being officially 
designated. In his address, he asks for the support of the Parliament that will appoint him. 
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of the welfare state.” In order to cushion the impact of the economic crisis on the 
welfare state, Ciampi called for the modernization and rationalization of the central 
administration, in the following terms: “We need to prepare the action of the future 
administrations for their modernization, which cannot be deferred further (…). We 
consider a priority interventions aimed at making each lira of public expenditure more 
efficient and rationalizing public procurement.” 
The enhanced role of the Ministry of Public Administration began to become 
evident at this early stage of the Ciampi government. The signals came in the form of a 
prime ministerial announcement in May 1993 on how formulation of the 1994-96 state 
budget would now proceed.  Three changes were indicated. First, the Ministry for 
Public Administration was allowed to participate in the process, for the first time. This 
process had previously been limited to the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Finance, the 
budget ministries and the State’s General Accountant. Second, the Prime Minister 
directed all ministries to critically review their costs in order to reduce spending through 
the rationalization of the public administration’s organization and functioning. Third, 
Ciampi authorized the Ministry for Public Administration to steer, coordinate and 
regulate all the matters concerning the public sector and the civil servants, and he made 
a specific request that the ministry draw up a report on the conditions of the Italian 
bureaucracy and guidelines on how to modernize the bureaucracy, for consideration by 
the Council of Ministers. This request served as a mandate for the study led by Cassese, 
using the model of his distant but familiar predecessor, Massimo Giannini.   
In order to understand the actions and events in 1993, it is important to look 
back more than fifteen years to the end of the 1970s, when Cassese and others 
participated in studies leading to the publication of the Rapporto Giannini. At the end of 
the 1970’s, the mechanisms of government were reorganized to establish a Ministry for 
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Public Administration, and the Office for Bureaucratic Reform ceased to exist. The new 
ministry was intended to function as a general management agency for the entire central 
administration, with specific authority over public personnel regulation. In its early 
days, the ministry began an extensive survey of problems in Italy’s central 
administration, led directly by the minister, Massimo Giannini. The overall study was 
organized in four commissions, on administrative techniques, urban planning and 
information technology, personnel, and restructuring the central administration to suit 
regional devolution, respectively. The results of the study were published in a major 
report, known even today as the Rapporto Giannini. The report did not, however, lead 
to the enactment or implementation of reforms, as Giannini failed to survive a change in 
government in 1980. Nonetheless, the study influenced an entire class of public leaders 
and academics in matters of public administration. A common conviction of these 
participants was that organizational improvement did not have to depend only on 
legislative reforms because steps could also be taken through administrative tools. 
Giannini was convinced that, “this new approach to reform obviously required 
continuity of action, of decision making, of encouragement and of evaluation” (Giannini 
1982, 720). The full flowering of this approach awaited the effort to reform the Italian 
state following the breakdown of the post-war political order in the early 1990’s. 
In 1993, Cassese organized and led a team of experts from outside the Ministry 
to assess the conditions of public administration in Italy, and to develop possible 
solutions soon after the mandate was received. The project offered a means for 
intervening in what was considered a malfunctioning bureaucratic apparatus. The first 
report on “The Conditions of the Italian Bureaucracy” focused on problems. 
Specifically, it mapped the sectors and the services with the highest levels of citizen 
dissatisfaction and the public functions with inadequate planning. It included critical 
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factors that demonstrated incomplete or, on the contrary, redundant organization, the 
deficiencies in managing, recruiting, and allocating public personnel. The survey listed 
the weaknesses of decision-making processes characterized by fragmentary and 
ineffective procedures and the constraints in distributing and using resources. The 
second report focused on solutions.  Entitled, “Guidelines for Modernizing the Public 
Administration,” the report called for seven lines of improvement, including serving 
citizens through public offices, making the bureaucracy less centralized and closer to 
the communities. This entailed simplifying the structures of the public administration to 
make them less cost-intensive and easier to access and understand; introducing more 
effective control systems, and making the administration more “European.” By issuing 
the two reports from the project, Cassese and his team tried to prompt debate within the 
Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the public administration, and public opinion.  
At the same time the Ministry for Public Administration, in charge of steering 
the rationalization of the whole public administration, was requested to examine its own 
expenditure. This process was conducted by Cassese in conjunction with the rest of the 
Council of Ministers and, for the first time, the Ministry of Public Administration 
moved from the traditional role of “expenditure advocate” in defense of the civil 
servants’ interests, to one of “treasury guardian” (Interview with Pia Marconi, March 
2005). The negotiations within the Council of Ministers were thereby eased. 
 
Developing “Projects for Change” 
Drafting the report had another crucial impact on the formulation of government 
innovation policy. Faced with the evidence of 3,600,000 employees and several 
thousand public entities, the team concluded on the one hand, that neither the 
Parliament nor the government had the power to reform this bureaucratic machine 
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entirely and immediately. On the other hand, only few administrations, particularly at 
the local level, had already addressed thorny problems, such as citizen satisfaction, 
accounting and reporting methods or performance pay systems, pioneering innovative 
solutions. As a result, the team decided to focus on experimenting with new practices in 
public organizations, preferring the “bottom-up versus top-down approach to the 
reform.” The next step was to translate this idea into an initiative aimed at supporting 
the large reform efforts with specific projects, at the central and local level, which could 
be tested, introduced and then spread throughout the administration.  
After benchmarking programs for change in the UK, France, Spain, the US, and 
elsewhere, Cassese decided to build on a model that had been developed in Italy a few 
years before the political change had brought about the “government of professors.” The 
model had its genesis in a 1988 law that established a fund to undertake projects aimed 
at improving public efficiency. In assessing these projects, Cassese’s team identified 
severe shortcomings of the scheme. The inadequacies included the lack of visibility of 
the initiative as a whole. Beyond this, none of the projects had been presented by a 
public administration, but rather by consulting firms and information technology 
vendors. As a consequence, some of the projects were aimed exclusively at buying 
hardware and software. Those that did not include a role for public personnel were 
carried out by external consultants. Some projects were geared towards acquiring funds 
to reduce work backlogs; others took for granted the collaboration of various 
administrations, which in practice did not cooperate. “All in all, the scheme was viewed 
as having been poorly implemented.” (Interview with Pia Marconi, March 2005).  
Cassese’s expert group decided that the concept of orchestrating pilot projects 
still provided the most promising means to pursue a bottom-up strategy of reforming 
practices in Italy’s public administration at the time. They sought to avoid the problems 
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that had beset the earlier iteration by modifying selection criteria and processes. The 
eligibility criteria aimed to exclude projects that solved contingent problems and to 
conduct straightforward studies. Furthermore, the criteria were geared to accepting 
projects that would be carried out under the direction of public employees and that 
could be replicated. 
 
Finalizing and Launching “Projects for Change” 
Negotiations within the Council of Ministers and the new deal of the expenditure 
planning phase, which had linked the administrative reform to the goal of deficit 
reduction created the conditions for the inclusion of the pilot projects in the 1994 state 
budget. However, two circumstances determined a sharp revision of the initiative. 
Meetings with the Finance Ministry and with the State General Accounting Office 
between July and October 1993 led to severe scrutiny of the projects already in place. 
The financial law included an article on the discipline of the pilot projects: the 
previously appropriated funds were significantly reduced for years to come and a 
detailed annex stated the differences between the old and the new initiative. 41 The 
article was approved with minor amendments by Parliament, and the entire financial 
law was issued in late December 1993.  
Early in 1994, the Ministry decided to launch the new version of the pilot 
projects in order to ensure visibility of the initiative. The Ministry of Public 
Administration, carrying out its original mission, was in charge of promoting, selecting 
and controlling the projects through an ad hoc Team (Nucleo Progetti Finalizzati) and a 
scientific committee. The Team was expected to sustain the administrations throughout 
the phases and to disseminate the results. More importantly, the Ministry was 
41 The reduction was 14 billion Lire, approximately 7 million euros. 
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responsible for removing normative and procedural barriers, which could impede the 
full-fledged development of the projects.  
Three elements of the 1993 Projects for Change were novel. The first was the 
inclusion of the initiative in the bigger picture of government rationalization and in the 
deficit cutting process. The second was the choice to sustain innovative administrations 
in the planning and implementation phase. The third was the recognition of the 
limitations of previous attempts to change the bureaucracy, based on top-down legal 
reforms. These elements determined the beginning of a new policy cycle in 1993. Let us 
now move to the second interval of the policy episode, resulting in the launch of the 
Program for Change. 
 
Program for Change 
Setting the agenda 
After Projects for Change was launched early in 1994, the implementation process 
progressed slowly. The policy for government innovation had not been a priority for the 
two governments that ruled the country in 1994 and 1995. The government innovation 
policy continued as a low priority when Romano Prodi was elected Prime Minister in 
April 1996. The political program of the first Left coalition emphasized building 
consensus between the government, business and trade unions, maintaining a strong 
stand in fiscal policy to meet European Monetary Union criteria, promoting 
privatization, and completing electoral reforms.  
Prodi named Franco Bassanini as minister of public administration in May. A 
professor of constitutional law and member of the Parliament since 1979, Bassanini 
came from the group of experts, who had worked on the Giannini Report in the late 
seventies. Between the 1970’s and the early 80’s, Bassanini directed several ministerial 
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commissions on the decentralization of functions from the central state to the regions. 
Once the Left Democratic Party was established in 1992, he became its leader on state, 
regions and constitutional reforms.    
Though the issue of government innovation had not scored high in the political 
program of the Left coalition it was revived by Bassanini. Improving the country’s 
economic performance without raising taxes or decreasing the services became an 
overall challenge faced by the new government. Recalling this time, Bassanini 
commented on how this overall challenge translated into an agenda for changing the 
orientation of public administration toward efficiency and service quality:    
 
“In the mid nineties it was evident to me that government innovation couldn’t be just a 
matter of costs, but rather quality of public services as a competitiveness factor. 
Globalization, the rise of information society and the European Union were phenomena 
that could be dealt with only with the quality of services. The administrative costs we 
had in Italy were not to be assessed only in terms of GDP percentage, but in terms of 
general impacts on the country. Too much bureaucracy was negative for businesses, and 
negative for citizens”. (Interview with Bassanini, May 2005) 
 
In 1996, Bassanini began to prepare a comprehensive and government-wide reform 
aimed at modernizing practices and organizational structures. The reform was 
conceived in terms of the three building blocks of administrative simplification, of 
introduction of managerial tools, and of functional devolution to local administrations. 
The case for simplification had been made by the Confederation of Italian Industry-
Confindustria, among other actors. The case for introduction of managerial tools had 
long been accepted by experts on administration, stretching at least as far back as the 
Rapporto Giannini. The third element came from the recently accelerated devolution 
process. The introduction a few years prior, of the direct elections for municipalities and 
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provinces, had given actors within the recently formed Northern League party and from 
the Left Democrats their first opportunities to hold office. Local administrations 
demanded more autonomy, irrespective of their political affiliation. As they were eager 
to show a focus on decentralization and modernization, these otherwise opposing actors 
each endorsed the issue of government innovation. The agenda for modernizing 
practices and organizational structures gained support from each of the four left-wing 
governments that led the country during the 1996-2001 legislature, as well as from the 
parliamentary opposition.42   
The main reason was that this agenda was perceived as bi-partisan, given 
consensus on simplification and devolution. The issue of government innovation and of 
the need to establish an ad-hoc initiative also enjoyed a relative continuity because of 
Bassanini’s ability to survive government reshuffles. However, this ability was not 
absolute: Bassanini vacated the post of Minister for a year and a half in the middle of 
the parliamentary mandate. Nonetheless, Bassanini continued to play the role of reform 
champion during this interlude, as the Secretary of the Council of Ministers. This 
relative continuity also allowed for the progressive creation of a reform-oriented team 
within the Public Administration Ministry. Most of the top civil servants directing the 
Ministry were substituted by a team of public managers selected for their profile of 
innovators and on average twenty years younger than the previous ones. For instance, 
Pia Marconi, a young manager from the private sector who had been working as a 
consultant for the ministry in 1993 under Cassese, was appointed Director General of 
the Office for Procedures and Administrative Efficiency. 
 
42 Prodi, D’Alema (I), D’Alema (II) and Amato led the four executives between 1996 and 2001. Bassanini 
in his speech to the Fifth Global Forum on Reinventing Government, 3-7 November 2003 (p.5-6) stated 
that, “the strong political support that the three Prime Ministers in charge provided, in my capacity as 
Cabinet Minister responsible for Public Administration and to the Reform, proved to be, in my 
experience, the trump card permitting me to win the game or, at least, to avoid failure.” 
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Developing the Program for Change 
The staff of the Office for Procedures and Administrative Efficiency calculated that the 
resources needed to carry out a reform included large investments in information and 
communication technology (ICT), training and education and the recruitment of 50,000-
100,000 young employees, able to introduce fresh professional skills. However, during 
a period in which the government was striving to reduce the state debt and to cut 
spending, the appropriation of funds to advance the reform was considered unfeasible. 
In Bassanini’s words (May 2005), “We were not in the condition to ask the finance 
ministry for billions of lire. So, we had to make a wedding banquet with dried figs.”   
After realizing that the resource scarcity would impede structural investment, the 
team considered launching new initiatives aimed at sustaining the innovation in the 
Italian public administration. Their review of the experience of Projects for Change led 
to the conclusion that this ongoing initiative was a viable model. In addition, the 
fundamental idea of a central agency responsible for igniting, supporting and spreading 
innovation throughout the public administration, which had inspired the Projects for 
Change in 1993, perfectly matched the current vision of the wider administrative 
reform. 
The team evaluated the experience with Projects for Change to improve on 
its design and operation. They observed that some of the available funds had been 
allocated to central and local administrations willing to experiment with new ideas. 
Some critical concepts emerged from the evaluation of the funded projects. There 
was general agreement that funds had been given to innovative projects, albeit of a 
diverse nature. The project selection was poorly managed, “by giving incentives to 
the administrations simply for experimenting, without defining the priorities, without 
a strategic vision on innovation” (Interview with Mauro Bonaretti and Renato Tasca, 
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May 2005). Overall, the view was that allocation of funds had been based more on 
distributional than instrumental criteria. 
In March 1997, the Public Administration Ministry obtained the government’s 
support for cancelling the funds appropriated to projects deemed to be out of alignment 
with the modernization policy, in order to release resources for projects aligned with the 
new innovation objectives. The Parliament ratified this solution with minor 
amendments.43 A scientific committee composed of top civil servants, academics and 
consultants was created to evaluate the projects and identify those that did not achieve 
the expected results and those projects whose results were unlikely to be replicable.  
The latter specification had been the result of a debate in the community of 
experts that was progressively coalescing within and around the Ministry. The academic 
studies on government reform and innovation intensified, the ministerial staffs were 
frequently exposed to international networks and the ex-post analysis of the previous 
initiatives highlighted strengths and weaknesses of innovation practices. As a result, the 
team gained greater awareness of the skills and leadership attached to innovation and to 
the practice of innovating. Spreading and sustaining change started to be considered as a 
process rather than as an event. As such, they needed constant managerial efforts.  
The lessons learned through the examination of domestic and international 
practices were mainly focused on the spectrum of the projects to be funded. Leaving the 
concept of government innovation excessively broad could confirm the reputation of an 
initiative that distributed funds in a non-targeted way. Subsidizing too many and very 
diverse projects increased the risks of dispersing the resources. Organizing the selection 
with a call for funds increased the risk of collecting applications from administrations 
that did not represent the core target of the policy. These shortcomings had a common 
43 Parliamentary Meeting 17 January 1997. 
69 
 
                                                          
denominator, and the community of practice progressively recognized it in the lack of 
central management. 
 
Finalizing and Launching Program for Change 
In July 1998, the policy for government innovation entered a new phase. In the context 
of a comprehensive plan for the bureaucratic reform, with a group of skilled people and 
a secured knowledge of the issue, the Ministry for Public Administration issued a new 
directive for regulating the pilot projects. The initiative Projects for Change was 
relabelled Program for Change,44 in order to signal the centrally coordinated efforts. 
Unlike the previous initiative, Program for Change was to fund a limited number of 
projects, all keyed to issues directly related to the three reform pillars that the ministry 
considered strategic and therefore of high priority. Also, unlike the previous initiative, 
the projects were conceived of and promoted directly by the Ministry. Furthermore, the 
projects were designed to include local and central administrations, considered as 
“partner organizations.” The spirit of the new initiative was expressed in the following 
terms: 
“Program for change was based on the concept of collective learning and cultural 
growth. It did not just help the administrations to implement the reform, but also had a 
genuine impact on the bureaucratic system. It was not just training, but a 
systematization of the experiences of the administrations.” (Interview with Mauro 
Bonaretti, May 2005) 
 
The Program started to run in January 1998, after six (out of the eight) projects 
initially planned for had been selected. The six projects included in the Program for 
Change concerned, respectively, procedural simplification, new forms of public 
44 In 1998 the initiative Progetti Finalizzati a sperimentare soluzioni innovative per migliorare la 
funzionalità e l’efficienza delle prestazioni delle Pubbliche Amministrazioni, con particolare riguardo a 
quelle aventi immediata rilevanza per gli utenti, commonly known as Progetti Finalizzati was re-labelled 
Programma Progetti Finalizzati. 
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contracting, integrated communication of the reform, regulatory impact analysis, best 
practices in managerial control and flexibility of public employment.45 By March 1999 
all six projects had been launched. A small team of external experts, mainly consultants 
and academics contracted on an ad hoc basis by the Ministry, managed each of the six 
projects. For each of these, the Ministry established agreements with local and central 
administrations in order to develop and test new solutions. The Office for the Procedure 
and Administrative Efficiency, under the direction of Pia Marconi, supervised all of the 
teams. The projects began to be wrapped up as general elections approached. 
 While the projects were under way, the Office for Procedures and 
Administrative Efficiency was renamed as the Office for Innovation in Public 
Administration, with Marconi continuing to act as director. One role of the office was to 
bring together academics, consultants and civil servants and to form a community of 
practice. The first “Innovation Day” demonstrated the visibility reached by the issue of 
innovation, during the same month as general elections were held.    
 
Construction Sites for Change 
Following a government turnover, with the victory of Silvio Berlusconi’s House of 
Freedom electoral coalition in May 2001, the government innovation policy cycle 
entered a third phase.   While the issue of government innovation was not mentioned in 
the coalition’s electoral program, Berlusconi’s government seemed eager to signal 
45 The projects were crafted to collect experiences and to develop new skills around the three pillars of the 
Bassanini grand plan to reform the administration. In particular, the projects ‘procedural simplification’ 
and ‘regulatory impact analysis’ were aimed at experimenting solutions and developing skills with 
reference to the reform goal of administrative simplification. The project ‘new forms of public 
contracting’, ‘best practices in managerial control’ and ‘flexibility of public employment’ were 
instrumental to the reform goal of introducing managerial tools. All these projects gave specific emphasis 
to the role and the inclusion of local administrations, in accordance to the third reform pillar of functional 
devolution to local administrations. Last, the project ‘integrated communication of the reform’ was aimed 
at raising awareness among public sector organizations about the changes connected to the reform, as 
well as to collect feedbacks on the reform implementation among selected key targets, i.e. private 
entrepreneurs, civil servants and journalists.   
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discontinuity with its predecessor in any and all policy domains. Nonetheless, a new 
ministerial initiative, Construction Sites for Change came to be supported both by the 
Council of Ministers and by the pre-existing community of practice. 46   
      
Setting the Agenda  
The issue of government innovation did not score highly in the political agenda of the 
new government. The week before the 2001 elections, Berlusconi appeared on 
television to sign a "contract with the Italian people,” promising to enact a large tax cut, 
change the policing of urban centers, increase minimum pensions, cut unemployment by 
50 per cent, and rebuild Italian infrastructures. In several public discourses, however, 
the issue of reforming the public administration had been mentioned in terms of making 
life easier for citizens and businesses, particularly through the use of information and 
communication technologies (ICT's). This issue was receiving growing attention since 
2000, when Bassanini launched the Electronic Government Action Plan. 
The Executive marked the definitive separation between the issue of Electronic 
Government and the issue of government innovation. The first became a task of the 
newly established Ministry for Innovation and New Technologies, while the second 
remained a task of the Ministry for Public Administration, under the leadership of 
Franco Frattini. The new minister for public administration was familiar with the issue 
of government innovation and with the evolution of the associated initiatives launched 
by the Ministry. He had already been in charge of this office, for approximately one 
year, during the 1995 transitional government, managing the funds allocation of 
Projects for Change. Afterwards, he had actively participated as a minority member to 
46 The new initiative was labelled “Cantieri per il cambiamento nelle Amministrazioni Pubbliche” 
(Construction Sites for Change in Public Administrations) and became commonly known as Cantieri 
(Construction Sites).  
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the parliamentary debates on the bureaucratic reform and on the Program for Change in 
1997.47  
From the previous government, Frattini inherited an organizational unit in 
charge of innovating: the Office for Innovation in Public Administration. The six 
projects included in the Program for Change were being systematically completed by 
the office. Early in his tenure, Frattini confirmed the office’s place in the Ministry’s 
structure as well as Marconi as director.   
The issue, though familiar to the new minister, was not easy to reformulate in 
accordance with the three distinct viewpoints within the ruling coalition. Forza Italia, 
consistent with conventional right-wing rhetoric, conceived of innovation as shrinking 
the state in favor of the private sphere and business freedom. For the Northern League48, 
government innovation implied a federalist form of state where the bulk of public 
activities ought to be planned and carried out at the local level. These two visions had to 
be combined with the conservative view of the National Alliance, a party that enlisted 
civil servants among its main constituencies.  
A synthesis of these perspectives started to emerge in late 2001, during the 
meetings between the new minister and his staff. The issue of government innovation 
was shaped as a process aimed at delivering benefits, long lasting and visible, directly to 
citizens and businesses. Government innovation was not an issue that concerned public 
47 See, for example, the intervention of Franco Frattini to the parliamentary discussion on the amendments 
proposed by the Executive on Article 16 concerning the possibility to withdraw funding to the Projects 
for Change not in line with the Law on public sector reform and administrative simplification. Acts of the 
Parliamentary Meeting n. 139, 30 January 1997, p.11472. 
48 In the late 1980s this political movement with roots in Milan and its hinterland merged other northern 
leagues from Piedmont, the Veneto and elsewhere in 1991, and formed the Northern League (Lega Nord). 
In the early 1990s, it represented itself as the agent of the “North that produces” against an Italian South 
“that consumes” at the North’s expense. “At bottom, the League represents the Italy of producers, whose 
capital is Milan, in counterpoint to Rome, capital of the old party system (“partitocrazia”) and of state 
centralism” (Diamanti and Mannheimer, 1994, p.ix). 
73 
 
                                                          
administration as a whole, but, rather, the single units and agencies. It was based on the 
concept of empowerment and it was intended as bottom-up innovation.   
In late 2001 the issue definition was completed. While Program for Change had 
been implemented on the principles introduced by the extensive reform of 1997, the 
new Ministry could not introduce further regulation into the system. The negotiations 
and the debate about the next steps of the Office for Government Innovation moved 
from the acknowledgement that a “legal moratorium was needed, and that any new 
initiative had not to be considered instrumental to the legal reforms” (Interview with Pia 
Marconi, March 2005). 
 
Developing Construction Sites for Change 
The office started to develop the new initiative in late 2001. Under Frattini and 
Marconi’s direction, the Office for Innovation in Public Administration and the external 
experts that had worked on the previous initiative exchanged ideas and experiences. It 
was clear from the beginning that the resources available for any initiative related to the 
issue of government innovation were scarce, at least compared to other public 
management programs49.  
An ex post analysis of Program for Change conducted by the Office for 
Innovation highlighted some of its limitations and some of the aspects that had to be 
better implemented. Important insights into formulating the new initiative, such as local 
administration empowerment and knowledge management, also came from Marconi’s 
work as a member of the OECD’s Public Management Committee, which in 2002 
issued “Government Modernization: A New Agenda.” This report presented a critical 
49 E.g. the Governance Program was allocated 35 million Euro for a five year period, while the 
Construction Sites for Change Initiative was allocated 1 million Euros. 
74 
 
                                                          
analysis of New Public Management principles and cases, and proposed strategies and 
tools available to improve government adaptability to the changing context.  
A round of negotiations on business-government relations also shaped the new 
initiative. The Ministry for Public Administration and the Italian Industrial Association 
signed an agreement in November 2001, aimed at encouraging the cooperation between  
public and private sectors to innovate “the public administration according to the 
demands of the business world, improving managerial practices in public 
administrations.” 50 Further negotiations took place between the office and the Italian 
Institute for Public Administration Training and Studies. The previous government had 
restructured the institute and had created CIPA, a spin-off on government cohesion and 
innovation, whose mandate included the provision of human and financial resources for 
the new initiative. 
Finally, the office conducted several meetings with local administrations to share 
ideas and expectations. They convened some of the local administrations that had been 
particularly active in experimenting with the pilot projects, and collected their 
suggestions through the “Unified Conference between Central State and Local Entities”. 
In addition to the consultation with this official Board, meetings with two associations - 
the National Association of the Italian Municipalities and the Union of the Italian 
Provinces - were also organized. While these administrations agreed with the Ministry 
on the need to receive support for innovation, they expected more autonomy in defining 
priorities and solutions. 
Local administrations recognized, since the beginning, that the new initiative 
was not a channel to receive significant amounts of funding or media coverage. The 
issue of Electronic Government, instead, was catalyzing the interest of politicians and 
50 Protocol of Understanding 6/11/2001 between Confindustria and Ministry for Public Administration, 
“Shared actions for the efficiency and quality of public administrations”.  
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public opinion (Mele, 2008), as well as the resources.51 As a result, the initiative was 
crafted as a central service to the individual administrations willing to innovate. 
 
Finalizing and Launching Construction Sites for Change 
In two months, the Office for Innovation, supported by the external experts, finalized 
“Proposals for Change”, the position document aimed at launching the new phase of 
government innovation. The document drew heavily from the works and perspective of 
the Public Management Committee of OECD. It took into consideration the political 
inputs of the ruling coalition, agreement with the Industrial Associations and exchange 
with the local administrations. The authors were the same ministerial staff members52, 
academics53 and consultants54 that had been developing Program for Change. 
In February 2002, the Minister presented to the public and to the press the 
document “Proposals for Change”, which officially launched the new initiative 
“Construction Sites for Change”, aimed at supporting government innovation through 
the institutional empowerment of the single administrations. Each “construction site” 
was going to provide research, shared guidelines and manuals developed with the public 
organizations willing to participate. The construction sites were based on a sophisticated 
system of knowledge management and were aimed at increasing the social capital of the 
single administrations. In May 2002, the office organized a second “Innovation Day,” 
during which Frattini and Marconi presented the details of Construction Sites for 
51 The previous government had appropriated the income of the UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications Systems) Auction for Electronic Government development. 
52 Sabina Bellotti, Carlo D’Orta, Pia Marconi and Paolo Testa. 
53 Prof Capano, Prof Meneguzzo, Prof Mussari and Prof La Spina. 
54 Mauro Bonaretti, Marco Mena and Renato Tasca.   
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Change to an audience including 1,700 civil servants. The launch of this initiative 
represented a further evolution of the policy cycle on government innovation.  
 
Understanding The Genesis And Dynamics Of Government Innovation Policy In 
Italy 
The episode analyzed here includes the three intervals of the policy episode of 
government innovation policy making in Italy between 1993 and 2002. This section 
attempts to give a process account of why the issue of innovation was introduced into 
the policy agenda and how the design of Projects for Change came to be decided - with 
respect to the first interval.  With respect to the second and third intervals, the section 
examines why the direction of policy choices remained stable, and how follow-up 
programs for government innovation were instituted. The following analysis is 
organized around the answers to these questions for each of the three intervals.  
 
Projects for Change 
The first question addressed here is why the issue of innovation was introduced in the 
policy agenda, resulting in the launch of the Projects for Change in 1993. The political 
crisis of 1992 led to an abrupt turnover of the whole establishment. The system was 
going through a deep transformation and while the Christian Democrats and the 
Socialists were collapsing under the allegations of bribery, the former Communist party 
was trying to reposition its ideology and discourse. The numerous corruption scandals 
that coincided with the struggle to meet the Maastricht standards brought about a new 
interest by the public in the functioning of the public sector.  The national mood was 
definitively anti-government, as indicated by impressive levels of participation in the 
referendum that exposed the state’s functioning to the voters’ opinion.  
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Members of the Executive were co-opted from the university. The experts who 
had participated in the Commissions for the Reform of Public Administration in the late 
seventies (the Giannini report) were given important positions in the so-called 
“technical” government, the prime example of this being the Minister for Public 
Administration, Sabino Cassese. The common background of the members generated a 
collective belief about the agenda priorities.   
Government innovation was introduced by the Left in the issue package, which 
signaled a modern and reformist approach to socio-economic problems. The 
implications of this approach for reforms in the public sector were broadly outlined in 
the Prime Ministerial investiture speech of Carlo A. Ciampi in 1993. He also certified 
Cassese, the Minister for Public Administration, as a policy entrepreneur by delegating 
to him the analysis of public sector problems and subsequent proposal development for 
solutions. Cassese promoted the specific issue of government innovation. Its intrinsic 
“technical” nature made it a natural candidate to rank high on the technocrat 
government agenda, and to complement other issues on the political government 
agenda. In doing so, he kept a keen eye on the expectations of the finance ministry, 
while distancing himself from his own ministry’s natural constituency of civil servants. 
Consequently, the issue of government innovation was included on the government 
agenda and packaged mainly as being instrumental to austerity measures. The nature of 
the issue was decisive in extracting the policy issue from the process of legal enactment, 
and parceling it out to the specialized agenda of the policy sub-domain.    
Here we have to account for the act of conceiving government innovation as a 
policy issue, which was done by Sabino Cassese - the Public Administration Minister - 
and his close collaborators during the first policy cycle. The temporal context represents 
an important class of explanatory factors. Within this class, a crucial factor was the 
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broad aspirational direction of government policy of Carlo Ciampi. This aspirational 
direction was toward modernization of public institutions, the shoring up of the welfare 
state, and squeezing more value out of public expenditure. The wider policy context for 
these aspirations included Italy’s commitment to join the incipient European Monetary 
Union. Delivering on this commitment required reducing the public deficit to levels 
permitted by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.   
Another aspect of the temporal context in 1993 was public opinion. Opinion 
surveys55 indicated that the public had become profoundly disappointed in government, 
while the referendum voting behavior also signaled a disillusionment with public 
administration56. For a government inclined to shore up a welfare state, this attitude 
represented a problematic condition.   
It is not difficult to understand how Sabino Cassese came to be responsible for 
expanding on the Ciampi government’s approach to public management. Cassese had 
been recruited to the ministerial post because of his prominence in one of the best- 
positioned epistemic communities in Italy, namely the academic field of public law. 
Explaining how the concept of government innovation came about as an issue definition 
is difficult to do with complete confidence. What we do know for certain is that Cassese 
entered the role of Public Administration Minister at this critical juncture with a 
prepared mind; indeed his cognition was socially supported by a solid epistemic 
community that had grown out of the effort that produced the 1970’s Giannini report. 
55 The opinion polls that preceeded the administrative elections showed the lack of trust in government 
and the coalition parties – the partiti di governo – in favor of new parties such as the Northern League 
and the National Party of the Right. (150 years of Italian history: 1861-2011. Archives Alinari - 
Università degli studi di Milano). A poll on the trust towards government revealed, “50% of the Italians 
do not believe in government” (Corriere della Sera, Historical archives, 19 March 1993). 
56 The referendum held on 19th April 1993 obtained an unprecedented turnout rate (76.8). It abrogated 
three Ministeries: 70% of votes determined the abrogation of the Ministry for Agriculture, established in 
1929; 82.3% of votes determined the abrogation f the Ministry for Tourism & Entertainment established 
in 1959 and 89% of votes determined the abrogation of the Ministry for Public Participation in Private 
Enterprises, the Ministry established in 1956 to manage public shares in private companies. In addition, 
the results of the referendum led to the reduction in scope of the functions performed by local healthcare 
agencies (82.6 of positive votes).     
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Despite the fact that academic lawyers were central to this epistemic community, 
one of the features of its outlook was that organizational improvement could be pursued 
through administrative tools and not only through legislative reform. This socially 
supported belief tended to push the search for alternatives in the direction of crafting 
long-term managerially-oriented change initiatives, in addition to preparing and selling 
legislation to alter the institutional context of public employment and functioning. In 
other words, we can attribute some of the actors’ cognitive conduct to a kind of 
organizational learning, specifically a carefully engineered one that had taken place 
more than ten years earlier. 
Turning to the question of how and why the design of Projects for Change came 
to be, policy transfer and imitation did not play a major role in developing the initiative, 
notwithstanding the official visits and the exchange of ideas between the minister and 
his foreign counterparts. The process was influenced instead by interpretations of the 
government’s own experiences and by their availability. Here, the concept of feasibility 
in selecting alternatives (Kingdon 1984) can be integrated with the concept of 
availability and proximity in developing new organizational practices (Levitt and March 
1988) to account for the decision of the minister to select an initiative that already 
existed and that had already shown its shortcomings.  
A further incentive to recycle this experience was also a result of the time 
constraints ingrained in the transitional nature of the government, which had to 
compress the innovation policy cycle into a few months. Thus, after analyzing the 
critical aspects of the previous initiative and developing possible adjustments, the 
minister and his staff of external experts finalized the initiative to reflect the repair work 
and launched Projects for Change. The participation of the Minister for Public 
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Administration in the expenditure-planning phase, coupled with his reputation as a 
“treasury guardian,” helped to secure resources for the government innovation policy.  
 
Program for Change 
The analysis of the second policy cycle explains why and how in 1997 the issue of 
government innovation was revived despite a congested agenda by employing the 
concept of familiarity with the issue of the policy entrepreneur, along with two 
concurrent spillover effects (Kingdon 1984). Franco Bassanini, the Minister for Public 
Administration appointed in 1996, came from the same policy community as Cassese, 
the minister who three years earlier had launched the Projects for Change initiative. 
They had both worked in the government reform commission in the late 1970s and had 
developed a similar conception of public sector reform also by experimenting with new 
solutions.  
As for the two spill-over effects: the first came from the policy domain of  
Europeanization and the need to match EU criteria; and the second from the policy 
domain of administrative decentralization. Government innovation was thus repackaged 
as instrumental to the country’s competitiveness on the one hand and to the 
empowerment of local administrations on the other hand. This latter domain had strong 
advocates throughout the political spectrum, ranging from the recently formed Northern 
League party to the Left Democrats undertaking their first governing experience, who 
were eager to show a focus on decentralization and modernization thus endorsing the 
issue of government innovation, which then achieved a bipartisan image. It should be 
noted that the stability of the issue on the agenda was also ensured during the four left-
wing governments that governed the country during this five-year legislature, due to the 
reputation of the policy entrepreneur. 
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Turning to the process of program development, Bassanini created a team for 
government innovation within the Ministry for Public Administration and in particular, 
attributed the organizational responsibility of expanding the issue and launching an ad 
hoc initiative to Pia Marconi, the manager who had worked as a consultant for Cassese 
in 1993. This phase was influenced by budget constraints, which obliged the policy 
entrepreneurs to ignore other options due to a perceived prohibitive cost. Consideration 
was given to both the availability of solutions and technical feasibility, thus leading to 
the decision to recycle the Projects for Change initiative.  
The feedback on this experience, coupled with the stability of the policy sub-
domain, allowed for the accumulation of knowledge on managing the design process of 
these initiatives. Additionally, the delegation of explicit responsibilities to organizations 
provided them with the opportunity to engage directly with the issue and benefit from 
previous lessons learned and vicarious experiences of other administrations. The 
practice of sustaining government innovation was refined consistently with these 
features of the design process. Thus, the initiative launched in 1998 was re-labelled 
Program for Change. Fewer projects, focused on the innovation priority of the 
government, had to be selected based on their potential achievements and of their ability 
to be replicated. The ministry was not distributing funds, but rather launching 
partnerships with selected administrations interested in developing new solutions to the 
common priorities of the Italian administrative system. The Ministry was also providing 
a platform for the exchange of innovation experiences, problems and even staff.  
 
Construction Sites for Change 
The analysis of the last cycle questions how the issue of government innovation 
remained stable on the policy agenda despite the fact that the 2001 elections brought in 
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a new party coalition led by Berlusconi, and despite the natural deadline of the Program 
for Change initiative in the same year. Over time, the issue and the related initiative had 
come to be perceived as a technical, bipartisan tool to support innovative 
administrations, regardless of their political affiliations.  
One feature of the development process that shaped the innovation initiative was  
the cohesion within the professional community of public innovators, strengthened by 
the creation of an Office for Government Innovation within the Ministry for Public 
Administration in 2000. When Silvio Berlusconi appointed Franco Frattini as Minister 
for Public Administration in 2001, a policy monopoly (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) 
had already formed. The new minister and government neither interfered in the flow of 
activities and debate that was already active and had produced positive feedback, nor 
dismantled the office in charge of coordinating the innovation efforts.  
The cohesion within the professional community of public innovators was 
enabled also by the confirmation of Pia Marconi as Director of the Office for 
Innovation. Her participation in the OECD Public Management Committee coincided 
with the development of the initiative by validating both the actor and the new program. 
On the one hand, the policy entrepreneur associated with government innovation by the 
community of experts and administrations was legitimized also at the international 
level. On the other hand, the new initiative was launched within the framework of the 
OECD recommendations of institutional empowerment and bottom-up innovations as 
key resources for the government’s ability to adapt to a changing context.  
This determined a new approach to the management of the process design, since 
the Minister linked the idea of bottom-up innovation to the idea of legal moratorium and 
took the development of the new initiative away from the process of legal enactment. 
The initiative shifted completely into the specialized agenda of the Ministry, supported 
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by the community of practice which had turned into a constituency for change (Kelman 
2005).  
The process of developing the new initiative was constrained by a concurrent 
parallel cycle. The policy entrepreneurs could not propose a large-ticket item since the 
issue of Electronic Government had captured the media’s attention including funds 
available for innovation, and had determined the establishment of an ad hoc ministry 
with specific allocations. As a consequence, while Electronic Government was 
receiving high coverage and had climbed the political agenda, the new initiative for 
government innovation, Construction Sites for Change, was crafted for a specialized 
audience. While the flagship initiative for Electronic Government was based on a call 
for projects to be funded, Construction Sites was based on a sophisticated system of 
knowledge management and support to the communities of practice that had developed 
over a decade-long period.   
 
Discussion 
This section offers an explanation of continuity and change in this decade-long episode 
by analyzing the three cycles longitudinally. Within such a timeframe, policy making 
concerning government innovation evolved in a consistent direction. Interestingly, it 
took a consistent direction even though Italy was passing through a period of recurring 
cabinet instability between 1993 and 2002, with a turnover of nine Executives and six 
different ministers for public administration.  
Following Baumgartner and Jones (1993), we can posit that the policy making 
on government innovation was a partial equilibrium situation during these years. 
Therefore, we can dissect this situation by examining the interlocking features of a 
partial equilibrium, including the policy subsystem and issue image. By the end of the 
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first cycle, the Public Administration Ministry had achieved a policy monopoly over 
government innovation issues. There is no evidence of any attempt to contest this 
jurisdiction, as the composition and the internal structure of the public management 
policy community served as bulwark against incursions into the public administration 
ministry’s policy jurisdiction. No single factor, including the stability of the ministry’s 
jurisdiction, accounts for the consistent direction of policy making. Another condition 
that played a causal role was the stability in issue image (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). 
The condition is partly explained by the fact that the issue of government innovation did 
not relate to the basis of partisan competition and, similarly, the very idea of 
government innovation appealed equally to parties of different ideological colors (Mele 
and Compagni, 2010).  
Since we now understand continuity, let us now explore the repeated 
introduction of novelty in the features of government innovation policies. As we have 
seen, the features of Projects for Change (1993) were different from those of the 
Program for Change (1998) and, in turn, from the ones attributable to Construction 
Sites for Change (2002). The first initiative distributed funds to projects in any phase of 
development, generically based on innovative ideas. The second initiative carefully 
selected projects in one of the key areas identified by the Public Administration 
Ministry, with the aim of testing and demonstrating practices that could be spread 
throughout the public sector. The third was a sophisticated initiative of knowledge 
creation and knowledge sharing, aimed at developing and supporting communities of 
practice.  
Just as we have used Baumgartner and Jones (1993) to account for the continuity 
of policy making on government innovation, we can now employ Levitt and March 
(1988) to structure an account of the changes in the policy design. According to Levitt 
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and March, routines are chosen by actors in the system that monitor the operation of 
such routines. Then they encode experiences as either a success or failure, they try to 
explain the outcome despite causal ambiguity and they proceed in variation of routines 
in the interest of achieving success in the next period of operation. This scenario came 
to pass in the episode. Periodically, there was an interruption in the experience where 
actors asked whether it had been successful or not. The very meaning of success 
evolved in parallel with the initiative’s features, shifting from the completion of a 
project roughly consistent with the department’s mandate, to the positive analysis of the 
project impacts on the users and on its replicability. This provided an opportunity for 
understanding and greater comprehension of the initiative. The more the initiatives 
progressed, the more they activated positive feedback regarding their outcomes.   
The program’s ability to progress rather than deteriorate was also facilitated by 
the ‘routinization’ of the transition phases between cabinets, that would have otherwise 
been disruptive for the policy sub-domain, both in terms of stability of jurisdiction (i.e. 
units in charge of innovation policy) and in terms of issue image (how the issue was 
framed). Routinization of the transition phases meant that policy entrepreneurs learned 
how to manage the frequent cabinet transitions and the associated reorganization of the 
policy sub-domain.  
 
Conclusion 
The established research literature on public management reform in Italy is not 
consistent with the fact that initiatives aimed at promoting government innovation in 
Italy between 1993 and 2002 proved durable rather than ill-fated. The best evidence that 
they were not ill-fated is that a single exercise of political will gave rise to the 
persistence and to the preservation of a novel approach to public management policy. 
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These initiatives were able to develop gradually, becoming a sophisticated system of 
knowledge management, establishing their national and international reputation as 
effective programmes, and aggregating a considerable and, more importantly, 
recognizable network of public managers willing to invest continuous efforts in 
experimenting and adopting innovative practices.  
This analysis of the Italian innovation episode is suited to question the 
theoretical case that Italy’s state tradition and legalistic culture operate as indomitable 
structural constraints on public management reform. It has done so first by showing 
how these traditions were actively discredited by policy entrepreneurs and a niche of the 
public management system was built around the novel view. Second, the research 
argument shows how the character of meso-structures (e.g. policy subsystems) is deeply 
implicated in public management reform. In particular, while most works patterned on 
Kingdon (1984) take the policy subsystem for granted, this experience suggests that it 
deserves more attention in politically instable contexts. In such settings, the rubric of 
social mechanisms that explain continuity and change needs to be enriched and must 
include developing a community of practice and working through frequent cabinet 
transitions. 
Generalizing arguments about the politics of public management reform in Italy 
should naturally take into account explanations of episodes in which a change in the 
direction of public management policy and practice has been sustained for numerous 
years. They should take into account research arguments that consider the effects of 
transitory political factors within the political stream (Kingdon 1984), such as political 
crises, as well as institutional factors, such as policy subsystems (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993), that are more fine-grained than a governmental system’s legalistic tradition 
of public administration. If accepted as research knowledge about the country case of 
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Italy, individuals’ risky investment of energy and reputation in reforming public 
management might no longer be dismissed as curiously heroic, but rather regarded as 
sociologically explicable.  
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Appendix A 
The author interviewed a former Prime Minister, a former Minister for Public 
Administration, the Director General of the Public Administration Department, two 
former Senior Officials at the Public Administration Department in charge of Innovative 
Projects, two former consultants in charge of “Cantieri” (Construction Sites for 
Change), a Senior Official at the Department for Innovation and IT, an expert and 
former consultant for the Public Administration Department and three academics in 
their role of experts of public policy and consultants for the Public Administration 
Department.  
The empirical work occurred in three phases. First, in order to get a sketchy draft 
of the research case and to guide subsequent data collection, five preliminary interviews 
were conducted and a focus group of four informed participants was organized. Second, 
these insights were supplemented by written documents and archival records of the 
Public Administration Department, such as feasibility studies, internal reports, project 
evaluation reports, minutes of meetings, research papers conducted by academics and 
consultants. To gain insight into the process dynamics of the pre-decisional stage of the 
three sets of initiatives, twelve further semi-structured interviews with key informants 
were conducted until reaching saturation (Bauer and Gaskell 2000, 23). The interviews 
were conducted taking into consideration the challenges of 'elite interviewing'. 
To limit informant bias and improve construct validity, four in-depth interviews 
were conducted for each policy cycle with informants who viewed the project from 
diverse perspectives - policy entrepreneurs, civil servants working at the launch and 
implementation of the project, consultants in charge of operationalising the project and 
academics with a deep knowledge of the Public Administration department activities - 
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former consultants - with an external, yet informed, perspective on the initiatives for 
innovation in government.  
The interviews took place mostly in the interviewees’ office. The duration of 
each interview was between ninety minutes and three hours. Five of the twelve 
interviewees were consulted at least twice. Four follow-up interviews with different key 
informants were conducted for a respondent validation of the data.  
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2. DYNAMICS OF ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT POLICIES: THE CASE OF 
ITALY (1992-2003) 
Introduction 
A main theme of public sector innovation is the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICTs)57 to strengthen state capacity. These reforms often involve efforts 
to improve state economic and social programs, its relationships with citizens and its 
internal operations by exploiting ICTs (Brown 2005). In public administration, “the use 
of ICTs, and particularly the Internet, as a tool to achieve better government” has been 
defined as Electronic Government (OECD 2003, p.1). This term was coined in the wake 
of the Internet-driven transformations in the modus operandi of entire business sectors, 
known as Electronic Commerce. After its debut in the early nineties58, the concept of 
Electronic Government has gained currency among policymakers and has become, first, 
a significant component of the modernization and innovation agenda in developing and 
developed countries and then, since 2000, the main target of numerous administrative 
reforms.  
Paralleling its spread in the policy arena, Electronic Government has been 
progressively incorporated in the studies on public management and is currently used as 
an umbrella category under which separate research streams have coalesced. Despite the 
variety of these research streams, the process of Electronic Government policy-making, 
must be analyzed further. This chapter develops research arguments about the politics of 
Electronic Government, analyzed as an instance of innovation and change in a public 
services context. 
57 In this chapter the acronyms IT (Information Technology) and ICT (Information & 
CommunicationTechnologies) are used interchangeably. For a complete account of the shift from IT to 
ICT see Castells, 1996. IT policy and E-Government policy are also used without distinction, though 
aware of the fact that EGovernment as a label was coined much later when the first IT policies were 
launched.  
58 The term first appeared in the 1993 US National Performance Review. 
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In the frame of this section– dedicated to the analysis of concrete experiences of 
innovation – this chapter reports and then analyzes a decade-long episode of Electronic 
Government in Italy. The efforts to launch and sustain Electronic Government policy in 
this country were initiated with the establishment of an Authority for IT in Public 
Administration in 1993 and continued throughout the decade resulting in a high number 
of ad hoc laws, institutional rearrangements, initiatives and projects. The episode 
analyzed is used as an instrumental case to answer two empirically grounded questions: 
(a) How did the innovative content of E-Government evolve in the decade under 
analysis? (b) Why and how was the issue of Electronic Government introduced in the 
agenda in the three policy cycles? 
 Answering these questions, in turn, contributes to inform an analytically 
significant question on what explains the trajectory of the E-Government policy in Italy. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section features the theoretical underpinnings of 
the study and the methodology. A narrative of the policy episode follows. The narration is 
organized into three intervals of policy making. The narrative provides the empirical basis for 
the analysis of the policy cycles thus providing insight into the process of innovation in the 
context of public services. In conclusion, the chapter offers some analytical insights and 
implications for policy makers. 
 
Concepts And Methods  
As the literature on Electronic Government evolves, what remains communal is the 
accepted view that ICTs are a set of technical means, processes and skills enabling not 
only the creation and access to information but also the unprecedented level of 
integrated communication systems. Besides this communality, three distinct thematic 
areas of the Electronic Government literature can be identified. The first strand of 
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literature aims at recognizing the role of ICT in enabling revolutionary change in public 
administration. The central question is whether government would become dramatically 
different if technological possibilities of ICTs were fully exploited. In fact, scholars 
have formulated a singular issue around which they have developed various scenarios. 
Several basic analytical devices have been employed to comment on the issues. These 
devices include holistic concepts such as paradigm shifts and very stylized notions of 
the processes operating within the output side of government (Moore 1995), such as 
public service delivery. For example, some argue that the advent of ICTs is shifting 
governments away from the traditional bureaucratic model (La Porte, Demchak, and De 
Jong 2002; Thompson and Jones 2008), triggering a new form of governance and 
setting in motion an information polity (Taylor and Williams 1990). Others have 
investigated the dynamics between the paradigm of New Public Management (NPM) 
and the paradigm of government informatisation (Bellamy and Taylor 1992; Bellamy 
and Taylor 1994). More recently, the ICT-driven paradigm superseding NPM has been 
conceptualized as ‘digital era governance’ (Dunleavy and Margetts 2000), a 
constellation of ideas and reforms that grant a central role to ICTs in a wide-ranging 
series of alterations of how public services are organized and delivered to citizens 
(Dunleavy, Margetts, Bastow, and Tinkler 2006). 
A further stream of literature can be considered as a contingency version of the 
one described above. The work of the scholars writing in this strand challenges the 
optimistic claims of inevitability of the first approach. In particular, it shows that such 
universal expectations cannot possibly be accurate. The evidence, in fact, confirms that 
the relationship between an intention of E-Government and its outcome is highly 
conditional (Gil-García, Ramon and Pardo 2005; Ho and Ni 2004; Kim 2005; Luna-
Reyes, Gil-García and Cruz 2007; Rose and Grant 2010). Studies in this strand are 
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focused on the identification of critical issues and success factors of E-Government 
policy design and implementation. These studies typically try to identify salient 
predictors of the decision and successful implementation of E-Government policy. For 
example Carter and Weerakkody (2008) have investigated the country variation in the 
citizens’ E-Government adoption. By comparing data from the US and UK they 
conclude that determinant factors driving citizens’ willingness to use E-Government 
services are the level of their perceived utility and the level of trust in the public agency 
offering such services. Similarly, Dimitrova and Chen (2006) have attempted to profile 
the adopters of E-Government services according to non-demographic characteristics 
such as perceived usefulness, perceived uncertainty and civic mindedness. Other 
scholars have investigated the supply side, offering that specific institutional 
arrangements and the availability of resources, such as IT budget allocation, IT staff or 
IT training, are conducive to positive outcomes of E-Government initiatives. For 
example Luna-Reyes, Gil-García and Cruz (2007) argue that institutional arrangements 
and organizational forms affect the way in which technology is understood, designed, 
and used in a particular inter-organizational project.   
The third stream of literature, analyzes the “output side” of government (Moore 
1995). Instead of the holistic perspective on Electronic Government seen before, these 
studies adopt an empirical approach and ground their commentary on a clearly argued 
appraisal of a particular technical innovation within programs (Moore 1995). There is a 
lot of variety in the required performance characteristics of E-Government projects and 
their outcomes. Illustrative of this approach are some studies that appraise ICT-based 
projects in relation to their effectiveness in cutting red tape (Peled 2001), others in 
increasing the direct interaction with citizens (Thomas and Streib 2003) or in 
channeling a democratic input into the policy-making process (Torres, Pina, and 
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Acerete 2006). It should also be noted that many of these design criteria, such as the 
level of public agencies’ accountability (Pina, Torres, and Royo 2007) are familiar to 
public administration studies, while some, such as system openness, appear to be novel 
and specific to this domain (Wong and Welch 2004). These works seem to conclude 
that there is little improvement determined by E-Government in relation to the valued 
criteria to appraise the expected change. In particular, the rhetoric of a full-fledged, 
integrated, and transactional E-Government is compared with the reality of merely 
informational websites or of online services with an unsatisfactory takeup (Moon 2002; 
Norris and Moon 2005; Scholl 2005; Nasi, Frosini and Cristofoli 2011). It should be 
noted that not only has this stream questioned whether the incorporation of new ICT 
assets changes the performance characteristics of a public program (i.e. it is truly 
conducive to innovation in public services), but has also attempted to diagnose failures 
in implementation. Such failures are mainly associated with the fact that Electronic 
Government often only exacerbates the pre-existing practices of public bureaucracies 
(Wong and Welch 2004), thus preventing innovative projects from unleashing their full 
transformative potential (Torres, Pina, and Acerete 2006). 
In synthesis, despite the variety of approaches taken by the literature on E-
Government, there is still a gap on empirical research that investigates policy-making as 
an important component of the broad Electronic Government enterprise. Some scholars 
do not partake in this research interest because they conceptualize E-Government 
holistically. Others study Electronic Government in its components but develop a 
narrow interest for the utilization of such innovative technical features of delivery 
systems, thus missing the stage where decisions on these features are taken.  
A minority strand of research focuses on single country-cases of Electronic 
Government (Acaud and Lakel 2003; Hudson 2002; Liou 2008; Lofgren 2007; Margetts 
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2006). Most of these studies are commentaries on the evolution of the Electronic 
Government policy in one country. Yet, they represent encouraging precedents in that 
they show how an interest in policy-making is not entirely idiosyncratic with the 
literature on Electronic Government.  
This chapter posits that analyzing continuity and change in Electronic 
Government policy should be a substantive inquiry, and one that also responds to recent 
calls for a better understanding of the political dynamics among the actors that lead to 
the decision to launch Electronic Government initiatives. Moreover, the research should 
entail a greater use of out-of office data gathering. Some scholars have identified, as a 
limitation of this literature, the narrow range of research methods being used, with little 
empirical work and website development as the main indicator (Norris and Moon 2005). 
While this per se does not invalidate the findings of the research, the fact that “most E-
Government researchers appear to do little more than sit at their PCs” tends to exclude 
events and opinions from the analysis and triangulation of large tranches of data (Heeks 
and Bailur 2007, 257). This methodological choice might, in turn, be mutually 
reinforced with the lack of interest for the policy-making processes behind E-
Government developments (Yildiz 2007). 
Therefore, this chapter analyses the instrumental case (Ragin, 1987; Yin, 1994; 
Abell, 2004) of Electronic Government in Italy in the frame of a research approach on 
public management policy change (Barzelay 2003; Barzelay and Gallego 2006, 2010). 
This programme seeks to develop a middle-range, historically based, causal theory of 
public management policy-making. Public management policies are government-wide 
institutional rules and routines that carry out administrative functions, such as 
expenditure planning and financial management, civil service and labor relations, 
procurement, organization and methods and audit and evaluation (Barzelay 2001). The 
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synthesis scheme is built around Kingdon’s theorization of the policy making process, 
composed of the three phases of agenda setting, alternative specification and decision-
making. The middle-range theory is structured around the dynamics of each component 
phase and their interfaces (Barzelay and Gallego, 2006).  
The standard unit of analysis for investigating this process is the policy cycle 
and, considering that the E-Government policy in Italy during the decade under analysis 
included three waves, this chapter analyses a multi-cycle case. Details of the study 
design, sources examined and interviewees are in Appendix B2.  
 
Narrating E-Government Policy In Italy 
Activities for promoting Information Technology (IT) were formally started in 1993 
with the establishment of the Authority, designed to be a key player over the following 
decade for this policy domain. Since the beginning, the mandate of the Authority has 
been two-fold: to spread IT usage in public administrations and to exert control over IT 
procurement processes. Its main achievements include the issuing of organic plans for 
IT application in the public sector and a project to create a system network of local 
Italian public administrations. The political context during this decade was a turbulent 
one, resulting in the continuous turnover of Executives. Thus the responsibility for 
strategic planning relating to IT in the public sector fluctuated between the Authority 
and the Ministry for Public Administration. Moreover, the policy arena for IT in the 
public sector saw the rise and fall of several Commissions, Units and Centres. Despite 
this institutional turmoil, there has been substantial continuity and evolution of IT as a 
policy issue and practice. 
The following sections present a narration of a decade-long policy cycle 
organized around three turning points, namely the establishment of the Authority in 
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1993, the launch of the Action Plan for E-Government in 2000 and the Call for an E-
Government project in 2002. These three decisions represent the outcome of intentional 
efforts aimed at changing practices and principles embedded in the public 
administration. The narrative is focused on the phase preceding each decision, 
structured around the above mentioned meta-categories of agenda setting, alternative 
specification or program development and finalizing and launching the program. The 
synthesis of the events selected and narrated is presented in the Appendix B1. 
 
Previous events 
Academic works (Calise and De Rosa 2003; Cucciniello and Nasi 2008) and policy 
documents59 associate the beginning of the policy cycle on E-Government in Italy with 
the establishment of an ad hoc Authority in 199360. The nature and mission of the 
Authority, however, represented a controversial matter during its entire mandate, which 
ended a decade later. Analyzing the phase that preceded the Authority’s launch helps to 
account for the ambiguities that marked the interplay between context and actors during 
this decade-long episode. 
At the time, Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in Public 
Administration were not a new issue in the debate on administrative modernization. 
Since the late seventies, one of the Commissions charged with assessing the status quo 
of the Italian bureaucracy and its modernization needs focused on ICTs. The 
Commission denounced the scarce level of technological penetration in the public 
offices, while it recognized the tremendous potential of automated procedures for public 
59 Policy documents refer to the establishment of the Authority in 1993 as the beginning of the policy for 
electronic government. See for example the Premesse al piano di e-government nazionale. Roma. 
Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 22/6/2000 or Riferimenti normativi (p.6) in the Guidelines for the 
interoperability of the Public administration unitarian network. Roma. RUPA 31/1/2003. 
60 The time boundaries of the episodes have been set by analyzing the literature and the policy documents, 
and by corroborating this information with the perception of the interviewees. Especially in the first round 
of interviews, my interview protocol included questions aimed at identifying the milestones of the policy 
under analysis. 
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office modernization. Simultaneously, the studies on e-administration flourished, 
though their main interest was limited to the legal validity of documents managed and 
archived through the prototype PCs. 
Throughout the eighties, cultural and technological developments provided the 
foundations for the modern conception of E-Government in the country. Several 
scholars and intellectuals became advocates of the democratic potential of ICTs, 
influenced also by the French experience with Minitel. In the words of one of our 
informants: “Not only did we believe that new technologies were improving the internal 
efficiency of public agencies, the most remarkable progress brought by the advent of 
technology regarded communication between citizens, between public administrations, 
and, above all, between citizens and administrations.” 
At the same time the distribution of basic technological equipment per public 
sector office increased conspicuously, though “in 1990 Italy was still lagging behind the 
other industrialized countries” (Interview with a top bureaucrat of the PA Department). 
The issue was given a certain level of attention also from the Executive throughout the 
second half of the eighties. In 1984 the Public Administration Ministry established a 
Commission for IT in Public Administrations. Five years later the Commission 
delivered a decree on the coordination and planning of IT in central agencies, which 
“can be considered a turning point in the conception of the bureaucratic machine as an 
entity in charge of delivering services to citizens also through new technologies.” 
(Interview with the former Minister for Public Administration). However, the advisory 
nature of the Commission and the relatively low status of this issue in the Executive 
agenda prevented this decree from producing actual change in the procedures of central 
agencies. 
99 
 
Efforts aimed at rationalizing IT developments continued throughout the period 
in office of the following Executive, when the Public Administration Ministry issued an 
ad hoc memorandum and Guidelines for IT Standardization in Government. 
Nevertheless, despite the increase in investments, the process of IT diffusion in the local 
and central public organizations was developing in a fragmented fashion, with scattered 
projects and applications.  
Therefore, despite the establishment of an ad hoc Commission, investments in 
ICT in public administrations proceeded with scant coordination. Moreover, ICT 
investments – as well as any significant public procurement decision - had to be 
authorized by the State Account and Controller General. However, the role of this 
Controller was limited to checking the legal validity of the procurement procedures. 
Strategic planning, coordination and standardization were far beyond its mandate. 
Direct effects of such a fragmented approach were that “the systems being 
implemented were hardly ever compatible” (Finocchiaro 1991, 49), the potential 
economies of scale were hindered and the bargaining power of public administrations 
with vendors was limited. In 1992, the figures on ICT penetration showed an uneven 
distribution. Some public organizations, both at the central and at the local level, were 
technologically advanced while the majority of public organizations were still relying 
on backward ICT systems. In fact, the president for the Commission on IT coordination 
in public administration affirmed, “We lacked a comprehensive development model. 
Several of our initiatives were praiseworthy. Yet, they turned out to be like the tesserae 
of a mosaic whose shape and content had not been defined in advance”. Let us now turn 
to the first phase of this decade-long episode. 
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The Authority for IT in Public Administration (1993) 
Setting the agenda 
In 1992 the issue of ICT in government moved from the specialized agenda of the 
Public Administration Minister to the congested agenda of the Executive, after a phase 
of political and economic turbulence. In 1992 the “clean-hands” scandal had reached its 
peak, and the media had exposed civil society to the evidence collected over years of 
investigations on political corruption and bribery. At the same time, the currency crisis 
of 1992, which mirrored the global financial crisis, together with the struggle to meet 
the EU standards, prompted the Executive to introduce emergency measures. 
The issue of ICT in government found a receptive audience in the two 
Executives that ruled the country during, and in the immediate aftermath, of the scandal. 
The first of these two Executives was headed by Giuliano Amato and, under his short 
mandate, “the coordination of ICT strategies and expenditure in public administration, a 
process which had matured slowly, abruptly exploded” (Interview with the former 
Prime Minister). The mandate of Amato focused almost entirely on the drafting and 
approval of a ‘package’ through which he intended to delegate the economic 
rationalization of the public system to the Executive. The package interested domains 
and jurisdictions as diverse as healthcare, social security, civil service, financial 
accounting and expenditure. He was also familiar with the specific challenges of 
reforming the Italian bureaucracy as he had participated in the attempts to reform the 
Italian bureaucracy since the early seventies, thus he developed a maturing awareness 
on the role of ICT as an enabler of streamlining and administrative simplification.  
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Alternative specification/developing the Authority 
The Prime Minister’s familiarity with the main problems of the Italian public 
administration, including the lack of a coordinated policy for ICT in government, led to 
the inclusion of IT in the agenda. The last mile for the inclusion, however, was gained 
as a serendipitous result of the intense negotiations with the unions that preceded the 
approval of the Amato package. The labor unions’ leadership, in fact, was concerned 
that the austerity measures were excessively penalizing for civil servants, forced to give 
up some of their established benefits. Thereby, the Prime Minister was asked to 
introduce parallel measures clearly attending to the need for austerity but “signaling that 
civil servants were not the only scapegoat” (Interview with the former Prime Minister). 
The result was two oddly disparate alternative measures to be included in the austerity 
package: an additional tax for luxury motorcycles and the establishment of an entity 
aimed at coordinating, and thus controlling, the public expenditure on ICTs. The 
inclination of the Prime Minister and the current debate on the need to increase the 
efficiency of public administrations determined the inclusion of the latter issue in the 
‘Amato package’, approved right before the Executive resigned amid corruption 
allegations in 1992.  
The President of the National Statistics Institute was appointed ad interim as 
Special Commissary for IT in Public Administration. He drafted the regulation for the 
new entity, conceiving it as a qualified structure with high technical expertise. It was 
beyond his mandate, however, to determine the legal status of the new organization; to 
exercise the choice between establishing an Agency or an Authority. While the former 
was considered as semi-autonomous from the Executive (Fedele et al. 2007), the latter 
had the status of a completely independent organization. 
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Finalizing and launching the Authority  
The following Executive discarded the alternative of an Agency and opted for an 
Authority. By creating an Authority completely independent from the political parties, 
the Executive signaled its commitment (Gilardi 2002; Elgie and McMenamin 2005) to 
fight the corruption of elected officials. Hence, in 1993 the Authority was officially 
launched with a vast and ambiguous mandate.  
The Authority was expected to support the process of ICT diffusion in the public 
sector, rationalize the adoption of ICT and review the regulations for technology 
procurement: “the Authority was created to stimulate and coordinate technological 
developments in public organizations as well as to regulate their procurement 
procedures in the aftermath of the ‘clean-hands scandal.’ These two distinct needs 
determined a bi-cephalous entity.” (Interview with a former top bureaucrat of the 
Authority for IT in Public Administration). A further ambiguity marked the 
establishment of the Authority. Notwithstanding the intention of its President to create 
an Authority completely independent from the Executive, the Public Administration 
Minister considered it an Agency, subject to the priorities of the Executive and, more 
specifically, to those of his own department. In the words of one of our informants: 
“Basically the Executive launched an Authority, but regarded it as an Agency.”  
The Authority operated with 3-year plans that were to be updated annually and 
with a main focus on ICTs in central administrations. Ministries were requested to 
submit their ICT procurement contracts to the Authority, in charge of assessing the 
contracts’ conformity to the annual plan. The main criterion for assessing the 
appropriateness of the contracts was their formal compliance with the procurement 
standards more than their substantial coherence with the Authority ICT plan. 
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The E-Government Action Plan (2000) 
The second cycle of this decade-long episode is associated with the launch of the E-
Government Action Plan. While efforts to draft the Plan had been rapid and intense, it 
had taken a few years for the issue to be widely recognized in the political and 
administrative arena, both at national and at European levels, and for the community of 
interest to coalesce around the Public Administration Department. 
 
Setting the Agenda 
In the period from 1994 to 1996 the Authority performed two main tasks. First, it 
assessed a considerable number of central ICT procurement contracts - an activity 
considered as the primary tool for steering the ICT policy. Second, it worked on the 
ambitious project of an Internet-like information system, which should have connected 
all the Italian public administrations through a network based on the Internet Protocol. 
In 1996, in fact, Italy and the Scandinavian countries were the only European countries 
to have an Internet Protocol. 
While the Authority mandate was focused on central administrations, local 
administrations such as the Municipalities of Bologna, Milan and Modena started to 
experiment electronic community networking. Such developments were aligned with 
European Union guidelines on the Information Society, which prepared the ground for 
the inclusion of Internet development as a priority in the EU agenda for development 
and social cohesion. 
The new Executive elected in 1996 soon recognized the importance of ICT in 
the public sector. First, it established the Information Society Forum, composed of key 
representatives from different Ministries, assigning it the mission of promoting 
Information Society and supporting the creation of a favorable regulatory framework. 
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Second, it included the development of a Unitarian Telematic Network in the 
comprehensive reform of public sector launched by the Public Administration Minister. 
The Minister also established a Technical Centre, in charge of managing the Unitarian 
Network. 
The prominent status gained by the issue of Information Society in the agenda 
was strengthened further over the following months. Early in 1999 the Executive 
established a new organizational structure for promoting the Information Society, 
composed of three boards reporting directly to the Prime Minister. The three boards, in 
charge of drafting a new Action Plan for the development of Information Society, were 
supported by a permanent task-force within the Prime Minister’s Council. Regional and 
local authorities were involved in the activities of the Information Society Forum, and 
an ad hoc Coordination Centre for E-Government in Local Administrations was set up 
in Turin. 
In the 2-year timeframe between 1997 and 1999, the work of both the newly 
established bodies and the Authority led to the approval of a significant number of laws 
and decrees, which promoted and ruled the use of new technologies in the public sector. 
Documents produced by civil servants through digital devices were granted legal status, 
while digital signature, optical archives and digital documents were introduced. The 
practice of tele-working for civil servants was pioneered in Italy while the online 
management of the revenue service and the land registry was introduced and became a 
best-practice at the EU level. 
 
Developing the Action Plan 
During the same period, between 1997 and 1999, the European Commission was 
developing a draft strategy for the Information Society. The eEurope Action Plan, 
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endorsed by European heads of government at their summit in June 2000, was aimed at 
fostering the Information Society, considered a crucial component of European 
competitiveness. The eEurope Action Plan also marked a shift in the conception of ICT 
usage by public administration. The Plan legitimized Electronic Government as a key 
asset of the European strategy for development and, more importantly, it signaled its 
policy salience as an autonomous cross-country issue. 
In parallel, after a reshuffle of the Italian executive in late 1999, Electronic 
Government was confirmed as a policy priority. In particular the Executive established 
the institutional role of an Under-Secretary at the Prime Minister Office for 
Technological Innovation. Another significant indication of the issue’s rise in status on 
the policy agenda was the inclusion of a chapter on Electronic Government in the action 
plan for Information Society drafted by the Committee of Ministers for Information 
Society. The chapter was drafted by the Public Administration Minister with the support 
of an E-Government Working Group, a think-tank mainly composed of experts from 
academia. A few days after the Information Society Action Plan had been approved, the 
chapter was extracted from the general strategy and was launched as the E-Government 
Action Plan 2000-2002. The document promoted Electronic Government as a main 
instrument for modernizing the public sector, and it was packaged as instrumental to the 
structural reforms initiated by the coalition in 1996. In particular, the main pillars of the 
public administration reform were strengthening the managerial tools available for 
public officials, such as performance evaluation systems; simplifying the administrative 
procedures thus reducing red-tape; and devolving new functions and service delivery to 
local governments. Unsurprisingly, the Action Plan for Electronic Government mirrored 
these priorities and was organized around the building blocks of ICT-based decision 
support systems for public managers, streamlining bureaucratic procedures and 
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delivering online services. This chapter was also the result of the intense cooperation 
with a group of a few local administrations that had experimented with cutting-edge 
ICT applications, typically for streamlining the internal procedures or for activating 
online communication channels with groups of citizens. The exchange and collaboration 
of the E-Government Working Group with these local administrations led to the 
immediate endorsement of the Electronic Government Action Plan by the Joint 
Conference of Central, State, and Local Administration, a step that ensured higher 
visibility and consensus to the Action Plan. 
 
Launching the Action Plan for E-Government and reorganizing the Policy Domain  
In 2000, Giuliano Amato, the Prime Minister that had led the Transition Executive in 
1993, once again received the mandate to lead a Transition Executive before the 
political elections of 2001. As a consequence, the same Premier who had launched the 
Authority for IT in 1993 was responsible for approving the E-Government Action Plan 
in June 2000. 
The Plan laid out the details of specific E-Government initiatives, such as the 
establishment of an Internet connection among all public agencies, the development of 
an electronic ID card and the use of electronic signature to certify online procedures. 
These goals required high-level technological expertise. The institutional venue with the 
highest concentration of expert staff whose skills ranged from computing engineering to 
legal aspects of information systems was a Unit within the Authority – the Technical 
Centre. The Unit had been established in 1997 to tackle the complex issues associated 
with the development of the Unitarian Network for public administrations, the most 
ambitious project of the Authority. This project had never been fully deployed. In fact, 
the lengthy process of authorizing and setting up the Network lagged behind the pace of 
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technological innovation so that, by the time the Authority defined the technical and 
legal standards of the Unitarian Network Project, alternative full-fledged Internet 
solutions had been made available ‘off the shelf’ making this complex architecture 
technologically obsolete.  Over time, the substantial failure of this and other minor 
projects, announced and never delivered by the Authority, undermined its reputation. 
The reservations held by an increasing number of experts and civil servants on the 
effectiveness of the Authority in building capacity and in coordinating large ICT 
projects were exacerbated by an ill-timed mismatch between the scope of its mandate 
and the emerging needs of Electronic Government projects (Interviews with two top 
bureaucrats at the Public Administration Department and with one academic consultant 
of the Authority). On the one hand, the target of the projects launched by the Authority 
had been limited since its inception to central administrations. On the other hand, local 
administrations had become the key enablers of Electronic Government developments, 
and especially of what was progressively considered at the heart of the national strategy 
for E-Government, namely online service delivery. Therefore, the exclusive focus of the 
Authority on Ministries and large central agencies was no longer compatible with the 
dominant conception of Electronic Government and with the current shift towards the 
devolution of public functions to local entities. 
These reasons prompted Bassanini, the Public Administration Minister, to move 
the Technical Centre from the Authority to the Prime Minister’s Council. This shift also 
marked the end of a period during which the Authority had been in charge of strategic 
planning on ICTs. Bassanini created a new Permanent Unit for implementing the E-
Government Action Plan within the Public Administration Department. The Unit 
included representatives of local administrations, well-known academics, experts and 
top officials. At the same time, the reorganization of the Public Administration 
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department offered the opportunity to include an Office for ICT and Public Digital 
Networks in the new organizational chart. In 2000 the Public Administration 
Department completed the process of appropriating the jurisdiction over Electronic 
Government matters by incorporating the Technical Center that was previously part of 
the Authority.  
The prominence gained by the issue of Electronic Government by early 2001 
ensured the allocation of a significant amount of funds to implement the Action Plan.61 
This was the last act of the Electronic government policy under the four Executives of 
the Left-wing coalition that had ruled the country during a 5-year legislature. 
  
Call for E-Government Projects (2002) 
Setting the Agenda 
The issue of E-Government remained a priority for the right-wing coalition chaired by 
Silvio Berlusconi, who won the elections in May 2001. During the electoral campaign 
and in the following years, modernization of the bureaucracy was addressed as a matter 
of so-called ‘digital state’ and E-Government became the one-size-fits-all solution to cut 
red tape, to improve country competitiveness and to strengthen business-government 
and business-citizens relations. The ‘digital revolution’ was expected to spill over from 
the public administrations to schools, universities, businesses and citizens. 
Consistent with the priority given to innovation and ICT in the electoral 
campaign, the Premier established a new office in his Cabinet, namely the Ministry for 
Innovation and Information Technologies and appointed Lucio Stanca as Minister. Mr. 
Stanca had over 30 years of professional experience at IBM and had served as CEO of 
IBM Italy. The initial mandate of the Ministry for Innovation and IT swept across 
61 The funds totaled approximately 410 million Euros coming from the auctioning of licenses for UMTS 
(Universal Mobile Telecommunication System) to telephone companies. 
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different policy domains. The Ministry was in charge of steering any policy on 
information society, science, technology and innovation, including basic research. 
However, despite such a broad mandate, Electronic Government immediately became 
the focal point of the Ministry’s activities thanks to the availability of ad hoc funds, 
allocated by the previous Executive to the implementation of the E-Government Action 
Plan. 
 
Developing the Call for Projects 
While the available funds and the institutional mandate created a favorable context for 
the Minister to launch incisive actions and to implement the Action Plan for E-
Government, Mr. Stanca struggled to assemble a team under his leadership. When he 
took office in 2001, the policy domain of E-Government was difficult to coordinate. 
The Authority was still in place and claiming its autonomy from the Executive. As for 
the Technical Centre, its shift from the Authority to the Executive had brought it closer 
to the leadership of the Minister. Yet, its Director had been appointed during the 
previous Legislature. In his view, the next steps to implement the E-Government Action 
Plan entailed investing in the infrastructure and the back-offices of public 
administrations, while the new Minister was keen on immediately strengthening front-
office services highly visible for citizens and corporations.  
The distribution of the institutional mandate for Electronic Government was 
complicated by the presence of the Permanent Unit for managing the E-Government 
Action Plan and of the Office for ICT and for public administration networks. Both 
entities, whose institutional locus was the Department of Public Administration, were 
composed of members designated by the previous Executive. Such a fragmented policy 
sub-system was not compatible with the existence of a newly established Ministry for 
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Innovation and IT that had been granted both the clear mandate and the resources to 
steer Electronic Government initiatives. Consequently, between 2001 and 2002 the 
Electronic Government domain was restructured. First, the responsibility for policy 
making shifted definitively from the Authority of IT in Public Administration to the 
Ministry for Innovation and Technologies. Second, within the new Ministry an Office 
of E-Government for Local Administrations was created. The drivers to do so were 
partly political and partly instrumental to the goal of implementing the Action Plan. At 
the political level a debate initiated in the early nineties, over the need to devolve 
functions downward and to empower local administrations, had intensified. This 
pressure was fuelled by the inclusion of the Northern League in the ruling coalition; a 
Political Party very attentive to the needs and requests of local administrations. The 
decision to actively involve local administrations was not only driven by the perception 
of political opportunity, but also by the awareness of the Minister and his staff that local 
administrations represented the “administrative backbone of the country. Without the 
support of local administrations, delivery of services to citizens and businesses would 
have remained wishful thinking” (Interview with a top-bureaucrat at the Ministry for 
Innovation and IT). The Minister appointed as Director General of the Office of E-
Government for Local Administrations was an experienced top official who had been 
working at the Authority for IT in Public Administration, and then headed the Office for 
IT and digital networks at the Public Administration Department. His work and profile 
was well-known among central and local agencies. Therefore, his appointment 
facilitated the liaison between the Ministry and local administrations. The following 
months were characterized by intense negotiations between local administrations and 
the Ministry over a crucial decision: the modalities and criteria to allocate the funds 
already appropriated by the previous Executive for Electronic Government. The 
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alternatives being evaluated could be roughly synthesized into two approaches. The top-
down approach required that the new Ministry select a few priorities for the 
development of Electronic Government and then invest the funds in building capacity at 
the local and central level by ensuring that technological infrastructure, system 
integration and ex officio removal of the administrative barriers were in place. In the 
bottom-up approach, central and local administrations were expected to define their own 
strategies to enact Electronic Government projects and the Ministry had to provide the 
adequate resources.  
 
Launching the Call for Projects and Restructuring the Policy Domain 
The latter approach prevailed, mainly due to the complexity of a centralized, top-down 
approach in terms of institutional capacity needed to orchestrate the initiative as well as 
in terms of resistance by local administrations to give up some of their prerogatives. In 
2002, the Minister launched the first Call for E-Government Projects, open to any 
administration delivering services to citizens and businesses. The previous initiatives 
gave priority to less visible aspects such as back-office re-engineering and systems 
interoperability (i.e. making different applications and technological architecture 
compatible with each-other). Instead, the most important criterion for selecting projects 
was identified in the visibility of the outcomes for citizens and businesses. 
The Minister completed the restructuring of the policy domain in June 2003, 
when the Executive replaced both the Authority and the Technical Centre with the 
National Centre for IT in Public Administrations (CNIPA). The new entity was 
responsible for the implementation of the E-Government plans devised by the Minister 
for Innovation and Technologies, and became the operating unit of the Ministry. 
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Analysing The Electronic Government Policy 
This section attempts to provide a basic understanding of E-Government policy making 
in Italy between 1993 and 2003. The idea pursued here is that E-Government can be 
analyzed as a public management policy, related specifically to the role of central 
coordinating agencies (Barzelay 2007: 21). The episode presented here includes three 
policy cycles, each resulting in the launch of an entity or a project for E-Government.  
The first question concerns the evolution in the innovative content of Electronic 
Government policy. 
The analysis of this episode shows a significant evolution in formulating and 
implementing a policy aimed at fostering an innovation, namely IT in the public sector. 
When the Authority was established in 1993, it was considered innovative in terms of 
potential impact on the IT procurement procedures and on the harmonization of the IT 
procurement policies. The system put in place to monitor the public expenditure for IT 
consisted of the mandatory approval by the Authority of each IT public procurement 
contract. It is also important to highlight that the Authority’s mandate was only exerted 
over central administrations. 
When the Action Plan for E-Government was launched in 2000, the concept of 
IT-related innovation had evolved tremendously. First of all, ICTs were regarded as 
instrumental to the general reform of public sector, and particularly to the one initiated 
by the Minister himself, that was launching the E-Government Action Plan. Second, the 
emphasis was not on changing IT procurement procedures, but rather on supporting the 
system-wide country competitiveness through the new available technologies. Third, 
while in 1993 the Authority was established to control and possibly reduce IT 
expenditure, the 2000 Action Plan came along with an allocation of ad hoc resources. 
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The last substantial difference is that, consistently with the general public sector reform, 
the Action Plan was addressing both Central and Local Administrations.  
The third phase was the Call for E-Government Projects in 2002. The alternation 
from left-wing to right-wing in the ruling majority introduced by the political elections 
in 2001 did not significantly change the trajectory of E-Government policy. Yet, the 
notion of IT-related change was redefined and increasingly associated with the impact 
on the end users’ experience. The initiatives were formulated accordingly, and the funds 
available were distributed to the central and local administrations whose projects were 
employing ICTs to improve the service delivery, thus increasing end users’ satisfaction.  
The second question is focused on why and how the issue of Electronic 
Government became introduced in the policy agenda in the three policy cycles. 
The inclusion in the agenda, which led to the establishment of the Authority for 
IT in Public Administration in 1993, can be explained by the interplay between the 
context factors and the quality of participation of the policy entrepreneurs. The concept 
of IT in the public administration, in fact, was not a novelty when it was added to the 
agenda in 1993. Ever since the late 1970s, experts in the policy community brought the 
IT issue to the attention of a specialized audience and included the issue among the 
critical factors for bureaucratic modernization. Encouraging signs also came from the 
political stream, where parliamentary members managed to create ad hoc commissions 
to discuss and analyze the implications connected to the introduction of IT in public 
administrations. Yet, this subject could have remained a low priority issue on the 
cabinet agenda, had it not been for the quality of participation of the policy 
entrepreneurs and for the malleability of the issue image of IT in public administration. 
On the one hand, the political turmoil of the early 1990s determined an abrupt turnover 
of the whole establishment and the majority of the members of the transitional 
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Executives were co-opted from academia. These experts who had participated in the 
Commissions for the reform of Public Administration in the late 1970s had been given 
crucial positions in the so-called ‘technical’ government. For example the quality of 
participation of the Prime Minister in the IT policy domain in 1992 was influenced by 
his previous experience as member of the working groups in charge of assessing the 
problems of the Italian bureaucracy fifteen years prior. On the other hand, the issue 
definition process played a crucial role in 1992, as IT in the public sector was 
introduced on the agenda under the guise of an action aimed at fostering control and 
transparency in public procurement.  
Turning to the following policy cycle, the period started with the election of a 
new Coalition in 1996 and culminated with the launch of the E-Government Action 
Plan in 2000. The issue of IT in the public sector had not scored particularly high in the 
electoral program. However, it found a secondary entrance as the pressure to improve 
the country competitiveness and the struggle to meet the EU standards called for reform 
in the public sector. 62 The issue of IT in this context was defined as instrumental to 
bureaucratic modernization. The institutional locus around which the community of 
experts and civil servants coalesced was the Public Administration Ministry, and this 
reinforced the overlap between public sector reform and IT in the public sector policy 
domains. Also, the Minister in charge of the government-wide reform of public 
administration became the champion of IT (E-Government). Changing the label of these 
initiatives from ICTs to Electronic Government was a consequence of his participation 
in the EU ministerial meetings for the eEurope Action Plan. However, being part of 
62 This view is witnessed by the initial section of the E-government action plan (22/6/2000), which states 
that: “The actions and the tools of the E-gov action plan are an an integral component of the policies for 
the development of the information society, which the Executive is promoting, not only for the benefits in 
terms of country competitiveness due to the higher quality, savings and efficiency of public services, but 
also for the fundamental role that innovation in public sector may have for the social diffusion of culture, 
tools and experience of new digital economy , across all the sectors of the population”. 
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such international polity also had a domestic outcome in terms of issue and actor 
certification.  
Last, in the third policy cycle, the recognition received by the issue at the 
national and international levels, together with the availability of funds appropriated for 
E-Government, persuaded the incoming Executive to build on the issue and to reinforce 
its status. This was due to the fact that during the electoral campaign Digital 
Government had become the substitute for the discourse on bureaucratic modernization. 
The issue, however, had to be repackaged in terms of devolution, which was consistent 
with the political milieu of the executive. A newly established Ministry for Innovation 
and IT was the natural candidate to aggregate the policy community and to channel the 
different initiatives. Thus, despite some internal resistance and the slow pace, the 
competencies for E-Government were ultimately shifted from the Public Administration 
Ministry and from the Authority to the Ministry for Innovation and IT. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has combined the previously distinct streams of literature on Electronic 
Government and public management policy change, thus responding to calls for a better 
understanding of the policy dynamics that lead to the initiation of E-Government 
initiatives. In particular, these calls have suggested the importance for the literature on 
Electronic Government to extrapolate its theoretical underpinnings from established 
public policy frameworks (Hudson 1999) and to tie the subject of E-Government to 
mainstream public administration research (Heeks and Bailur 2007; Yildiz 2007). 
Now we can employ institutional processualism to analyse and then compare the 
three cycles, thus distilling analytical insights on what explains the overall trajectory of 
the E-Government policy in Italy. First, the analysis has indicated the importance of the 
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issue image in explainaing the resilience of the E-Government policy in Italy, which is 
surprising considering the frequent government turnover in Italy during the decade 
under study. The subject of IT in the public sector was packaged in the first cycle and 
repackaged in the following two cycles around the leading themes of the political or 
electoral agenda. Transparency and austerity, country competitiveness and bureaucratic 
reform, devolution and visibility for the end users have, in sequence, shaped the issue 
image of E-Government in this decade-long episode. Such flexibility of the issue did 
not activate interference-effects from the champions of competing policy domains.  
On the other hand, despite its early start and the significant resources allocated 
to the E-Government policies, several experts and scholars question whether these 
actually resulted in a more efficient, responsive and transparent administration at the 
central and local level. Among the factors that may have hindered a systemic 
development of ICT in public administrations, this chapter has identified a certain 
degree of contention over its jurisdiction. In fact, the period under analysis witnessed a 
continuous reconfiguration of the E-Government policy sub-system, with ad hoc 
working groups, inter-ministerial and central-local coordination units co-existing with 
the dedicated Authority and, in the final phase, a new Ministry taking over the issue of 
E-Government. Two interrelated determinants explain this continuous reconfiguration, 
namely the frequent government turnovers over the decade combined with the 
ambiguity in the mandate that marked the functions and the activities of the Authority 
since its inception.  
To conclude, focusing on the policy developments of e-government thorugh the 
lens of institutional processualism has offered three main contributions. First, it brings 
to the forefront features of issue framing that explain its persistence (i.e. issue 
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malleability) and that can also complement more static analyses focused on the 
‘determinants or barriers’ to the development of e-government.  
Second, this account provides a more fine-grained explanation of the external 
influence on e-government policy adoption. So far, policy emulation among countries 
(Bolgherini 2007)63 has been a recurring explanation of e-government policy diffusion. 
What we observe in the Italian case is instead a more subtle effect. My account 
acknowledges that the extended career of E-Government (as a mainstay of public 
administration policies) in Italy echoed policy developments at the European Union 
level, though it reveals the mechanisms of ‘issue certification’ and ‘certification of the 
policy entrepreneurs’ through which this foreign influence was enacted. Third, the 
analysis has focused on the features of the policy subsystem, considered as a ‘sticky 
institutional context’ (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) to be understood in its evolutionary 
nature throughout the episode. In doing so, it complements extant analyses on the 
effects of institutional and organizational arrangements and the way in which IT 
programs in the public sector are conceived and designed.  
Previous studies warned public managers that designing and implementing E-
Government initiatives requires careful consideration of the technological and 
organizational conditions that enable the innovation. The evidence presented in this 
chapter supports the notion that the dynamics of policy making are also not to be 
overlooked. 
 
 
 
 
63 Scholars have also analysed e-government emulation among intermediate levels of government, such as 
regions or states (Yun and Oppheim 2010). 
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Appendix B1 
 
Establishing the 
Authority for IT in Public 
Administration  AIPA (1992 – 
1993) 
Launching the E-
Government Action Plan 
(1996 – 2000) 
Launching the E-Gov 
Funding Project    (2000 – 
2002) 
Setting the agenda 
– Packaging of IT 
coordination in terms of 
austerity and market 
competition 
 
Developing the Proposal for 
an Authority for IT in Public 
Administration (AIPA) 
– Consulting with the unions 
and considering alternatives 
– Appointing an 
Extraordinary Commissioner 
for IT in Public 
Administration (1992) 
– Formulating the mission of 
the Authority 
– Projecting the Authority 
resources and personnel 
needs 
 
Finalizing and launching 
Authority for IT in the Public 
Administration (AIPA) 
 
 
 
Setting the agenda 
- Establishing the Info 
Society Forum within the 
Prime Minister Council 
(1996) 
-Including the issue of IT in 
the wider public sector 
reform issue (1997) 
- Establishing a Technical 
Centre for the Government 
Digital Network (1997) 
– Establishing a new Unit for 
the Information Society, 
reporting directly to the 
Prime Minister (1999) 
 
Developing the Action Plan 
– Gathering ideas and 
working with the EU DG on 
the Info Society (1998, 1999) 
– Collaborating with the 
permanent task-force in the 
Office of the Prime Minister 
(1999) 
– Negotiating with the local 
authorities (establishment of 
a Coordination Centre for 
Territorial Authorities (1999) 
– Gathering ideas from 
academics and consultants 
and negotiating the resources 
with the Executive 
 
Finalizing and launching the 
Action Plan 
Setting the agenda 
-Creating an ad hoc Unit for 
E-Gov within the Ministry for 
Public Administration (2000) 
-Creating an ad-hoc Ministry 
for Innovation and ICTs 
(2001) 
-Certifying part of the 
previous team 
-Repackaging the issue in 
terms of federalism 
 
Developing the Initiative 
-Appropriating of 410 million 
euros from the UMTS 
licenses sale to fund the E-
Gov Action Plan (2001) 
-Negotiating with local 
administrations and 
establishing the Regional 
Competence Network on E-
Government (2002) 
- Gathering ideas from 
academics and consultants 
 
Finalizing and launching the 
Call for Projects 
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Appendix B2 
The 'corpus construction' (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000, p.23) has been built considering the 
criteria of relevance, triangulation (Creswell, 1994; Yin, 1994; Marshall and Rossman, 
1995) and saturation, through the analysis of the documents collected and the interviews 
conducted during the field research (2003-2005). Two main sets of documents were 
used for the study. One set included official documents such as Cabinet submissions, 
internal reports and project evaluation reports from the Italian Archive of the Prime 
Minister Council, from the Department for Public Administration and from the Ministry 
for Innovation & Technology. Another set of documents included research chapters and 
feasibility studies conducted by academics and consultants of the Prime Minister 
Council.  The list of the 20 relevant actors that were interviewed includes: (1) a former 
Prime Minister; (2) a former Minister for Public Administration; (3) the former Director 
of the National Center for IT in Public Administration; (4) the former President of the 
Authority for IT in Public Administration; (5) the former Director of the Area 
‘‘Innovation, Regions and Local Administration’’ at the Department for Innovation and 
IT; (6) the Director General of the Public Administration Department; (7) the former 
Senior Official at the Public Administration Department in charge of E-Government; (8) 
a Senior Official at the Public Administration Department; (9) a Senior Official at the 
Department for Innovation and IT; (10, 11) two former consultants for the PA 
Department and for the Department for Innovation and IT in charge of innovative 
projects; (12, 13, 14) three academics who worked as consultants for the E-Government 
Projects during the episode; (15, 16, 17) three top managers of large IT vendors (IBM 
Italia, Oracle Italia and Microsoft Italia) in charge of analysing and interacting with the 
public sector during the episode; (18, 19, 20) three top bureaucrats of local 
administrations (Modena, Siena and Reggio Emilia) that received funding from the 
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Public Administration Department for their Electronic Government pilot projects. These 
bureaucrats also participated in the preliminary stages of the Electronic Government 
Action Plan. 
The semi-structured interviews took place mostly in the interviewees’ office. The 
duration ranged from ninety minutes to three hours. Four interviewees have been 
consulted twice. Interviews were conducted taking into consideration the peculiarities of 
'elite interviewing' (Bauer & Gaskell, 2000) for the rapport building and the interview 
schedules. Consistent with Wengraf’s recommendations (2001), the research questions 
(i.e. main research questions and research sub-questions) have been distinguished from 
interview-questions/prompts. Access both to internal documents and to the interviewees 
was facilitated by the author’s work as consultant for the Public Administration 
Department at the Prime Minister Council (1999 and 2000). ATLAS.ti was used for 
coding, retrieving and recording the documents and interview text. 
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3. EXPLAINING THE UNEXPECTED SUCCESS OF THE SMOKING BAN IN 
ITALY: POLITICAL STRATEGY AND TRANSITION TO PRACTICE (2000-2005)∗ 
Introduction 
Conversations surrounding policy change and stability are among the most significant 
discussions in public administration and are increasingly being adopted to enrich the 
‘toolbox of policy analysts’ (Weible 2007, pp.113) beyond its technical bearing.  
Classical approaches to the study of policy dynamics include the multiple 
streams theory (Kingdon 1984), the punctuated equilibrium theory (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993) and the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). 
A strand of literature has applied each of these frameworks to highly debated policy 
issues, such as environmental (Grimble and Wellard 1997; Ramirez 1999; Weible 2007) 
and health decisions (Glassman et al. 1999; Kubler 2001). In the specific case of 
smoking bans, policy processes have been analyzed as case studies at both the national 
level (Sato 1999; Derthick 2005; Givel 2006; Wood 2006; Worsham 2006; Cairney 
2007) and at the supra-national level (Duina and Kurzer 2004; Gilmore and McKee 
2004). Some have compared country experiences (Kagan and Vogel 1993; Studlar 
2002, 2004; Marmor and Lieberman 2004; Albæk et al. 2007), while others have linked 
country experiences arguing that ‘policy transfer’ was at work (Asare and Studlar 2009; 
Cairney 2009). Most of these works have examined the pre-decisional phase, assuming 
authoritative decisions as unproblematic policy outcomes.  
∗Mele, V. and A. Compagni. 2010 “Explaining the Unexpected Success of the Smoking Ban in Italy: 
Political Strategy and Transition to Practice”. Public Administration 88(3): 819-835. 
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The mechanisms of turning policy decisions into action (John 1998) have been 
investigated, instead, by a different community of scholars (for a comprehensive review 
see O’Toole 2000; Hill and Hupe 2002), under the label of implementation studies. 
Implementation, with its drawbacks and hiccups, is considered to be a time of renewed 
conflict and negotiation among actors in the policy cycle. 
This chapter does not aspire to integrate these two tracks of literature, but 
explores the grey area of what unfolds in the policy-making process between ‘the 
establishment of an intention on the part of government to do something, and its 
ultimate impact in the world of action’ (O’Toole 2000, pp. 266). It does so by looking at 
the unexpected success of the smoking ban policy in Italy, which excluded the sigaretta 
from all indoor public places including cafes, restaurants (unless they had separate 
smoking areas with continuous floor-to-ceiling walls and a ventilation system), airports 
and railway stations, as well as in all public and private workplaces (Gallus et al. 
2006a). In the last forty years, several countries such as the US, France, Australia, 
Canada and others (Feldman and Bayer 2004) have introduced progressively stricter 
limitations to smoking in public places. However, some of them, especially in Western 
Europe, encountered difficulties in enforcing these laws.  
In January 2003, skeptical observers, both domestic and international, were left 
incredulous by learning that Italy was the first large EU country to approve a 
comprehensive and strict smoking ban policy. The feeling of surprise increased when, 
two years later, the law became effective and the Italian general public promptly 
complied with the new rules (Pisano 2007). In the meantime, Norway, Ireland and 
Malta approved and enforced similar regulations but it was mainly the example of Italy, 
with its reputation as an unruly country, that gained visibility in the international press 
(Povoledo 2005; Rosenthal 2006).  
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The episode analyzed here includes two policy cycles, between 2000 and 2005, 
of smoke-free policy-making in Italy, with two different outcomes: an incomplete 
decision stage and an authoritative decision. The first cycle started with the inclusion in 
2000 of a smoking ban on the policy agenda and ended in 2001 with an impasse, after 
the proposal had been deliberately ‘watered down’ by more than 100 amendments. In 
the second cycle, starting in 2001, the issue of the smoking ban was revamped by the 
new Cabinet and, by virtue of a well-crafted political strategy, approved (2003) and 
ultimately enforced in 2005.   
The chapter offers a historical account of the introduction of the smoking ban in 
Italy from a processual perspective (Pettigrew 1997; Barzelay and Gallego 2006), by 
addressing the following questions: Why was the smoking ban put on the policy agenda 
in the late 1990s? Why and how did the ban remain on the agenda despite the change in 
the Executive? How was the ban approved amid a contentious political debate? How did 
the government manage the period between the formal passage of the law and its 
enforcement?  
The synthesis scheme is built around Kingdon’s theories on the policy-making 
process (Kingdon 1984). A policy cycle involves the career of an issue on the 
governmental policy agenda (Abbott 2001); during the early phases, the issue evolves in 
response to occurrences in two sub-processes, agenda setting and alternative 
specification, and the cycle is completed by the third phase of decision-making. Besides 
adding to the analysis of pre-decisional dynamics, the case of the smoking ban in Italy 
allows us to uncover the set of events and activities occurring between the formal 
passage of a law (decision-making) and its full application. So far, studies have not 
systematically focused on distinguishing phases during implementation. We have 
conceptualized ‘transition to practice’ as the initial phase in the policy implementation 
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process. In the case under consideration there is a two-year gap between the passing of 
the smoking ban law and its application, making it an ideal example on which to 
conduct this study. 
The analysis presented in this chapter proceeds through two steps. First, it 
provides a condensed narrative history of the 2000-2005 period on which any such 
instrumental case study must be based. The narrative covers selected previous events 
and the actual episode, and it is organized around the policy cycle categories of agenda 
setting, alternative specification, decision-making and transition to practice. Second, the 
chapter applies institutional processualist theories (Barzelay and Gallego 2006) of 
policy change to account for the dynamics of policy introduction and success. Finally, 
explanations are presented and discussed with consideration given to comparative 
literature on tobacco policy.  
  
Methodology And Concepts 
While this case represents an interesting slice of history in itself, there are two main 
uses for the analytically significant evidence revealed upon further investigation. First, 
examining the Italian experience through the conceptual lens of institutional 
processualism promises to be more revealing than other frameworks, such as the 
advocacy coalition framework or the punctuated equilibrium framework, due to the 
subtle dynamics of issue inclusion in a congested policy agenda and of issue 
maintenance after a Cabinet turnover. Second, it is also more likely to reveal aspects 
such as political feasibility and policy entrepreneurs’ participation. Moreover, it allows 
for the explanation of how social mechanisms, such as attribution of opportunity, work 
and are activated during a policy cycle.  
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The study is based on a narrative analysis aimed at developing both a historical 
understanding and a causal explanation (Goldthorpe 2000). The ‘corpus construction’ 
(Bauer and Gaskell 2000, pp. 23) has been built considering the criteria of relevance, 
triangulation (Creswell 1994; Yin 1994; Marshall and Rossman 1995) and saturation, 
through the analysis of the documents collected (2006-2007) and the interviews 
conducted during the field research (2007-2008). Details of the study design, sources 
examined and interviewees are contained in Appendix C. 
 
Narrating The Introduction Of The Smoking Ban  
The long wave of anti-smoking policy 
In November 2002 the Italian Parliament approved an article that instituted a smoking 
ban in any public place, including bars and restaurants. The extension of the ban to 
these convivial spots was considered a sudden novelty and has changed the habits of 
millions of Italian citizens, both smokers and non-smokers. Yet, tobacco control 
policies in Italy, and particularly smoking bans, had a long history (for a concise 
timeline of the main events refer to Table 1). 
 
TABLE 1 
Timeline of the main events related to anti-smoking policies in Italy 
Previous Events (1934-2000) 
1934 Sovereign Decree on the ban to sell cigarettes to individuals under16 
(art 25 Sovereign Decree 24th December 1934, n.2316) 
1975 Ban to smoke in public places such as schools, hospitals, cinemas and 
theatres, trains (except in smoking areas), libraries etc. 
(law n.584, 11th November 1975) 
1995 Ban to smoke in any public administration office or area, including the 
private offices subcontracting from the public administration  
(Prime Minister Decree, 14th December 1995) 
126 
 
1998 Smoke prevention is included in the National Healthcare Plan 1998-2000 
 
Main episode (2000-2005) 
9/2000  Smoking ban proposed by the Health Minister Veronesi 
 
3/2001 Ministerial Ordinance on “Interpretations and applications of the current 
laws related to the smoking ban”  
(Ministerial Ordinance 28th March 2001, n.4) 
1/2002 Smoking ban proposed by Health Minister Sirchia 
 
1/2003 Smoking ban issued 
(art 51, law n.3, 16th January 2003) 
1/2005 Smoking ban enforced from 10th January 2005 
(Law decree 9th November 2004, n.266 and Health Ministry ordinance, 17th 
December 2004) 
 
 
The first milestone in this policy domain is represented by a sovereign decree restricting 
the sale of tobacco to individuals over the age of sixteen in 1934. It was only in 1975 
that Parliament banned smoking in public places such as schools, hospitals, cinemas, 
theatres, and trains (except in smoking areas). Twenty-one years later, in 1996, a 
directive toughened the ban by extending it to any office or area of public 
administration, including private businesses subcontracted by the public sector. 
However, the substantial lack of compliance with the ban prompted a new regulatory 
intervention. For the first time, the National Health Plan 1998–2000 included the 
promotion of healthy lifestyles and the reduction of smoking among the national public 
health priorities and started a positive trend that applied to all of the subsequent plans. 
In April 2000, a political crisis determined the appointment of a new Executive, 
which included Prof. Veronesi as Health Minister. Besides being a world renowned 
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cancer specialist and enjoying great visibility in Italy, throughout his career Veronesi 
had been very active, almost a militant, in attracting attention to the correlation between 
smoking and cancer. In 1987, together with his very influential French colleague, Prof. 
M. Tubiana, he had put the Italian Prime Minister Craxi under pressure to promote a 
European-wide action on cancer, with tobacco control as main priority. Craxi and the 
French President, Mitterrand, jointly proposed the initiative to the European 
Commission and this led to the establishment of the program ‘Europe against Cancer’, 
considered to be the channel for all subsequent action on tobacco at the European level 
(Gilmore and McKeee 2004). Veronesi was also familiar with the government dynamics 
as he had been a member of two National Commissions named by the Health Ministries 
in 1993 and 1998 on cancer-related issues. Two weeks after his appointment, Prof. 
Veronesi announced his intention to present a law proposal to ban smoking in public 
places and to increase fines for the transgressors, stating that this was “a moral duty, 
both as an oncologist and as a Minister” (La Repubblica, 18th May 2000). 
A smoking policy scored among the top priorities for public health interventions, 
and this choice was mainly backed by the Health Minister with the alarming figures 
concerning the effects of tobacco smoking. Almost 90,000 deaths per year could be 
attributed to lung and larynges cancers, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
degenerative cardiovascular diseases. In the speech64 accompanying the launch of the 
Annual report on the National Health Conditions65, Prof. Veronesi pointed out that 
despite a progressive decrease in the number of smokers from 15 million in 1980 to 
64 Speech given at the Italian National Research Council (CNR) by the Health Minister, Umberto 
Veronesi, on July 3rd 2000. Archive of the CNR.    
65 A comparison of the Report on the National Health Conditions issued in July 2000 with the two 
previous ones issued in 1999 and 1998 respectively, shows that all three reports included a chapter on the 
smoking habits of the population in the core section on ‘Health determinants’. Different from the 1998 
and 1999 reports, however, the report launched by Veronesi in 2000 referred to the importance of 
smoking prevention in the Preface among the top three priorities for the National Healthcare System and 
included Smoking prevention as a chapter in the section of the report titled ‘From health protection to 
health promotion’.    
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12.5 million (a quarter of the entire population) the goal of reducing it below 10 million 
was still far away. Veronesi highlighted this as a main priority to improve the health 
status of the country, to be achieved by working in two parallel directions. On the one 
hand, the anti-smoking campaign ought to be developed further, refining its gender, age 
and social reach. On the other hand, he stated that, “…by no means can we defer the 
approval of a new anti-smoking law which shouldn’t have the features of a crusade, but 
nevertheless should be rigorous and justly severe, both towards those that break it and 
towards those in charge of enforcing it”.  
In September 2000 the Executive approved the final version of the smoking law 
proposal in which the list of smoke-free areas included virtually all work and public 
places. The Commission on Social Affairs started the parliamentary works that were 
developed over the following months. The proposal focused only on the ban, since 
smoking prevention interventions and related health education programs had already 
been considered and approved in other phases of the political debate. The starting point 
of Veronesi’s law proposal was the prohibition of smoking, which ought to be 
considered the default situation, and the possibility of smoking only an exception. Yet, 
in order to strengthen the prescriptive effectiveness of the ban and to avoid any 
ambiguity, the proposal listed comprehensively the public places where smoking was 
forbidden and where the no-smoking sign was to be shown. In addition, each business 
or administration had to identify an individual responsible for the enforcement of the 
ban. The proposal also included an ad hoc article on the minimum standards for the 
separated smoking areas that private and public organizations were allowed to create. 
Depending on where the law violation occurred, the proposal established that the 
revenues generated through the fines would be redistributed to the regional or central 
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administrations. The latter would then reinvest these resources in training and education 
programs for tobacco prevention. 
The law was refined and adjusted, reflecting the negotiations with the different 
Parliamentary commissions. Illustrative of the adjustments that the proposal underwent 
was the decision not to extend the ban to inmates, prompted by the Parliamentary 
Commission on Justice and heavily debated by the Parliamentary Commission on Social 
Affairs.  
The Minister had preventively checked the support of the parliamentary political 
groups, obtaining a general support for the initiative. However, such support soon 
faltered, based “on the principle but not on the specific proposal” (La Repubblica, 9th 
July 2000). Thus, despite the unanimous praise of the law, the debate had remained a 
generic one and despite the imprimatur of the parliamentary restricted committee, a 
series of never-ending amendments (110 in total) were absorbed into the proposed ban 
in the following months, halting its approval. By the time the proposal was ready to be 
put forward (February 2001) for voting in the Chamber of Deputies, the legislature was 
over. In March 2001, Veronesi’s proposal was then converted into the short ministerial 
ordinance on ‘Interpretations and applications of the current laws related to the smoking 
ban’.    
 
Setting the agenda 
After the 2001 political elections, Prof. Sirchia was nominated Health Minister. He had 
worked as head of the immunohaematology unit and of the blood bank at the Ospedale 
Maggiore of Milan University for over thirty years, and occasionally served as a high-
level expert, or member of technical commissions for the Ministry of Health. The Prime 
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Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, appointed Sirchia on the basis of both his scientific record 
and his political experience as responsible for social services for the City of Milan.  
From the very beginning Berlusconi was supportive of Sirchia’s plan to tackle 
the issue of smoking control during his mandate. This endorsement was stimulated by 
the recent polls and surveys conducted by DOXA, the Italian branch of Gallup 
International Association. In 2001, a survey on the attitudes towards smoking regulation 
showed unexpected support by the general population (Gallus et al. 2007). In regards to 
cafés, restaurants and other places open to the public, more than 83% of adult Italians 
were in favor, moderately or strongly, of separate smoking areas, and of a blanket ban in 
the absence of such separation. The most striking result was that more than 50% of 
smokers would support a comprehensive smoking regulation in Italy. The scientific 
community promptly ensured that there was visibility of these findings, claiming that, 
“public opinion could not, therefore, be given as a reason for further delaying the 
adoption of a smoking policy” (La Vecchia et al. 2001, pp. 245). In addition, the belief 
that an anti-smoking policy was required was repeatedly expressed in reports and 
published commentaries (Invernizzi and Zagà 2003; Mangiaracina 2002; Tabaccologia 
2007), as well as in articles produced by the scientific community that were clearly 
aimed at proving how certain tobacco control strategies and prevention policies could be 
effective in changing attitudes and behavior (Sardu et al. 2006).  
It should be also said that, since 1994, legislation on health and safety in the 
workplace had been issued and, although it did not specifically deal with tobacco 
smoke, nonetheless, it required employers to protect the health of their workers from 
carcinogenic agents. Since tobacco smoke is a known carcinogen, the law could be 
applied to secondhand smoke in the workplace. Two sentences had marked the 
evolution and the public perception of this legal framework. First, a constitutional court 
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sentence in 1996 had included passive smoke as a health hazard. Second, in 1999, a 
bank had been clamorously condemned for the death of an employee, whose lethal 
asthma attack had been triggered by secondhand smoke in the workplace. 
Encouraged by the consensus basis, Sirchia presented to the Parliament the 
2001-2002 report on the health status of the Italian population, emphasizing the need to 
decrease and control public healthcare expenditure, and, consequently, contribute to the 
reduction of the budget deficit. In this context, the focus on healthy lifestyles and 
primary prevention of drug and alcohol abuse and smoke consumption appeared as high 
priorities. The Minister highlighted, among the various consequences, the heavy 
economic impact of problems directly linked to smoking on the national healthcare 
system.  
The annual report not only pointed out figures on smokers, adding up to 25% of 
the population, but, for the first time, also the number of passive smokers. The report 
drew attention to the importance of regional empowerment in health policy and 
delivery. This latter argument was influenced by the composition of the ruling coalition, 
which included the Northern League, a party strongly in favor of political and 
administrative devolution of the twenty Italian Regions. 
Learning from the failed experience of his predecessor, the Health Minister 
Sirchia committed to a strategy to ban smoking in public places that would not be based 
on the prohibition to smokers but that would be strictly limited to the protection of non-
smokers. The argument was intentionally broad and shifted the debate over 
constitutional principles, which were difficult to be disputed. It should be said that a 
logical linkage between the existing legislation and smoking had already been 
established in the Triennial report on tobacco consumption and trends (1998-2001), 
issued by the High Level Institute for Healthcare. The report addressed the opportunity 
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to link a smoking ban to the constitutional ‘right to health’ (art. 32 of the Italian 
Constitution). However, Sirchia established a constitutional reference for the ban that 
was an even less controversial principle. Consistent with the 3rd article of the Italian 
Constitution, the ban was in fact presented as a mere consequence of the ‘equal duties 
and equal rights’ principle.   
 
Alternatives specification 
Sirchia had assembled his team by confirming some top officials at the Ministry and by 
appointing three new experts as his immediate staff. The very nature of the Ministry of 
Health put it in close contact with the scientific and medical community. In particular, 
the ISS - the High Level Institute for Healthcare - represented a significant source of 
health research and epidemiological data and offered a platform for consultation 
between the ministerial staff, academia and other Italian medical research centers.  
In addition to the ISS, in 2000, the Italian Society for Tobacco Control and, in 
2001, a National Coalition for Tobacco Control was founded, bringing together 
governmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as scientific associations 
and individuals, to lobby for tobacco-free policies. This coalition supported the Ministry 
of Health in developing national smoke control strategies (Tamang 2007). Last, the 
presentation of the annual report on smoking in Italy, ad hoc seminars and symposia on 
health and economic risks associated with tobacco offered additional venues for an 
exchange on these issues between the scientific community and policy-makers, and, 
probably, helped shape the early phases of this policy cycle. 
The government concerns over potential protests of bar and restaurant owners 
were mitigated by the “data on the economic effects of smoke-free policies, for example 
from the US states of California and New York showing no impact or positive impact of 
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smoke-free laws on restaurants and cafés.” (Interview conducted by the authors with 
Prof. Sirchia, 30th September 2007). These reassuring results strengthened the 
negotiation power of the Health Minister with his colleagues, particularly in light of the 
continuous monitoring of popularity through polls and surveys commissioned by the 
Cabinet of Berlusconi. (Interviews conducted by the authors with Prof. La Vecchia, 
24th October 2007, and with Dr. Mangiaracina, 7th November 2007).  
Besides being influenced by the scientific community, the strategy followed by 
Sirchia for preparing his legislative project became focused on intentionally avoiding 
the major obstacles that his predecessor had found in the Houses.  
 
“I did not want my proposal to agonize in Parliament as it had been 
the case with Veronesi [the previous Minister]. His law had been 
considered too moralistic and persecuting to smokers. Critics would 
misleadingly claim it descended from a vision of “ethical state”. I did 
not want it blocked by endless examinations and infinite amendments” 
(Interview conducted by the authors with Prof. Sirchia, 30th 
September 2007).   
 
As a result, Sirchia decided to limit the fuss that would have been associated with a 
comprehensive regulation on smoking and worked along three directions. First, in 
December 2001, he tightened the existing legal framework by increasing the fines, both 
for Italians smoking in places like cinemas, hospitals, offices, schools, museums, buses 
and airports, and for the managers of public spaces failing to enforce the ban. For 
Italians who ignored the bans, fines ranged from 25 to 250 Euros. The fine doubled if 
the violation took place in the presence of pregnant women or children up to 12 years 
old. For restaurateurs or personnel of public offices, failure to enforce smoking bans 
could result in even stiffer fines, ranging from 200 to 2,000 Euros, and the loss of their 
license. 
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Second, in September 2002, Italy adopted the EU directive (Directive 2001/37/EC) on 
the labeling of tobacco products and forbade the printing of terms such as ‘Light’ and 
‘Mild’ on cigarette packs, as they were considered misleading. The adoption of the 
directive followed a pronouncement by the Antitrust Authority according to whom, 
“The label ‘light’ accurately indicates lower content of nicotine […] However, it evokes 
in the consumer a reduced perception of health hazard. Therefore, ‘light’ can be 
misleading as it alters the perception of the pernicious consequences of smoking. This 
position is consistent with the EU Directive 2001/37/EC”. The Antitrust 
pronouncement, was in reponse to a request from the Italian Consumers’ Federation66 to 
issue a formal opinion concerning the need to enforce a stricter policy for cigarette 
packs67.   
Third, he activated alternative advocacy channels, calling for the support of public 
agencies and bodies. For example, in July 2002, he condemned the promotion of 
tobacco during movies and TV shows and invited the national broadcasters to cease 
smoke-related indirect advertisements and product placement.  
Also, in September 2002, he appealed to police officials, requesting them “to refrain 
from smoking while in uniform”. Last, in October 2002, he urged the prefetti, state 
officials responsible for order and security at local level, to intensify the controls over 
smoking violations in public places. The sanctions, determined by the 1975 law and 
confirmed by a 1995 ministerial ordinance, had never been adequately enforced. For 
instance, during the entire year of 1999, the total sum from fines collected on behalf of 
tobacco scantions was only thirty-five Euros.  
66 Codacons-Coordination of the associations for the defense of environment and of the users’ and 
consumers’ rights.  
67 Similar to what has been reported for Denmark (Albæk 2004; Albæk et al. 2007) and for Germany, 
(Kohler and and Minkner 2014, 695) stricter regulations on tobacco products’ labelling and advertising, 
and even increased taxation on tobacco products do not trigger a level of contention comparable to that 
resulting from smoking bans.      
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While the search for strategies alternative to a systemic legislative proposal and the 
moral suasion had been fruitfully employed, Sirchia believed that eliminating smoking 
in public places, particularly bars, restaurants and clubs, would have been unfeasible 
without a norm. Thus, after a consultation with the other Ministries and with the 
Regional Governments, the Minister proposed a single article to be included in a 
broader law on public administration and attached it to the annual finance bill. The 
article was clearly committed to the protection of non-smokers and avoided any 
mention on the discipline of smokers. It only mentioned the sanctions for violators and 
the characteristics of separate smoking rooms and assigned the State-Regions Joint 
Panel the thorny task of setting, within four months, the standards through an ad hoc 
regulation.   
 
Making the final decision  
When making a decision on the final draft proposal in March 2002, the Minister decided 
to append it to a broad law on public administration that was on the parliamentary 
agenda for discussion at that time. Regardless of its limited fit with the general content 
of the law, the Minister was convinced that the narrow scope of a smoking article in the 
midst of a vast and controversial law would have limited the parliamentary conflict over 
the issue. However, after an animated debate, the speaker of the House of Deputies 
deemed the proposed legislation to be inadmissible as it was extraneous to the topic. In 
an official statement the Minister of Health expressed his disappointment that “despite 
the requests of the Italian citizens, Europe and the World Health Organization, his 
legislative initiative to protect non-smokers had been rejected”, but persisted in his 
intention to have an article included in a general law on public administration, aware 
that “missing the train of the financial bill would have meant deferring the law to a 
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vague and uncertain future.” (Interview with Prof. Sirchia, 30th September 2007).  
Thus, in early November 2002, after intense negotiations and the threat to quit the 
Executive, the House of Senators approved the article, incorporating it in the general 
law on public administration. While this represented a first success, major obstacles 
were expected in the House of Deputies.  
The endorsement of the President of the Republic came in the form of an official 
declaration during the third National Day for Cancer Research. During the press 
conference, the President stated that “smoking is always and anyway harmful, and there 
are no situations whatsoever in which it can be considered neutral”. He also spelled out 
his unambiguous support of the anti-smoking policy, by recognizing the importance of 
the preliminary approval by the House of Senators and by asserting his trust that “the 
law proposal would successfully conclude the process of parliamentary approval as 
soon as possible.”   
After a rushed debate on the entire legislative proposal on public administration, 
the article (Article 51, Law n.3, 16th January 2003) banning smoking anywhere indoors 
except for private homes, on December 22nd 2002, was approved by the Italian 
Parliament with a large majority (236 votes in favor versus 63 against). The Deputy 
Sergio Gambini, in the transcripts of the final discussion in the House of Deputies, 
claimed that “the law was substantially armoured and that the lack of time did not allow 
for a proper analysis” (parliamentary meeting, 4th December 2002, slot 3.20 PM-3.50 
PM). 
 
Transition to practice 
In January 2003 the law was officially promulgated and the following phase was a 
flurry of activities aimed at managing the transition to practice. The article had assigned 
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to the State-Regions Joint Panel the task of specifying, in the months to come, both the 
technical standards of the smoking rooms and the enforcement mechanisms for the 
sanctions. The extent of the efforts required to solve the implementation issues, 
prolonged the phase between the law approval and its actual coming into effect for two 
years.    
On the surface, the work of the State-Regions Joint Panel flowed with good 
organization and general collaboration. But this was not enough to ensure a smooth 
acceptance of their outcome. The shift to a later stage and to a more technical discussion 
of potentially problematic decisions had successfully reduced the parliamentary conflict, 
facilitating the approval process of the article. Yet, it had only displaced political 
conflict to the implementation phase and, far from being eliminated, the disputes 
surrounding the ban re-emerged in the form of a contentious public debate with high 
media visibility. While smokers' groups campaigned for a referendum to overturn the 
law, bar and restaurant owners threatened not to enforce the law, arguing that they were 
business people, and not ‘sheriffs of the state’. Bar and restaurant owners were 
organized through the Italian Federation of Bars and Catering (FIPE), a unit of the 
Italian Industry Association. Most certainly, these associations were fuelled by tobacco 
interest groups (Tamang 2006; and interview conducted with Dr. Mangiaracina, 7th 
November 2007). In the fall of 2004 the resistance of the Federation to the ban started to 
escalate. In October, the president of the FIPE sent a public letter to the Minister, asking 
him to defer the ban enforcement for six months, in order to allow the bar and restaurant 
owners to issue a shared interpretation of the ban and to organize ad hoc training 
initiatives. In December, the silence of the Minister caused the association to issue a 
petition among the members, formally requesting a postponement of the ban’s 
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enforcement68. A public letter sent from the President of the Italian Industry Association 
to Prime Minister Berlusconi followed shortly69. Next, FIPE launched a campaign to 
boycott the ban directed at bars and restaurants, which even provided a toll-free number 
to receive more information and updates by FIPE70. The last act of the FIPE association 
came with the announcement, through a press release, that the federation had contracted 
with prominent experts of constitutional law to prepare an appeal to Regional 
Administrative Tribunals71 
The Minister’s response to these threats mainly employed the media. On the one 
hand, he explicitly condemned the behaviour of these business associations during TV 
shows, uncovering the surreptitious interests that linked the Italian Federation of Bars 
and Catering to the tobacco industry. In fact, the Federation was a unit of the Italian 
Industry Association, shareholder of British American Tobacco that, in turn, had 
recently acquired the Italian Tobacco Public Company (Marini 2005; and interview with 
Prof. Sirchia, 30th September 2007).  
On the other hand, throughout 2003, an intensive media information campaign 
on healthy lifestyles and tobacco control was promoted by the Ministry of Health. The 
campaign, conceived of as a supporting tool for the ban, was consistent with the 
priorities of the National Health Plan (2003-2005) of “informing, communicating and 
educating on healthy lifestyles” and with the broader health agenda influenced by the 
Italian semester of EU Presidency. The general goal was to dissuade people from 
smoking by raising awareness of its negative effects, with an emphasis on the protection 
of passive smokers and vulnerable groups such as children and pregnant women. The 
target audience was, in fact, mainly the young, teenagers, women and mothers. The 
68 On 18/12/2004 the formal request was sent to the Minister, FIPE Archive. 
69 The letter was sent on 21/12/2004, FIPE Archive.  
70 FIPE press release 29/12/2004. 
71 Regional Administrative Tribunals (TAR) are the judiciary venues where private subjects claiming that 
their legitimate rights have been violated by a public decision can appeal.  
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operation was accurately planned and managed by the Minister and his team. After 
defining the message and the targets, an agreement between the Health Ministry and the 
main national broadcasters was signed, maximizing the campaign visibility and reach.  
In addition, the ministerial team identified an effective group of ‘message 
conveyers’ in a panel of renowned scientists and celebrities, selected according to TV 
channel and targets. Last, a whole set of adverts, video clips, announcements, 
information windows, entire TV and radio programs, online forums and chat rooms 
were produced.  
    During this transition phase, the Executive kept monitoring the popularity of 
the ban through surveys conducted by DOXA, the Italian branch of Gallup International 
Association, under the scientific supervision of an important medical research team. In 
2004, one year after the law was issued and one before it came into effect, more than 
85% of smokers were in favor of separate smoking areas in cafés and restaurants, and of 
a total ban in the absence of such separation. Even limiting the analyses to current 
smokers, the estimates did not change appreciably, confirming a steady support of the 
ban among the general population (Gallus et al. 2006a). 
In 2004, the creation, heavily promoted by Minister Sirchia, of two new public 
bodies, the Technical Group on Tobacco Control and the National Centre for Diseases 
Prevention and Control (CCM), further strengthened the coordination between central 
and local administrations in the field of tobacco policy. The Technical Group gathered 
experts working at the local level on smoking cessation initiatives and attempted to 
harmonize training and education programs for health and social workers throughout the 
national territory. The CCM was in charge of coordinating the Health Ministry and the 
Regions in the field of disease monitoring and prevention. The mission of the CCM was 
to establish a sound prevention network in Italy by providing a bridge between the 
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research world and practitioners in the public health sector, as well as by facilitating 
institutional partnerships and professional collaborations. 
Despite the strong opposition of restaurant and bar owners and strengthened 
coordination across the national prevention network, the enforcing regulatory step, in 
the form of a law decree signed by the Prime Minister, still developed into a rite of 
passage for Sirchia and his law. At the final meeting with the Cabinet, concerns and 
doubts were raised and the Health Minister threatened to quit. Consensus was found 
again only when Sirchia promised to ‘be reasonable’ with inspections and sanctions 
(interview with Prof. Sirchia, 30th September 2007). 
In December 2004, a few weeks before it came into effect, an ordinance by the 
Health Ministry on the application of the smoking ban summarized the mechanisms in 
place for law enforcement and clearly attributed the responsibility for inspections and 
sanctions to local public bodies and police forces. The document also confirmed the 
prominent role given to bar and restaurant owners, accountable for enforcing the ban in 
their own businesses. 
 
Later events: enforcement and compliance with the smoking ban  
Beginning January 10th 2005, despite some initial concerns on enforcement issues and 
the role that restaurants and bar owners would play, the Italian general public promptly 
complied with the new ban. Since then, Italians have radically changed their smoking 
habits in public places, at least in pubs, cafés and restaurants. In the following months, 
the thousands of inspections conducted first by the police force (NAS) under the direct 
control of the Ministry of Health and, then, by local police and civil forces found only 
112 law-breakers (approximately 1.5%). 
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Surveys showed that support for the ban in the Italian adult population, smokers 
included, increased from 83% to 93%. Smoke-free legislation did not unfavorably affect 
the hospitality business (Gallus et al. 2006b), as Italians reported that they went to 
restaurants and cafés more frequently. The data was confirmed by a survey of bar, 
restaurant and club owners, who by and large did not report any significant revenue 
losses. Consistent with other countries, the legislation has proven effective in protecting 
non-smokers (Gallus et al. 2007) and, at least in the short-run, it has determined a 
decrease in smoking prevalence and cigarette consumption (Gallus et al. 2006b). Also, 
it has shown immediate cardiovascular and respiratory health benefits (Barone-Adesi et 
al. 2006). 
 
Understanding Anti-Smoking Policy Making 
The episode analyzed here includes two policy cycles, between 2000 and 2005, of 
smoke-free policy making in Italy, with two different outcomes: an incomplete 
decisional stage (2001) and an authoritative decision (2003). This section attempts to 
give a process account of the episode, by addressing the following questions: Why was 
the smoking ban included in the policy agenda? Why and how did the ban remain on the 
agenda despite the change of Cabinet? Why was the ban approved amid a contentious 
political debate in 2002, as opposed to 2001? How did the government manage the 
period between the formal passage of the law and its enforcement (transition to 
practice)?  
Issue inclusion in 2000 can be accounted for by the combined effect of three 
factors, namely discourse diffusion, quality of the policy entrepreneurs’ participation 
and the attribution of political opportunity to the smoking policy issue.  
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We have also considered alternative explanations to the first inclusion of the 
smoking ban on Minister Veronesi’s policy agenda, in primis policy transfer and 
imitation (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000), which were already employed, thereby 
explaining the inclusion in the agenda of a smoking ban in other countries (Asare and 
Studlar 2009; Cairney 2009). However, policy transfer and imitation do not appear to 
have played a major role, since the parliamentary discussion in 2001 preceded the 
adoption of smoking bans in other EU countries (Ireland in March 2004, Norway in 
June 2004 and Malta in October 2004). Rather, we recognize a milder effect of 
‘discourse diffusion’ due to the increasing relevance of smoking and cancer prevention 
within the crusade that WHO and other international organizations had launched world-
wide.  
Second, Veronesi’s outstanding reputation as a top cancer specialist and his high 
public visibility determined the actor certification (McAdam et al. 2001) needed to 
launch a forceful action against smoking. Also, the Minister was familiar with political 
dynamics at the national level and had been very effective in advancing a policy agenda 
on smoking and cancer prevention with the European Commission. His positive 
experiences in policy making made him a confident policy entrepreneur. Veronesi’s 
conviction in including the smoking ban in the agenda was strengthened by a first round 
of parliamentary consultations that signaled support for his initiative across the political 
spectrum. This led the Health Minister to see a window of opportunity for the smoking 
ban. 
In 2001, despite the need to signal political discontinuity and the debacle of 
Veronesi, the anti-smoking issue was maintained on the policy agenda of the newly 
elected Executive led by Mr. Berlusconi. Such stability can be partially accounted for 
by the bipartisan issue image (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) of the smoking ban, as 
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policy advocates and their opponents were distributed across political parties. This 
allowed the incoming Minister to recycle the issue, notwithstanding that it had been the 
warhorse of his predecessor. Most of all, the support of the Prime Minister, the sound 
consensus of the public opinion as shown by the polls, and the Minister’s determination 
to tackle this issue by avoiding the obstacles faced by his predecessor, led him to 
recognize a political opportunity in pursuing the tobacco control policy. 
In late 2002, amid a controversial debate, the new Minister succeeded in having 
the ban proposal approved. Based on the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the different 
final outcomes of the two policy cycles, in 2001 and 2002, could have been explained 
by a changed balance among various stakeholders and interest coalitions or by external 
perturbations (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994). However, the evidence showing that 
the support for policy change by the general population and the scientific community 
did not change over time renders this explanation less plausible.  
Rather, the success of Sirchia’s political strategy is likely the result of the careful 
consideration of the political feasibility of his project, in the light of the errors of the 
previous Minister. Veronesi had translated his smoking policy into a comprehensive law 
proposal. Sirchia, instead, minimized the recourse to the legal enactment process. The 
ban was presented as a single article included in a much wider law disciplining disparate 
issues of public administration, and incorporated in the annual financial bill. This 
curtailed the time and the attention that the Houses and the parties could devote to the 
issue.  
The minimization of the legal enactment was enabled by three deliberate 
strategies. First, a potential source of conflict was parceled out from the parliamentary 
discussion, by deferring the definition of the standards for the smoking rooms and for 
the enforcement mechanisms, and by delegating it to a State-Regions Joint Panel. This 
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strategy had a further advantage, as it packaged the whole policy in terms of devolution 
to the Regions, one of the top priorities of the Executive. Second, surveys and polls 
were employed to bring about evidence of population attitudes towards smoking and 
smoking regulation, strengthening the political power of the Minister in the negotiations 
within the Executive and, at a later stage, with the Houses. In addition, the data on the 
economic impacts of the ban adoption in the US states of New York and California 
were used to dispel the claims of restaurant and bar owner associations. Third, the issue 
framing was deliberately shifted by Sirchia to the protection of non-smokers rather than 
to the more ambitious goal of smoking cessation. This limited the interference effect 
(Kingdon 1984) of the opposing issue of individual liberties in the parliamentary and 
public debates.  
Finally, our analysis points out how the government managed the period 
between the issuing of the law in January 2003 and its coming into practice in January 
2005, a phase that we named transition to practice and that we consider crucial for the 
successful implementation of the ban. During this phase, the Minister and his team 
performed activities that included establishing intergovernmental coordinating 
mechanisms as well as sustaining the political consensus for the decision. In turn, the 
institution of the Technical Group for Tobacco Control and the National Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control ensured a platform for the coordination and clarification 
of tobacco policies among the Regions and between the Regions and the Ministry of 
Health. On the one hand this coordination platform provided the details of law 
enforcement, decreasing the level of uncertainty perceived by the implementers. On the 
other hand, the prevention network also worked as a ‘constituency for change’ (Kelman 
2005) for the ban. Last, the tactical use of the media increased public awareness of non-
smokers’ rights, thus strengthening the bargaining power of the policy entrepreneur.   
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 Conclusions 
This work analyses two policy cycles in Italy between 2000 and 2005 in a very 
controversial policy domain, banning smoking in public places. In order to explain the 
opposite outcomes of the episodes, it focuses on the interplay between policy 
entrepreneurs and the institutional context. The narrative has covered the policy 
evolution by examining agenda setting, alternative specification, decision-making and 
transition to practice. The analysis has identified the main differences between the 
cycles in terms of the political strategies adopted by the two Health Ministers. 
In particular, the case highlights the importance of managing political feasibility 
(Meltsner 1972; Radin 2000). The incoming Minister learned from the experience of his 
predecessor and deliberately employed a low-key political strategy to uphold the 
initiative. He limited the conflict that might have jeopardized the policy outcome, by 
reframing the issue from smoking cessation to non-smokers protection. Second, he 
deferred and delegated the definition of standards and further clarifications of the law to 
the State-Regions Joint Panel. Third, he strategically employed polls and surveys to 
negotiate with his peers.  
These three features characterizing Sirchia’s political strategy can be traced in 
the experiences of other countries with tobacco control policy described in international 
literature (E.g. Feldman and Bayer 2004).  First, in the US (Bayer and Colgrove 2004), 
Canada (Manfredi and Maioni 2004), Germany (Frankenberg 2004) and Japan 
(Feldman and Bayer 2004), to name a few examples, smoking control had been 
reframed from a prohibition stance to one of protection of bystanders from the harmful 
effects of environmental tobacco smoke. This approach is justified by the fact that 
governments wanted to “retain the hands-off posture toward individual behavioral 
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choice while at the same time exercising [ …] their public health powers” (Feldman and 
Bayer 2004, pp.67). In Germany, for example, there was an agreement between the 
Federal Ministry of Health and the German Hotel and Restaurant Association aiming to 
provide smoke-free environments to non-smokers, but as it was a self-regulated 
compliance, it was largely ineffective.72. Beginning in September 2007, non-smokers 
protection has been governed by the Federal Law for protection from the hazards of 
passive smoking - clearly focused on guaranteeing the health of bystanders. The Law 
excluded from its compass workplaces open to the public, including bars and 
restaurants, providing only a loose requirement (i.e. to ban smoking to the extent 
compatible with the nature of the business or type of employment). In turn, each state 
parliament had to rule explicitly whether and where a smoking ban should be imposed 
and, starting in 2007, Germany’s sixteen states regulated smoking differently within the 
boundaries set by the Federal Law. However, most of the newly introduced smoking 
bans at the state level were soon modified and turned into milder guidelines, following a 
2008 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court decided that some of the 
state provisions constituted a violation of the fundamental right to freely exercise a 
profession. This ruling occurred after two operators of the hospitality business had filed 
constitutional complaints against the non-smokers protection laws in their respective 
states. This ‘focusing event’ contributed to the wrong perception in public opinion that 
smoking bans were harmful to business73 (Kvasnicka and Tauchmann. 2012). This 
especially allowed for reframing of the smoking bans from the relatively uncontestable 
72In 2005, a non-binding agreement between the Federal Ministry of Health and the German Hotel and 
Restaurant Association was signed which did not lead to the desired improvement in non-smokers 
protection. The Federal government successively opted out from this domain stating that it lacked the 
legislative competence in this area and, since 2007, the non-smokers protection in the gastronomy sector 
had been regulated by state laws. 
73 In particular, Kohler and and Minkner (2014) report that the law was perceived as unduly 
disadvantaging specific types of businesses, i.e. small gastronomies and nightclubs vs larger gastronomies  
- that could establish separate smoking rooms. 
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idea of protection of bystanders to a contentious dispute in terms of potential business 
discrimination. 
Second, the deferring of the debate to a devolved setting has also been observed 
in the case of Scotland where this venue shift has facilitated the approval of the smoking 
ban. Scotland was the first in the UK to implement comprehensive measures on the 
smoking ban. Discussion in 1999 during a Parliamentary debate resulted in a public 
backlash that lead to a suppression of debate throughout the 2003 election cycle, at 
which time no party made legislative proposals regarding smoking ban measures 
(Cairney 2009). A policy entrepreneur, elected in Parliament in 2003 introduced the 
Maxwell Bill, which proposed in the Parliament a smoking ban on public areas that 
serve food. The fact that the bill was straightforward as a public health issue (i.e. not 
pushing public opinion too far into debates on smokers’ protection), and required a 
relatively limited support to advance the agenda74, made it significantly easier, at least 
politically, to move forward in 2004 with examination of the subject matter for 
legislation. This ‘venue shift’ from the Executive to the Parliament, pushed by the 
policy entrepreneur, as well as the framing of the ban as an issue of public health, made 
it a matter that could be decided upon at the devolved level (i.e. by the Scottish 
Parliament) as opposed to the reserved level (i.e. aligned with the UK provisions). The 
shift was allowed by the Scottish Executive, looking for a ‘big idea’ (Cairney 2007, 27) 
that could advance its policy standing in the UK. This venue shift allowed for 
comprehensive smoking bans in Scotland, which contrasted, at the time, with the UK 
reliance on voluntary agreements.  
Third, the use of polls in the smoking political strategy had been pioneered by the US 
(Bayer and Colgrove 2004), and the Australian governments (Ballard, 2004), to monitor 
74 Only 11 signatures were needed to move to a Stage 1 examination by a select parliamentary committee 
- the Health Committee (Cairney 2009). 
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public opinion support and stir the political debate. Also in Scotland, in the period that 
preceeded the parliamentary approval of the ban, the Office for National Statistics 
issued an ‘Omnibus Survey’ that showed a strong support for restriction of smoking in 
most public places. Another independent poll commissioned and publicized by the 
Tobacco Manufacturers’ Association, however, reported a much lower score, especially 
if referred to the alternative of a total ban. As these surveys allowed for much 
ambiguity, the Scottish Executive made the decision to use a public consultation, 
leading to a response reporting 80% support of a smoking ban with 56% of responders 
rejecting any exemptions (Cairney 2007). 
Another form of direct participation can be found in the German policy episode, where 
numerous initiatives by citizens’ or interest groups, in fact, attempted to influence non-
smokers protection legislation through the direct democratic procedures available, in 
addition to the top-down legislation, at the state level. While only one state is reported 
to have strengthened the smoking provision as a result of the referendum, “the 
pronounced direct democratic activity on smoking bans in Germany reflects the 
controversy about smoking bans” (Kohler and and Minkner 2014, 695).  
Turning to Denmark, this is the only Scandinavian country where tobacco control has 
never scored high on the political agenda. Traditionally, the dominant policy approach 
has been to favour voluntary agreements (Albæk 2004). A milestone of the anti-tobacco 
policy has been an attempt in the late 1980s to ban smoking from public spaces. 
However, similar to what happened to the proposal of Veronesi in Italy, the 
extraordinary number of amendments to the law proposal determined the parliamentary 
defeat of the comprehensive anti-smoking program presented by the Health Minister.  
(Albæk 2004). The issue remained dormant for several years. Cyclically, health 
organizations would bring the issue to the Executive or parliamentary attention, but the 
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response of policy makers and ministers tended to be “hesitant to legislate in this area to 
say the least” (Larsen 2009, 13). Albæk et al. (2007) submit that the difficulties 
involved in including a smoking ban in the agenda and advancing it effectively to the 
decisional stage are due to its issue image. Specifically, tobacco consumption was 
traditionally framed as an exclusively private matter. Since the late 1980s political 
parties had opted out from taking a stance on what was defined as “part of ethical 
policy, where parliamentary members can vote as they see fit, free of party constraints. 
However, this happens [in a country] where most legislation is decided 100 per cent 
along party lines” (Albæk et al. 2007, 12) and this inevitably conferred to the issue low 
political salience.  
In late 2004, both unions and trades organizations in the hospitality industry called on 
the Government to introduce some form of legislation after a report from the Institute of 
Occupational Health had demonstrated the annual number of tobacco-related 
casualties in the hospitality industry, which also led opposition parties to raise the 
issue in Parliament (Larsen 2009). After some reluctance to regulate the issue, the 
Minister of Health engaged in a year-long public debate. Similar to what we have 
observed in the case of Scotland, in Denmark the Minister decided not to rely on the 
polls, skeptical about their ability to capture the real citizens’ opinions. Therefore, he 
initiated a series of popular hearings around the country75, which showed a remarkable 
support for the ban. In December 2006, a new smoke-free legislation was approved and 
came into effect in August 2007. 
We have sketchily reported some common elements of smoking ban policy trajectories 
in a few countries, with special attention to three European countries in addition to Italy, 
namely Finland, Germany and Scotland. From the analysis of these country 
75 Larsen reports that during such hearings smaller groups of workers, high school students, smokers and 
non-smokers would come in and listen to various arguments for and against smoking bans followed by 
instant electronic voting on a long series of questions. 
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experiences, we can draw some interesting, albeit temptative comparisons. First, we 
have seen how in all these countries, there have been heated debates triggered by 
smoking bans proposals. However, they do not activate partisan types of quarrels since, 
unlike national insurance or hospital privatization, anti-tobacco regulation is a sub-
domain of health policy that can be considered bipartisan. This specific political 
attribute of the issue may increase the chances for its approval. Instead, in Denmark, 
where the party appropriation of an issue is considered a pre-condition for its 
advancement on the agenda, it relegated smoking regulation to a limbo of political 
irrelevance.  
The policy episodes analysed confirm the importance, showed by the Italian case, of 
framing anti-tobacco regulation as protection of bystanders to prevent large 
controversies in the parlimentary and public opinon debate - especially those concerning 
the paternalistic intervention of government in the private sphere of citizens.  
We identified, as the second successful element of Sirchia’s political strategy, deferring 
and delegating the specification of the ban’s details and standards to the State-Regions 
Joint Panel. The comparison with the other countries provides stimulating insights. The 
case of Scotland confirms the positive influence that ‘devolution’ may have on the 
smoking bans (Cairney 2007, 2009). Noticeably, while in Italy devolution entailed 
collaborating with the regions, in Scotland it entailed affirming the autonomous policy 
capacity of the country vs the United Kingdom’s central legislative procedures. In both 
cases, however, devolution is a policy cycle unfolding in another domain. Also in both 
cases, devolution was saturated with positive political valence that generated a spill-
over, reinforcing the legitimacy of the anti-smoking provisions. If we compare the cases 
of Italy and Germany, we notice a remarkable difference in the implications on the 
policy issue of its devolution, obviously reflecting the different jurisdictional 
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arrangements of these two countries. In Germany, the Federal Law issued in 2007 laid 
down the general principles of health protection from smoking, leaving to the sixteen 
states the autonomous definition of the scope and details of the prohibitions. In Italy, 
standard-setting was delegated to the twenty regions, but only through a Joint 
Committee (Conferenza Stato-Regioni) in which the regions agreed upon a standard that 
was enforced consistently across the national territory. 
Last, we discussed how the policy entrepreneur in Italy strategically employed polls and 
surveys to negotiate with his peers. The analysis of the other cases show that polls were 
also used in Germany, Scotland and Denmark. However, the analysis also points to a 
certain skepticism of policymakers towards polls, either due to the risk of manipulation 
or to their limited capacity to decipher the public mood. Accordingly, these cases 
display alternative channels for the interaction between policymakers and citizens on 
the smoking bans, including public consultations in Scotland, popular hearings in 
Denmark and democratic procedures in Germany. 
To conclude, our work enriches this international literature on smoking policies 
in three substantial ways. First, it has explored an additional case, set in a country of 
highly legalistic traditions and in transition towards a decentralized institutional 
arrangement. The comparative literature on tobacco control policy has suggested that 
one explanatory principle for cross-national differences in policy outcomes is “the 
impact of a polity being organized along federal or unitary principles” (Marmor and 
Lieberman, 2004, pp 288). Furthermore, the chapter has investigated a case where 
political consensus has been attained at the central level, but successful policy 
enforcement had to rely on the participation of subnational units (the Regions). More 
significantly, it has revealed the dynamics by which the central features of a political 
strategy are effectively assembled to achieve the policy outcome. Finally, it allows us to 
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appreciate a phase, that we named ‘transition to practice’, covering the temporal gap 
between the passage of legislation and its implementation. This phase is particularly 
relevant in administrative systems where formal approval ought to be followed by an 
enforcing regulatory step.  
During ‘transition to practice’ the general principles of the law are translated 
into operational instructions. At this point, although legal uncertainties have dissipated, 
the policy cycle process still has the potential of being halted or undone. The fact that a 
number of authoritative decisions to ban smoking from public places in Italy and in 
other countries were never really enforced clearly confirms the associated risks. 
Consequently, besides the well-studied policy categories of the pre-decisional stage, a 
constructive analysis of policy dynamics should take into account this critical phase.  
At a more practical level, recognizing and understanding the challenges 
associated with transition to practice could be beneficial for policy entrepreneurs in 
order to achieve the last mile, and that is having bans enforced and respected.  
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Appendix C 
Documents were retrieved from multiple sources: the Italian Parliament, the Ministry of 
Health (MoH), the High Level Institute for Healthcare (Instituto Superiore di Sanità, 
ISS), the National Center for Disease Prevention and Control (CCM), Censis (Research 
Center on Social Issues) and ISTAT (National Statistical Institute). They primarily 
included epidemiological studies, policy documents and recommendations, internal 
reports, transcripts of parliamentary hearings and meetings, research papers and 
presentations conducted by academics and consultants. Another set of documents was 
derived from the scientific literature and, in particular, commentaries published in 
international medical and public health journals, from national publications specialized 
on the issue of smoking policies (i.e.  ‘Tabaccologia’) and from the databases of 
international organizations, such as the EU and WHO, that offered cross-country studies 
of anti-smoking policies and monitoring of their level of application. Analysis of the 
two major Italian daily newspapers and the international press were conducted to 
determine the degree of media coverage of the issue and the international reactions to 
the announcements of the passage and the enforcement of this legislation.  
Analysis of the retrieved documents also allowed us to identify the main players 
involved in the policy cycle and experts that had contributed either to its formulation or 
to the general debate on the issue. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
these players either on the phone or face-to-face and lasted between forty minutes and 
three hours. Interviews were tape-recorded. Fifteen relevant players were interviewed: 
(1) the former Minister of Health 2000, (2) the former Prime Minister,  (3) the Director 
of the Department of Prevention and Public health Campaigns at the Ministry of Health, 
(4) the Director of the National Center for Disease Prevention and Control, (5) the Head 
of External affairs and Communication at the Ministry of Health and personal advisor of 
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the Minister of Health on the issue; (6) one Senior Official at the Ministry of Health that 
had directly participated in the different phases of the anti-smoking policy cycle (7) one 
Official in charge of producing the statistical data for the Department of Prevention and 
Public Health Campaigns, (8) a top official at the High Level Institute for Healthcare 
(ISS) that normally provides the Ministry of Health with scientific and epidemiological 
data (9) the Director and (10) the President of the Italian Tobacco Association, chief 
editors of “Tabaccologia” - the newsletter on smoking attitudes and policy in Italy, 
(11,12) two medical scientists and epidemiologists, members of a prominent Italian 
Research Institute and authors of the international scientific literature on smoking 
attitudes in Italy, (13) the Director of the same Italian Research Institute, consultant for 
the Ministry on these issues (14) a member of the High Council on Healthcare, 
responsible for the elaboration of the technical criteria for the creation of smoking areas 
in restaurants and pubs and (15) one top official in the Health Department of the Emilia-
Romagna Region, coordinator of all Italian Regions during the discussions about the 
anti-smoking policy in the State-Regions Joint Panel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Comparing Dynamics Of Policy Change Across Cases 
Each chapter included in this collection has analyzed and discussed its empirical 
findings. This concluding section offers a systematic comparison of the insights across 
the three cases. As discussed in the introduction, the three policy episodes unfold in 
very diverse policy domains. Therefore, before moving to the comparison, it seems 
useful to introduce a brief account of potential differences between the domains of 
public management and health policy. 
 
Differences between the policy domains  
The first two empirical chapters, on Innovation in government and Electronic 
government respectively, unfold in the setting of the public management policy domain. 
Decisions in this domain pertain to government-wide institutional rules and 
organizational routines related to expenditure planning and financial management, civil 
service and labor relations, procurement, organization and methods, and audit and 
evaluation (Barzelay 2001).  Public management policies have achieved increased 
salience over the last three decades, since policy-makers saw them as the only option to 
respond to a major tensions for governments: responding to the fiscal stresses brought 
about by changes in the international economic system, while facing relentless demands 
for public services and regulations in national political systems (Aucoin 1990; Hood 
1991).  In the academic study of public administration and management, this specific 
reference to public management as a policy domain  (Barzelay 2001; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2000), provides a unit of analysis distinct from sector-specific managerial 
tools and institutional strategies or leadership styles in the public sector (Barzelay 2003, 
251-252). In other words, it asks the ‘big questions of public management’ on micro-
156 
 
management, motivation and measurement (Behn 1995), but it deals with them as 
policy-level issues rather than as management prescriptions.  
The third empirical chapter, on the Smoking ban, is set in health policy, a core 
sector in any welfare system, in charge of providing the conditions under which basic 
needs are met (Barker 1996; Immergut 1992a). The social significance of health 
correlates with its economic importance both in terms of government spending and in 
terms of its impact on the strategies of corporate production, for example in the industry 
of pharma and medical devices. It has been claimed that the right of access to healthcare 
has become a defining feature of democratic citizenship (Freeman 2000). However, 
enacting such rights requires governments to find a balance between equity 
and effectiveness (Powers and Faden 2008; Sassi et al. 2001). The way in which this 
balance is sought entails rationing resources among types of treatments, groups of 
patients or technologies. Consequently, health policy is more often than not a highly 
contentious domain, for it poses crushing dilemmas to policymakers (Choudry et al. 
1997; Ham and Coulter 2001). Such high levels of contention are hardly matched in the 
public management policy domain. Despite public management reforms’ increasingly 
high status on the political agenda, in fact, it is not typical for these types of policy 
decisions to “stir passions and mobilize interest groups on a massive scale” (Immergut 
1992a, 1) as is the case for health. The three cases display remarkable differences in the 
level of contentiousness, with the smoking ban clearly representing a much more 
contested issue compared to innovation in government and E-government. However, the 
comparison of the three policy episodes reveals a common feature, i.e. the bi-partisan 
nature of the issue, which transcends its level of contentiousness. In other words, the 
issue did not split the political spectrum between right-wing and left-wing partisanship 
(Toshkov 2013).  
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Another difference between the two domains is the extent to which evidentiary 
bases are systematically employed for policymaking. The importance of evidence-based 
policy in health seems correlated to the relative importance of technical expertise in 
different country settings. I don’t mean to argue that professional bureaucracies are a 
peculiarity of health. However, the physicians’ professional dominance creates a sort of 
“monopoly of medical practice that sets the limits to health policy” (Immergut 1992b, 
59). In healthcare, more than in public management, the evidence-based approach is 
saturated with positive cultural valence and has migrated from the sphere of clinical 
practice to the sphere of policy (Learmonth and Harding 2006). Consistent with these 
premises, in the case of the smoking ban we found that the policy entrepreneurs, who 
were also prominent medical scientists, resorted to different strategic sources of 
evidence to back their proposals and to defend them from the interferences of detractors 
and political adversaries. This account confirms the results of previous studies regarding 
the ability of policy entrepreneurs in the health domain to select and assemble different 
evidentiary bases (Mele et al. forthcoming). These bases, employed in the case on the 
smoking policy, range from knowledge and scientifically produced evidence (e.g. the 
studies on the correlations between the rates of lung cancer or cardiovascular diseases 
and tobacco usage) to codified forms of experiential knowledge (e.g. the reassuring data 
on the effects of smoking bans enforced abroad on the hospitality business).  
Having acknowledged some general differences between the policy domains, the 
section now moves to the comparison of insights resulting from the three empirical 
chapters. The comparison is organized around two selected analytical components of the 
selected framework, namely policy entrepreneurship and context.  
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Policy entrepreneurship  
Let me first recapitulate, for each chapter, the role played, and the actions undertaken by 
the policy entrepreneurs. In the innovation policy, the first entrepreneur (Cassese) was a 
‘technical’ Minister for public administration selected from the academia, aware of the 
short-term horizon of his mandate. The Minister received a strong endorsement from the 
Prime Minister, who certified his political caliber and the salience of the public 
administration domain by delegating him to diagnose and address the main problems of 
the public sector as well as by including him in the expenditure-planning phase. 
Consequently, innovation in government was framed as a means to reduce costs and 
support austerity measures. The Minister swiftly gathered a parallel team of skilled 
professionals around the country. He pragmatically inserted his initiative into the legal 
template of an existing project formally initiated five years before that had remained 
dormant due to poor management and lack of visibility. 
The second entrepreneur (Bassanini) came from the same policy community of 
his predecessor. A professor of administrative law, he carved out for himself the role of 
reform champion. In doing so, the policy entrepreneur remained constantly in charge of 
the initiatives for government innovation, despite an interlude of one year and a half in 
the middle of the mandate during which time the policy entrepreneur vacated the post of 
Minister. He framed Innovation in government as instrumental to the modernization of 
the public sector and to the pillars of his grand reform, namely devolution, transparency 
and simplification. He managed to gather a team of experts to work with him and he 
nurtured a professional community of ‘public innovators’ outside the Ministry through 
the activation of networks, conferences and awards.   
The third entrepreneur (Frattini) was a career politician, though with a strong 
background in public administration issues and exposure to the themes of the reform. 
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He developed the policy for Innovation in government along the existing trajectory, he 
retained, at the Ministry, most of the team assembled by his predecessors and he 
consolidated the community of practice with ad hoc initiatives. His framing of 
Innovation in government conformed to the broader goals of institutional empowerment 
and bottom-up innovation – i.e. public administrations enabled to innovate without 
being mandated to do it by law.  
Turning to Electronic Government, the first cycle is marked by the co-existence 
of two entrepreneurs, due to a tight alternation of two technical governments in a period 
of one year and a half. The first entrepreneur (Amato) stirred the inclusion of the issue 
into the agenda and participated in some alternative specification activities – taken over 
and led to the final decision by the second entrepreneur (Cassese). In the first cycle, the 
issue was framed as a measure to foster control and transparency in public procurement, 
against the general background of austerity and moralization of the public sector habits, 
for example to prevent corruption in public procurement.  
In the second cycle, the policy entrepreneur (Bassanini) partook in the high-level 
EU definition of an Action Plan for E-government, thus certifying himself and the issue. 
He framed Electronic government as instrumental to public administration 
modernization and as conducive to country competitiveness in the policy milieu of 
information society.   
The last policy entrepreneur (Stanca), a former top-manager of an IT 
multinational, was ‘certified’ as the head of a newly established Ministry for Innovation 
and Information Technology. He framed Electronic Government as a way to increase 
the satisfaction of public services’ users, either citizens or companies, as well as a 
means to cater to the devolution process, by supporting and funding the local 
administrations willing to participate to pilot projects.  
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Last, in the Smoking ban episode we see two main entrepreneurs. The first 
(Veronesi) was a prominent scientist, certified in Italy and abroad by his participation in 
high-level policy forums on cancer and tobacco prevention. He framed the issue as his 
fight against smoking and crafted accordingly an articulated law proposal that did not 
make it to the stage of approval. The second entrepreneur (Sirchia) also had an expert 
background. He assembled his team by confirming some top officials and appointing a 
few more as his immediate staff. The entrepreneur maintained the issue of the smoking 
ban high on the agenda, though he devised corrective measures to avoid what he 
thought were the mistakes of his predecessors. One of the measures was the framing of 
the ban, presented as mere protection of bystanders in order to minimize the contention 
over government incursions in the private sphere that had characterized the previous 
crusade against smoking. The other was the minimization of legal enactment to limit the 
chances of lengthy parliamentary discussions, more likely to result in the watering down 
of the proposal. 
By comparing the choices and the actions of the policy entrepreneurs across the 
three episodes, it is possible to identify some common elements and relate them to the 
broader debate on the theories of policy change. I will especially relate my findings to a 
stream that has addressed the interplay between policy change and policy 
entrepreneurship (Ackrill and Kay 2011; Balla 2001; Mintrom 1997, 2000; Mintrom 
and Norman 2009; Mintrom and Vergari 1996).  
A recurring feature in all three chapters is the ability of policy entrepreneurs to 
strategically frame the issue they are trying to push through, or maintain in the agenda. 
This finding is a locus classicus of Kingdon’s conception of policy entrepreneurship. It 
is also consistent with the conclusions of other studies that highlight the importance of 
‘problem definition’ (Mintrom and Norman 2009), i.e. the ability of entrepreneurs to 
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attribute salience to certain attributes of the issue, thus catalyzing the attention of the 
intended individuals and targeted groups. As anticipated, the three issues in my cases 
share an intrinsic malleability, afforded by the bi-partisan nature of their image 
(Toshkov 2013). Interestingly, by comparing the framing of the issue image across the 
three cases, we can observe a variation between the two public management issues and 
the health issue. Government Innovation and E-Government were not only ideologically 
neutral but also perceived as ‘technical’. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs and political 
parties were able to package these issues as instrumental to their priorities, be they 
austerity or country competitiveness measures. In the case of smoking, we also see the 
attempt to frame it in terms of control of public health expenditure. However, this 
supposed objective perspective did not easily mitigate the level of contentiousness of 
the debate on prohibition. Consequently, the political ability of the successful 
entrepreneur did not entail repackaging the issue as instrumental to other measures. 
Instead, it required the adoption of a low-key representation of the smoking ban as a 
protection of by-standers, thus minimizing contention over government incursions in the 
private sphere. This finding is consistent with the differences in political salience that 
we may expect between the two policy domains. It also leads us to the second key 
element of entrepreneurship – that IP is conceptualized as a social mechanism in terms 
of ‘attribution of opportunity’, i.e. seizing political momentum in order to advance an 
issue that may have otherwise scored low in the agenda.  
Attribution of opportunity resonates with ‘social acuity’ (Balla 2001; Mintrom 
2000; Mintrom and Norman 2009; Mintrom and Vergari 1996). In the words of 
Mintrom and Norman:  
“In policymaking context, as in all areas of human endeavor, opportunities 
must be recognized before they can be seized and used to pursue desired 
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outcomes. This suggests change agents must display high level of social 
acuity, or perceptiveness, in understanding others and engaging in political 
conversations” (2009, 652).     
While the notion of social acuity – as well as attribution of opportunity- reflects 
the volitional conduct of policy entrepreneurs, the analysis of my cases, afforded 
by the analytical framework of IP, also captures ‘actor certification’, a mechanism 
that complements the volitional character of ‘attribution of opportunity’ with a 
situational component. We can, in fact, observe the mechanism of ‘actor 
certification’ at work when prominent political actors lend their credibility to the 
policy entrepreneurs, thus attesting both their ability to carry out the mandate and 
the relevance of the issue at stake. The episodes frequently display actor 
certification at the international level, such as in cases where entrepreneurs obtain 
key responsibilities in prestigious policy venues - an OECD Committee or a EU 
Ministerial Group.  
A third recurring element of policy entrepreneurship in the three chapters 
is the determination and ability to build a team. The analysis of the chapters 
shows the importance of team building at two interrelated levels: the tight-knit 
team within the Ministry and the broader outside coalition. Especially in the 
second chapter, we observed the progressive coalescing of a community of 
experts – central administrators, local administrators, academics and consultants – 
around the issue of Innovation in government. Such professional network offered 
feedback and inputs in the phase of alternative specification, it ensured vitality to 
the Ministerial initiatives, and it signaled the political relevance of the issue. This 
account confirms the importance of networks of contacts for policy entrepreneurs, 
who can then draw upon these repositories of skills and knowledge to support 
163 
 
their initiatives (Knoke 1990; Mintrom and Norman 2009). It also resonates with 
the notion of ‘constituency for change’ (Kelman 2005), a critical mass of 
individuals, typically working within the policy sub-system, who become reform 
advocates, making it difficult to rewind change initiatives once they have been 
deployed. It is interesting, here, to analyze the dynamics activated by the interplay 
between team building and one feature of the political context, i.e. its 
discontinuity due to frequent cabinet turnovers.   
When policy entrepreneurs are aware of the limited temporal horizon of their 
mandate – and in the technical governments in my cases, this has meant anything 
between ten and fourteen months – they may gather a parallel team. In other 
words, instead of going through the procedural and political hurdles of 
substituting part of the ministerial staff, they may activate their professional 
network outside the Ministry for the ‘alternative specification’ while leaving 
unaltered – though mostly unexploited – the expertise and the experts available 
within the Ministry. A further implication of the interplay between team building 
and frequent government turnover is that, once established, the ‘constituency for 
change’ can help insulate the issue from the changes one may expect with a new 
executive and a new Minister, thus strengthening the tightness of the policy 
monopoly (Baumgartner and Jones 1993).  
Another frequent feature of policy entrepreneurs that emerges from the 
analysis of the cases, is their background as active members of the policy stream. 
In the first and second cycle of the Innovation policy and Electronic Government 
episodes, the entrepreneurs were both reputed members of academia and they had 
a track-record of active participation in the policy professional community 
through reports and working groups. Also in the third chapter, we see two medical 
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scientists with policy experience acting as entrepreneurs in the domain of smoking 
regulation. This is a substantial variation from the assumption of independent 
streams à la Kingdon. In his words “these two streams, [policy and politics] 
involve different people with different backgrounds and training, different 
orientations and different preoccupations” (1995, 220). This feature is, at least in 
two cases, linked to a specificity of the Italian political context. Cassese 
(Innovation and E-Government, 1993) and Veronesi (Smoking ban, 2000) operate 
in the political context of so-called ‘technical governments’ whose members have 
weak political affiliation and, instead, strong substantive expertise on the matters 
they are called to regulate, the natural candidates to be recruited are members 
from the academic and expert community. I will return later to the implications of 
the osmosis occurring between the policy and political streams.  
A last element of policy entrepreneurs displayed by the analysis of the three 
chapters is their codification of the legacies of the past. The importance of time and 
history has been discussed in the introduction and can be recollected through the words 
of Capano:  
‘Timing and history cannot be omitted. Timing is an essential 
discriminatory factor with regard to the essence of the process of change. 
History means that policies are not developed within a vacuum. History 
means that policies are contextualized in a place, that they come from a past, 
and that they have taken up time” (2009, 27). 
 The analysis of the cases through the selected framework gives substance to what may 
otherwise sound like a platitude. A processual perspective reveals that policy 
entrepreneurs are confronted with problems that persist over time and posits that  
episodes of policymaking can be interpreted as structured sequences of solving 
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recurrent problems (Haydu 1998, Rayner 2009). In the first chapter, solving recurring 
problems entailed stimulating and sustaining innovative practices among public 
organizations; in the second it involved devising a strategy to spread and guide the 
adoption of Information and Communication Technologies among public organizations; 
and, in the third, solving recurrent problems required passing legislation that banned 
smoking from public places. The way in which policy entrepreneurs constructed the 
problems and formulated solutions was influenced by ‘policy memory’, the active 
sentiment of their past that shapes perceptions, through thought and action (Kay 2006). 
For example, in the chapter on Government Innovation and in the chapter on Electronic 
Government we see the ramifications, about fifteen to twenty years later, of specific 
cognitive frames of public administration reform developed by the policy entrepreneurs, 
as a result of their participation in working groups tasked with identifying the main 
problems of the Italian bureaucracy. The community, assembled by a visionary Minister 
of Public Administration, pioneered themes that would become dominant in decades to 
come, and forged the next generation of statesmen. Similarly, in the chapter on the 
Smoking ban, the first policy entrepreneur had not only been a member of a community 
of top scientists for over twenty years but had also developed, together with other 
prominent oncologists, direct experience in advocating for European action on cancer 
more than a decade before the policy episode was narrated. It is worth emphasizing that 
in the three chapters the notion of policy memory, even when characterized as the 
familiarity of individual actors with an issue, implies that this familiarity or habitus is 
developed within the groups the individual belongs to (Bordieu 1984). Policy 
entrepreneurs learn from their past experiences as members of epistemic communities.  
We can also observe vicarious policy learning at individual and organizational 
levels as policy learning also stems from the encoding of previous policy initiatives. In 
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the chapter on Government Innovation, for example, we observed periodical 
interruptions during which incoming actors assessed recent or ongoing initiatives as 
either successes or failures and, on the basis of this exercise, designed the features of 
subsequent initiatives. Noticeably, the very notion of successful initiatives evolved in 
parallel with the progressive refinements of the dominant discourse on government 
modernization. In the chapter on the Smoking ban, the second policy entrepreneur 
designed the policy proposal by carefully avoiding what he had encoded as the mistakes 
of the previous Minister. The two examples I have recounted show how in these cases 
entrepreneurs experienced two types of vicarious learning – one based on encoding and 
interpreting of the substantive components of the policy experience, the other based on 
the acquisition of political sensitivity. This distinction resonates with the 
conceptualization of policy vs political learning. Policy learning is based on the 
production of knowledge that aims for a better “understanding – or even a redefinition – 
of the relationship between the configuration of components of policy design and their 
consequences” (Real-Dato 2009, 127). Political learning enables entrepreneurs to 
sharpen their ability to conceive and prosecute and promote policy goals and ideas (May 
1992).  
I am now turning to compare the cases in order to discuss another analytical component 
of the framework: the context.  
 
Contextual Elements: decentralization, Europeanization and legalism  
In the introduction I argued that one of the analytical merits of institutional 
processualism is to capture the interactions between context and situation, where 
“context includes fleeting occurrences and ongoing policy histories and where situation 
includes ideation and interactions among participants within the focal policymaking 
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process.” (Barzelay and Gallego 2006, 540). Institutional processualism, in the tradition 
of Kingdon, attributes principally to policy spillovers such causal relationship between 
context and situation76. As a result of  its ‘institutional’ roots, IP is also attentive to how 
situated interaction is influenced by stable cultural context (Barzelay and Gallego 2006; 
Thelen and Steinmo 1992).  
Applying this framework to the analysis of my cases has allowed me to capture the 
diverse ways through which the three elements of the administrative context enter the 
policy scene in the three chapters. I will start with ‘decentralization’ and ‘EU 
integration’, and will then move to ‘legalism’ – an element typically codified as the 
trademark of Italian administrative culture (Capano 2003; Gualmini 2008; Lippi 2003; 
Ongaro 2011; Panozzo 2000). 
Let me recapitulate the role of decentralization and Europeanization in the cases, 
by starting with the former. In the first chapter, decentralization takes the form of an 
overarching principle, i.e. ‘empowerment of local administrations’, which was 
increasingly enacted in the initiatives for Innovation in government.  In the second 
chapter, Regions and local administrations cooperated with the Ministerial staff in the 
drafting of the E-government action plan, thanks to the establishment of an ad-hoc E-
government Coordination Centre for Local administrations. In the last chapter, local 
administrations not only contributed to the preliminary works but they were also tasked 
with an autonomous step of the legislation process, i.e. to specify the technical details 
after the ban had been approved.  
Moving to the process of the Europeanization, the first policy cycles of 
Innovation in government and Electronic government are temporally situated in a period 
where Italy had committed to join the incipient EMU. This required, among other 
76 In addition to policy spillovers, another type of causal mechanism that is employed to account for the 
interplay between context and situation when an empirical case exhibits it, is called ‘a focusing event’.  
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responsibilities, reducing the budget deficits to levels permitted by the 1992 Maastrich 
Treaty. In the first chapter, for example, the ‘Guidelines for modernizing public 
administrations’ included as a top priority ‘to make the public sector more European.’ 
In the second chapter, the European Guidelines for the information society acted as a 
reference for the Italian action plan for E-government. In the last chapter, the first policy 
entrepreneur also owed his reputation to the launch of the plan ‘EU against cancer’ he 
had pioneered with prominent foreign colleagues. We also find a tangible implication of 
the process of European integration in the adoption of the EU directive on the labelling 
of tobacco products.  
The analysis of these very diverse examples and experiences of decentralization 
and Europeanization indicates that the framework is geared to capture not only their 
nature of static contextual factors, but also the interactions between the context and the 
main policy cycle as it unfolds. I identified three channels through which the interaction 
takes place. One is instantiated by the formal mechanisms of jurisdictional shift towards 
the EU (e.g. the EU directives or the Treaty provisions on economic and monetary 
union) and towards local administrations (creation of ad hoc governmental units in 
charge of dealing with local issues). Another channel, discussed before, is through 
‘actor certification’. A third channel, through which context and action interact, comes 
in the form of the political currency enjoyed by decentralization and Europeanization in 
the period under analysis. Europeanization became synonymous with modernization 
and competitiveness and was evoked by policy entrepreneurs as a value per se. 
Similarly, participation of local administrations in the drafting of a national policy 
proposal carried, for its proponents, a political benefit that was independent from its 
technical benefit. In other words, the political currency enjoyed by these contextual 
elements turned them into guiding principles for other policy domains (e.g. the ‘mantra’ 
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of Europeanization or of devolution). Understanding these micro-dynamics sheds some 
light on the actual functioning of ‘policy spillover’, that is to say it allows starting to 
unpack how “ideas pass between institutionally-unrelated policy areas” (Ackrill and 
Kay 2011, 75). In doing so, it may also relate to the scholarship that has investigated the 
influence of European integration on policy change in the members countries and 
particularly in Italy (for a review see Redaelli and Franchino 2004). Some of these 
studies posit that policy change is activated from top (the EU) to bottom (Italian 
policies). Dyson and Featherstone (1999) for example attribute domestic policy change 
to Europeanization conceptualized as an ‘external lever’ that alters power relations in 
government and between government and parliament. In the same vein, Della Sala 
(1997) shows that the Treaty provision on EMU has enabled government agencies to 
resist the pressures of interest groups and advance more firmly economic regulatory 
reforms. Few studies opt for a ‘bottom-up’ approach. Among them, and particularly 
close to my research endeavor, is the study by Natali that investigates the effects of 
Europeanization on welfare state reform in Italy. Building on the three streams model, 
he shows how “creative policy entrepreneurs can use the [European forces] to enlarge 
the policy breaches” (2004, 1091).  
To sum up, the comparative analysis of my cases has allowed me to discern the 
channels through which the spillover effect is enacted. I posit that this preliminary result 
may be a promising insight for researchers on Europeanization, especially those 
engaging in empirically based studies on the dynamics of domestic policy change 
triggered by the EU, beyond the top-down vs bottom-up dichotomy.  
The third contextual element, legalism, is a striking, though not exclusive feature 
of the Italian administrative setting77. As discussed in the introduction, this feature has 
77 Capano for example warns us that legalism is a phenomenon that has characterized other EU 
administrations, rather than some kind of Italian eccentricity (2003, 785). 
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especially attracted the attention of scholars interested in the Italian administrative 
traditions. In stylized terms, legalism is associated with the concept of law as an 
instrument for intervening in society rather than as a means of conflict resolution 
between different societal actors (Knill 2001; Ongaro 2011 Painter and Peters 2010; 
Sotiropoulos 2004). The corresponding dominance of legalism in the Italian 
administrative community is often held responsible for inhibiting reform efforts or 
turning them into perfunctory rituals, thus hollowing out their potential for real change 
(Capano 2003; Gualmini 2008; Lippi 2003; Panozzo 2000).  
What the analysis of my cases suggests is that there is more variety at work, and 
that such variety is worth exploring. A first, basic outcome of the research is thus to 
introduce into international scholarship the previously unreported episodes of 
policymaking that, despite the legalistic setting, lead to policy change. A second type of 
variety that the framework is set to capture is displayed by the entrepreneurial responses 
to the legalistic pressures. Comparing the cases, we do find entrepreneurs that resort to 
legislation for highlighting the societal relevance of specific policy issues. Examples of 
this tendency are the establishment of an Authority in the attempt to make more 
transparent the IT procurement habits of central administrations or the search of a legal 
route to (re)affirm the principle that smoking in public places is not allowed. However, 
we also find examples of entrepreneurs that decode the constraints posed by legalism 
and find a way to achieve their policy goal by downplaying the legal component of the 
policy change. We even find entrepreneurs that try to counterbalance the legalistic 
approach by explicitly promoting a ‘legal moratorium’ and by packaging their 
initiatives accordingly.  
Such empirical variety is (moderately) interesting per se, as it portrays a more 
nuanced view of the Italian policy community that includes elements of consciousness 
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about the dominant paradigm. More importantly from an analytical point of view, is that 
the framework allows us to uncover the dynamics through which, in the episodes I have 
studied, the legalistic culture that indisputably characterized the Italian administrative 
landscape does not prevail and inhibit the aspiration to change of policy entrepreneurs.  
A closer look at the scholarly work on the Italian administrative culture, shows 
that my findings could hardly have been achieved by adopting the perspective that links 
administrative traditions to policy change. In the following, I try to explain why this is 
the case, by comparing my work with those of Capano (2003) and Panozzo (2000), 
which I take as illustrative of the research strand on administrative traditions. 
First and most important, we have asked different questions. The work of 
Capano, for example, is set to explain ‘a whole spectrum of results of change’ (Capano 
2003; 784), asking explicitly whether “the reforms introduced during the 1990s can be 
perceived as a paradigmatic change” (Capano 2003, 788). Along similar lines, Panozzo 
(2000) wonders whether managerial accounting reforms of the 1990s are ‘for real’ or 
whether the legal transposition of managerial and accounting principles has hindered 
their “original legitimacy and appeal” (2000, 363). These questions reflect the 
epistemological and ontological premises of culturalist theories applied to political 
change. One such premise is ‘oriented action’, that we find at work very often in the 
sociological stripe of new-institutionalism, for example under the guise of ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; March and Olsen 1989). Eckstein has 
provided a clear definition of orientations to action:  
“Actors do not respond directly to situations but respond to them through 
mediating orientations. Orientations to action are therefore general 
disposition of actors to act in certain ways in sets of situations” (Eckstein 
1988, 490).  
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Looking for ‘oriented action’ clearly leads culturalist approaches to expect continuity. 
Orientations to action - in this case legalistic culture - are cognitive and normative 
elements immanent in institutions and leading to ‘institutional inertia’. Culturalist 
theory submits that massive counterforces are needed to dislodge inertia. Consistent 
with these postulates (and with common sense), the works of Capano (2003) and 
Panozzo (2000) do not rule out policy change. However, and here we switch to a 
difference with IP in terms of ontology, the type of change that can be seized through 
their lens is a “change of paradigm, conceived in terms of the deep transformation of all 
the constitutive elements of a public policy - goals, strategies and programs as well as 
policy tools” (Capano 2003, 783). I have briefly discussed this in the introduction, but I 
would like to highlight that this definition clearly points to ‘macro-patterns of cultural 
routines’ (Schmidt 2006, 2010) to the exclusion of individual action which, as emerges 
from the analysis of my cases, could in fact determine change by infringing upon the 
cultural norm. In denying explanatory power to social mechanisms explicitly activated 
by individuals, the scholarship on administrative traditions ends up portraying ‘action 
without agents’ (Hall and Taylor 1996, 954) or even ‘structures without agents’ 
(Schmidt 2010, 51).  
Second, we have sought answers to our questions in different ways. The corpus 
of data of the two exemplary works on administrative traditions in Italy draws on pieces 
of legislation (Panozzo 2000, but see also Lippi 2000) complemented with a few policy 
reports (Capano 2003)78. In the introduction I have discussed the rationale for including 
78 Capano (2003) relies on the analysis of five policy documents - three authored by the very policy 
entrepreneur (Bassanini), and two issued by the Public Administration Department – to challenge the 
paradigmatic novelty of the reforms. The study identifies a mismatch between the strong conviction of 
policy entrepreneurs that they were bringing about an historical break with the past and the ‘reality’ of a 
substantial continuity between concepts portrayed as novel and pre-existing pieces of legislation. Panozzo 
compares pieces of legislation on managerial control in Italy. He states upfront that the study is focused 
on the “conditions of possibility for reform rather than evaluating outcomes or impacts” (2000, 358). 
Similarly, Capano asserts “we should be looking for the organizational and functional principles 
underlying this reform process rather than the yet unclear results of the reform itself” (2003, 788). 
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interviews to gain first-hand testimony from direct participants and witnesses of the 
policy making process. Here I am not contending that interviewees should necessarily 
contribute to corpus construction in qualitative research (Bauer and Gaskell 2000) on 
policy making. I would argue however that their complete absence may preclude the 
“access to consciousness of actors” (Martin 1986, 131), thus preventing scholars that 
search for paradigmatic changes through the exclusive analysis of official documents, a 
more ‘agentic’ understanding of policy making. We may conclude that the 
epistemological differences between these two perspectives are also reflected in the 
methodological choices. 
In this section, I have compared the three policy episodes that compose this 
collection around two main analytical components, namely policy entrepreneurship and 
context. For each component, I have provided a brief synthesis of the empirical 
evidence and then relate this to the relevant theoretical debates. I am now going to 
conclude the thesis by distilling key insights from this comparative exercise and by 
acknowledging the limitations of both the chosen framework and my own analysis in 
light of the findings79.  
 
Concluding remarks  
The role of entrepreneurship in policy change has received attention and recognition by 
a large scholarship (Ackrill and Kay 2011; Balla 2001; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 
Kingon 1984; Mintrom 1997, 2000; Mintrom and Norman 2009; Mintrom and Vergari 
1996). From these studies emerges a widely felt tension. On the one hand, it has been 
acknowledged that, behind any instance of change, there are individuals that act as a 
driving force. Correspondingly, there have been calls to shift the unit of analysis from 
 
79 I do not repeat here the individual contribution of each of the three empirical chapters as a stand-alone 
piece nor the general limitations of the framework discussed in the introductory chapter.  
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members of ongoing collective action processes to individuals that shape the agenda 
and introduce new knowledge to policy sectors (Dudley et al. 2000). On the other hand, 
accounting for personal motives and behaviours is likely to appear idiosyncratic, and 
“idiosyncrasy does not offer propitious ground for theorization” (Mintrom and Norman 
2009, 651).  
My analysis has identified different analytical elements of entrepreneurship. 
Some are mostly volitional such as ‘framing’ and ‘building a team’; some are 
predominantly situational such as ‘attribution of opportunity’ and ‘institutional origin in 
the policy stream’; others can be located between situation and context, such as in the 
case of ‘actor certification’. Spelling out these analytical elements allows us to breach 
the theoretical impasse and respond to the call for a study of entrepreneurship attentive 
to “contextual factors, to individual actions within those contexts and to how context 
shaped such action” (Mintrom and Norman 2009, 651).   
Next, all three policy episodes I analyzed unfold in Italy. Specific features of the 
country’s administrative and political landscape have allowed me to further develop the 
analytical bearing of the selected framework in three respects. The fact that policy 
entrepreneurs are experts coming from policy communities creates an osmotic effect 
between the policy and political streams. There is widespread agreement that 
interdependencies between streams are one of the main aspects of the MSF still 
overlooked (Capano 2009; John 2003; Nowlin 2011; Real-Dato 2009; Zahariadis 2007). 
My analysis has not been structured as a systematic investigation of the institutionalized 
connections between the streams. However, I have been able to explore that by virtue of 
their professional experience, actors belonging to the political stream (i.e. Ministers) 
engage in the activities that Kingdon exclusively attributes to the experts and academics 
that inhabit the policy stream: gathering data, conducting studies, drafting and polishing 
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proposals. In other words, they actively participate in the alternative specification phase 
and in doing so, two separate mechanisms of policy-making are conflated: the selling of 
ideas to and the selection of ideas by policymakers (Ackrill et al. 2013). In a political 
context characterized by frequent government turnovers, this conflation may be the 
condicio sine qua non for an effective entrepreneurship.  
This leads us to the second feature of the Italian context with potential analytical 
relevance. I am referring here to the interaction between entrepreneurship and frequent 
government turnovers, including ‘technical governments’ whose members are aware of 
the short-term duration of their mandate. Looking at that interaction allows us to cast 
some light on the nature of the policy window, and in particular at its width, an element 
that to date remains under-theorized (Ackrill and Kay 2011, Ackrill et al. 2013; Natali 
2004). Policy entrepreneurship in these cases is bound by the short-term time-pressured 
political agenda, and ‘political feasibility’ (Kingdon 1984) ends up being conceived 
mostly in terms of temporal feasibility. In other words, we see entrepreneurs and their 
staff adjusting to the unnatural width of the window in two ways. They “filter out the 
more difficult or demanding aspects on the change agenda and focus on the more 
readily doable, programmable or internally valued aspects” (Lodge and Hood 2002, 4). 
They transpose already existing initiatives to tackle new problems, thus building on the 
“comparative certainty of known institutions and contacts to reduce uncertainty” 
(Genshel 1997, 59).   
Last, in this chapter I have engaged with the notion of legalism and with its 
implications for policy change, or lack thereof. The analysis of my cases afforded by IP 
does not deny the influence of this relevant feature of the Italian administrative 
landscape. However, it uncovers dynamics through which successful entrepreneurs find 
their way through the hurdles of a legalistic culture. One such dynamic is the interplay 
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between framing and legalism, enacted when entrepreneurs strategically frame issues 
and initiatives to remove them from legal procedures. Interestingly, in the original 
administrative setting of the MSF, entrepreneurs struggle to move an issue from the 
technical to the political agenda. The analysis of my cases set in the Italian 
administrative context shows that effective entrepreneurship, more often than not, 
entails efforts to move issues in the opposite direction. Overall, these considerations 
provide analytical and empirical ammunitions to the postulate of Mintrom and Norman 
(2009), according to which, when a range of contextual factors appear to reduce the 
likelihood of change occurring, the actions of effective policy entrepreneurs could be 
decisive” (2009, 651). 
In the introduction of the thesis, I devoted a section to discuss the limitations of 
the theoretical framework and of the research design. Here I am going to briefly present 
two interrelated limitations in light of my own findings. The first is a bias in case 
selection. The three cases, in fact, are not representative of the population of policy 
cycles in their own domain. Consistently with the research strategy of the IP, the criteria 
for selecting these cases as ‘instances of a process’ have included their analytically 
interesting features more than their being representative of policy developments in a 
certain sector. It might be also noted that the setting for surprising cases seems to be a 
common scholarly posture in studies of public policy. In the words of Lodge (2007, 
275) “comparative public policy is about questioning stereotypes by exploring 
somewhat paradoxical or counterintuitive developments”. In my case, however, I do not 
compare my policy episodes with foreign experiences in the same policy domain. Nor 
do I compare, within the Italian setting, cases selected to reveal systematically different 
levels of political salience or legal enactment, as I have recently done with a co-author 
(Mele and Ongaro 2014). This bias in case selection has two main consequences. 
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Lacking a proper comparative design, the surprise generated by the cases, be it the 
persistence of the issue on the agenda or the approval of a contentious proposal, risks to 
remain an end in itself instead of catering to a full-fledged variation-finding enterprise. 
Moreover, this approach to case selection matched with the focus on the pre-decisional 
phase and with a scarce attention to the content of change, weakens the potential of my 
analysis to contribute significantly to current policy debates on the Italian public 
administration reform or public policy change in healthcare. A mid-term goal of my 
research strategy includes amending these limitations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
178 
 
 ANNEXES 
Annex 1 
An example of research schematics: Government innovation policy in Italy (1993-2002)  
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A. EVENT STRUCTURE 
 
The Innovation in government policy cycle (1993-2002) 
 
E1 “Projects for change” (1993-1994) 
E-1-1 Setting the agenda for Public Administration Innovation 
E-1-1-1 Emerging and ascending of Government Innovation as a policy issue 
E-1-1-2 Campaigning for issue visibility and status 
 
E-1-2 Developing “Projects for Change” 
E-1-2-1 Drafting a report on the conditions on the Italian Public Administration and the Guidelines for 
P.A. modernization. 
E-1-2-2 Gathering ideas from innovative local administrations  
E-1-2-3 Gathering ideas from foreign top civil servants (Ministerial visit to the UK) 
E-1-2-4 Negotiating with the Finance Ministry 
E-1-2-5 Readapting an initiative previously approved (Imposing a new discipline on a 1986 initiative for 
gaining productivity and experimenting public procedures)  
 
E-1-3 Finalizing and launching “Projects for Change” 
E-1-3-1 Deciding to include the initiative in the Italian Economic Plan (1993) 
E-1-3-2 Launching publicly the initiative among Central and Local administrations(1994) 
 
E-1-4 Managing organization transitions within the public management policy subsystem-  
E-1-4-1Reorganizing the Ministry for Public Administration 
E-1-4-2 Building a team of external experts 
 
E2 “Programmatic Projects for change”(1996-1999) 
E-2-1 Setting the agenda for Public Administration Innovation 
E-2-1-1 Reviving the issue of government innovation 
E-2-1-2 Including the issue of government innovation to the wider programme for reforming public 
administration 
E-2-1-3 Repackaging the issue in terms of decentralization, simplification and managerial innovation in 
1997 
 
E-2-2 Developing “Programmes for Change”  
E-2-2-1 Assessing the results of the current Projects for change 
E-2-2-2 Gathering ideas with external academic experts 
E-2-2-3 Gathering ideas with high-ranking civil service officials 
 
E-2-3 Finalizing and launching Programmes for Change 
E-2-3-1 Starting and completing the decisional process 
E-2-3-2 Launching publicly the initiative among Central and Local administrations (1999) 
 
E-2-4 Managing organization transitions within the public management policy subsystem 
E-2-4-1 Naming a Scientific Committee for evaluating the “Projects for Change” 
E-2-4-2 Building a team of local civil servants and academic experts and assigning responsibility for the 
new initiative 
 
E3 “Constructions sites for change” (2000-2002) 
E-3-1 Setting the agenda for Public Administration Innovation 
E-3-1-2 Maintaining the issue as a priority (2001 election) 
E-3-1-3 Extending the issue to include bottom-up initiatives and knowledge management 
 
E-3-2 Developing Construction sites for change 
E-3-2-1 Gathering ideas from OECD PUMA members 
E-3-2-2 Gathering ideas from external experts 
E-3-2-3 Establishing consultation channels (with the Italian Industry Association, with the Unified State-
Regions Conference and with the National Association of Italian Municipalities) 
E-3-2-4 Establishing synergies with the Italian Institute for Public Administration Training and Studies 
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E-3-3 Finalizing and launching Construction sites for change 
E-3-3-1 Starting and completing the decisional process 
E-3-3-2 Launching publicly the initiative among Central and Local administrations (2002) 
 
E-3-4 Managing organization transitions within the public management policy subsystem 
E-3-4-1 Reorganizing the Ministry for PA to include an Office for Innovation 
E-3-1-2 Building/confirming the team 
 
 
 
Previous Events 
PE1 Public Administration reform Policy cycle (1861-1990) 
 PE1-1 The reform decade of the neo-Constitution (1948-1957) 
 PE1-2 The planning and efficiency decade (1961-1972) 
 PE1-3 The Giannini Commissions (1973-1979) 
 PE1-4 The 1990 Reforms on transparency and Local Authonomy 
 
PE2 Referendum for the Majoritarian System Voting (1991) 
PE3 Bribesville-public unveiling of widespread corruption practices (1992) 
PE4 Currency crisis (1992) 
 
Contemporaneous Events 
1993-1994 
CE1 1993 Referenda on Public Administration Functioning 
CE2 Currency devaluation (1993) 
CE3 Direct election of the Mayor (1993) 
1994-2001 
CE4 Political crisis first Berlusconi Executive (1994) and Transitional Executive (1995) 
CE5 First Italian Left Executive (1996) 
CE6 Joining EMU (1997) 
CE7 Comprehensive Public Administration Reform on Simplification and Decentralization (1997) 
CE8 Political turbulence (1998, 1999, 2000 Executive Reshuffling) 
CE9 Political elections and new Berlusconi Government 
 
Related Events 
RE1 Policy cycle on Transparency/Simplification in Public administration (1990, 1993, 1997) 
RE2 Policy cycle on the devolution of powers to local and regional administrations (1992, 1997, 2001) 
RE3 Policy cycle on strengthening government-citizens connections (1990, 1993, 1997, 2000) 
RE4 Policy cycle on Information Technology in Public Administration (1993, 1997, 2000, 2001) 
RE5 Policy cycle on economic planning (Including the Public Administration Minister in the 
Economic Planning phase) 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The Innovation in government policy cycle (1993-2002) 
A Question:  
A   What are the process dynamics of public management reform and how does the context affect them? 
A1 What have been the process dynamics of public management reform in Italy? [Keyed to A] 
B1 What makes public management reformers effective, in Italy? [Keyed to A1] 
 
B2 Questions 
LINKED TO THE E1, E2, E3 AS A WHOLE 
B2-1 Why did a public service delivery change program take root in Italy's governmental system and 
become progressive element of the country's strategy of public management reform in the 1990s and 
2000s? [Keyed to E1, E2, E3. Keyed to A1-1] 
 
B2-1-2 Why did it turn out to be a stable item on the agenda of public management reform in Italy 
(despite party system and Cabinet instability)? [Keyed to B2-1] [Keyed to E-1-1, E-2-1, E-3-1, CE4, CE5, 
CE8, CE9] 
 
B2-1-3 Why did this program become a progressive (rather than decaying or static) element of the 
country's strategy of public management reform? [Keyed to B2-1] [Keyed to E2-1-2, E2-1-3, E3-1-2, E3-
1-3] 
 
The Innovation in public sector policy cycle (1993-2002) 
“Projects for change” (1993-1994) 
Agenda setting: issue inclusion, issue image and issue status 
B2-3 Why did innovation in public administration emerge as an issue in the early nineties while the 
governmental agenda was congested?  [Keyed to B2-1 and A1-1-2]  [Keyed to E-1-1-1, E-1-1-4] 
 
B2-3-1 What explains the inclusion of innovation in public administration in the governmental agenda of 
the technical government in 1993? [Keyed to B2-3 and A1-1-2] [Keyed to E-1-1-1, E.1.1.4] 
B2-3-2 Why was the issue packaged as instrumental to austerity measures in 1993?  
[Keyed to B2-3] [Keyed to E-1-1-3, CE2] 
 
Developing programmes for innovation 
B2-4 Why did an innovative proposal about Projects for Change come to be supported within the 
community of interest formed to develop it? [Keyed to B-2-1, B2-1-3] [Keyed to E-1-1-2, E.1.2.1, 
E-1-2-2] 
 
Finalizing and launching programmes for innovation 
B2-5 Why did the quality of participation by the reformer (Cassese) affect the practices trajectory? 
[Keyed to B-2-1, B2-1-3]  [Keyed to E-1-3-1, E.1.3.2] 
B-2-5-1 What explains that quality of participation? [B2-5] 
  
“Programs for change”(1996-1999) 
Agenda setting: issue inclusion, issue image and issue status 
B2-6 Why was the issue of innovation in public administration revived by in 1997? [Keyed to B-2-1, 
B2-1-3]  [Keyed to E-2-1-1, E-2-1-2, E-2-1-3] 
 
B2-7 Why did the issue of innovation in public administration change status but remain on the agenda 
despite the Executive turnover in 1994 and 1995? [Keyed to B2-1] [Keyed to CE4, CE5,] 
 
B2-8 How was it repackaged in terms of decentralization, simplification and managerial innovation in 
1997? [Keyed to B2-1] [Keyed to RE1, RE2, RE3] 
 
Developing programmes for change 
B2-9 What changes in the process design features are observed? [Keyed to B2-1-3] [Keyed to E-2-1-4, 
E-2-1-5] 
B2-9-1 Why did such changes occur? [Keyed to B2-1-3] [Keyed to E-2-2-1, E-2-2-3, E-2-2-4] 
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B2-10 How did agenda stability operate as part of a configuration of factors explaining these changes?  
[Keyed to B2-1-3], and how did the programs' dynamics contribute to agenda stability? [Keyed to B2-1-
3] 
 
B2-11 Why did an innovative proposal about Programmatic Projects for Change come to be supported 
within the community of interest formed to develop it? [Keyed to B2-1, B2-1-3] [Keyed to CE7, E-
2-1-2, E.2.1.4, E-2-1-5] 
 
Finalizing and launching programmes for change 
B2-12 Why did the quality of participation by the reformers (Bassanini, Marconi) affect the practices 
trajectory? [Keyed to B-2-1, B2-1-3]  [Keyed to E-2-3-1, E.2.3.2] 
B2.12-1 What explains that quality of participation? 
 
“Constructions sites for change” (2000-2002) 
Agenda setting: issue inclusion, issue image and issue status 
B2-13 Why did the issue remained in the government agenda despite the change in the Executive and 
the need to signal new priorities? [Keyed to B2-1 and A1-1-2] [Keyed to CE8, CE9] 
 
B2-14 How was it repackaged in terms of bottom-up innovation? [Keyed to B2-1-1] [Keyed to E-3-1-3, 
RE2, RE4] 
 
B2-15 Why was it included in the agenda despite the fact it scored low in the electoral programme? 
[Keyed to B2-1 and A1-1-2] [Keyed to E-3-1-4] 
 
Developing programmes for innovation 
B2-16 What changes in the process design features are observed? [Keyed to B2-1-3] [Keyed to E-3-1-3] 
B2-17 Why did such changes occur? [Keyed to B2-1-3] [Keyed to E-3-2-1, E-3-2-2, E-3-2-3, E-3-2-4] 
 
B2-18 How did agenda stability operate as part of a configuration of factors explaining these changes? 
and How did the programs' dynamics contribute to agenda stability? [Keyed to B2-1-3] 
 
B2-19 Why did an innovative proposal about Cantieri come to be supported within the community of 
interest formed to develop it? [Keyed to B2-1, B2-1-3] [Keyed to RE2, E-3-1-4] 
 
Finalizing and launching programmes for innovation 
B2-20 Why did the new Executive launch a Programme which was rooted in the efforts of its 
predecessors?  
B2-21 Why did the quality of participation by the reformer (Frattini, Marconi) affect the practices 
trajectory? [Keyed to B-2-1, B2-1-3]  [Keyed to E-3-3-1, E.3.3.2] 
B2-21-1 What explains that quality of participation? [Keyed to E-3-1-3, E-3-2-1, RE3, RE2 ] 
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Annex 2: 
List and background of the interviewees for each chapter 
 
 Chapter 1 
Innovation in government 
(17 interviewees) 
Chapter 2 
Electronic government 
(20 interviewees) 
Chapter 3 
Smoking ban 
(15 interviewees) 
Policy 
entrepreneurs 
-Prime Minister 
- Minister for Public 
Administrationɸ  
-Prime Minister; 
-Minister for Public 
Administrationɸ; 
-President of the authority for 
IT in Public Administration; 
- Prime Minister 
- Minister of Health  
   
Bureaucrats -Director general of the 
PADɸ*; 
- Director of the Office for 
public personnel of the 
PAD; 
-5 Senior officials of the 
PAD (Director of the 
Office for the relationship 
with stakeholders, Head of 
the international projects*, 
2 Officials of the Office 
for innovation in public 
sector, 1 Senior official in 
charge of the relationships 
with local 
administrations);  
-Director of the National 
Center for IT in public 
administration; 
- Director general of PADɸ; 
- Director of the office 
‘Regions and Local 
administrations’ at the 
Department for innovation 
and IT*; 
- Senior Official of PAD in 
charge of E-Government*;  
-Senior Official at the Public 
Administration Departmentɸ;  
-Senior Official at the 
Department for Innovation 
and IT; 
- 4 Senior officials at the 
MoH (Director of the 
Department ‘Prevention 
campaigns’, Responsible 
of the statistical data, Head 
of External affairs, Senior 
official at the Minister 
office) 
- Director of the National 
Center for Disease 
Prevention and Control 
- Director of the High 
Level Institute for 
Healthcare (ISS) 
- Top official at the High 
Level Institute for 
Healthcare (ISS) 
Consultants  -Consultant of the PAD, 
manager of Program for 
change; 
- 2 consultants of the PAD, 
managers of Construction 
Sites for Change; 
-3 academics/consultants 
of the PAD *;    
- 2 consultants of the PAD 
&the Department for 
Innovation and IT in charge of 
innovative ICT projects; 
- 3 academics also consultants 
or the E-Government Projects;  
- Member of the High 
Council for Healthcare, in 
charge of the technical 
criteria for the creation of 
smoking areas in 
restaurants and pubs and  
 
 
Relevant 
external 
stakeholders 
-President of Forum 
Public Administration, a 
think tank with an annual 
conference;   
- Responsible of the Unit 
‘Public Affairs’ within the 
Italian Industry 
Association. 
- 3 top managers of large IT 
vendors (IBM Italia, Oracle 
Italia and Microsoft Italia) in 
charge of the public 
administration units/public 
affairs; 
-3 bureaucrats of local 
administrations (Modena, 
Siena and Reggio Emilia) 
carrying out Electronic 
Government pilot projects 
funded from PAD. 
- Regional Top official, 
coordinator of all Italian 
Regions in the State-
Regions Joint Panel at 
MoH. 
- The Director and  the 
President of the Italian 
Tobacco Association, chief 
editors of “Tabaccologia” 
-  2 medical scientists and 
epidemiologists, authors of 
the international scientific 
literature on smoking 
attitudes in Italy. 
 
PAD = Public Administration Department 
MoH = Ministry of Health 
*The interviewee has been interviewed twice on this policy cycle 
ɸThe interviewee has been interviewed for both policy cycles (Innovation and E-gov), though in two 
separate interviews 
  
184 
 
Annex 3 
Table with the executive turnover and the ministers of the three policy cycles80  
Period 
(legislatures) 
Executive turnover 
(Prime Ministers) 
PA Ministers IT Ministers Health Ministers 
1992-1996 Amato (6/92-4/93)81 
Ciampi (4-93-5/94) 
Berlusconi (5-94-1/95) 
Dini (1/95-5/96) 
 
Cassese (4-93-5/94) 
Urbani (5-94-1/95) 
Frattini (1/95-5/96) 
  
1996-2001 Prodi (5/96-10/98) 
D’Alema (10/98-
12/99)  
D’Alema II (12/99-
4/2000) 
Amato II (4/00-6/01) 
Bassanini (5/96-10/98) 
Piazza (10/98-12/99) 
Bassanini (12/99-4/00) 
Bassanini (4/00-6/01) 
  
 
 
 
 
Veronesi (4/2000-
6/2001) 
2001-2005 Berlusconi II (6/01-
4/05) 
 
Frattini (6/01-11/02) 
 
 
 
 
Stanca (6/01-4/05) 
 
 
 
Sirchia (6/2001-
4/2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
80 I have marked in bold the policy entrepreneurs that are included in the analsysis of the three policy 
episodes. 
81 In the first cycle of the E-government policy cycle, the first policy entrepreneurs is the Prime Minister 
Amato who set the idea of the Agency. This transitional governmentis short-lived and followed by 
another transitional government where the entrepreneur of E-government is the Minister of Public 
Administration.  
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